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# CROSS CROSSES

A QUARTERLY REVIEW  
*to explore the implications  
of Christianity for our times*

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CULLMANN • DANIÉLOU • LECLERCQ

PERROUX • BENNETT • LÉONARD • MORREN

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# FROM THE AVARICE OF NATIONS TO AN ECONOMY FOR MANKIND

FRANCOIS PERROUX

**M**ODERN ECONOMICS, born with the industrial revolution, has been at work for almost two hundred and fifty years. Its present results, judged on a planetary scale and from the standpoint of the entire human race, are extremely second-rate. For half of mankind is still subject to an infra-human economy.

Weighed down with death, sickness and ignorance they are like hunted beasts. Developed, semi-developed and under-developed regions contain respectively, one fifth, less than a sixth, and two thirds of the world's population. The average annual per capita income of the first group is \$461 (US dollars), that of the second 154, and of the third 41 US dollars.<sup>1</sup> If we assume that average income has meaning on a world-wide scale we will very probably find that it has decreased since 1913. Though it has rapidly increased in the developed group there has been very little increase in the under-privileged area. Also, the number of under-privileged has grown swiftly in relation to the more favored group in the total population.<sup>2</sup> The world is very unequally poor, but it is poor.

Life, health and the disposition to knowledge are cruelly measured by "our" standards. The life-expectancy at birth which is sixty or more years in the United States, Germany and the United Kingdom, is about thirty-nine years for Brazil, thirty-seven for Mexico and twenty-seven for India. The general mortality rate which is a little below nine out of every one thousand inhabitants of the more advanced countries, exceeds twenty in Mexico, Chile, Ceylon and India. The infant mortality rate in India is 136 out of every thousand, in Ceylon 141, 153 in Egypt and 160 in Chile. Three hundred out of every thousand deaths in India and the Philippines result from tuberculosis. In China and Indonesia the rate is 450 per thousand.<sup>3</sup>

More than 75% of the inhabitants of Turkey, Egypt and India are illiterate, and in Mexico, Peru, Venezuela and Brazil more than 50%.<sup>4</sup> As a general rule human deterioration concurs with very low economic standards. Approximately two-thirds of the world's population lives in dread of hunger while 46% of the so-called free world consumes 2,000 calories a day, 20% less than the 2,550 F.A.O. minimum.<sup>5</sup>

The other half of the world stands out by its relative prosperity.

It will probably be observed that averages conceal concrete suffering. Before this war 25 million inhabitants of the United States and 15 million per-

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sons living in Great Britain were under-nourished.<sup>6</sup> Accurate American and English statistics definitely show an increase in mortality and morbidity concurrent to a decrease in income among the various social classes.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, sickness attacks even the most fortunate. In 1949 medical and hospital care represented 5% of the U.S.'s total income. In the same country annual losses suffered by untimely death, disablement and brief illness can be estimated at \$8 billion dollars.<sup>8</sup>

It is in these hardly brilliant conditions that Man adjusts his resources to his basic needs. The diagnosis would be less disturbing if he could be assured of possessing an excellent but merely slow or retarded system. But there exists, on the contrary, powerful reasons for doubting the system's competence.

Its first tendency is to brutalize and sterilize nature. Modern economy lays both animal and vegetable species to waste, and is very much the cause of soil erosion and exhaustion. It pursues a destructive program in North and South America, in Asia, Africa and to a lesser degree in Western Europe. As F. Osborn stoutly put it: "Nature is in no position to give us a blank cheque in our quest for profit." The maximum distribution of resources and employment through the price-mechanism and the play of individual decisions appears as a bitter mockery to whoever looks at the total and long-term effects. The entrepreneur and the merchant destroy forests, waste natural resources and show themselves as disrespectful of animal and plant life as of human existence.<sup>9</sup> When a conservation program is finally decided upon it is due to the limited, belated and precarious wisdom of an elite and certainly not to the free workings of the market. F. Bastiat's "natural harmonies" seem indeed to have lost much of their beneficent and esthetic efficiency.

Without any deep-rooted solidarity, a very cowardly and vulgar interdependence has been instituted among groups by modern economics. Means of communication between men have multiplied so that events in one section of the globe resound all over the world. Yet, the achievements of the prevailing economies are far from being automatically beneficial to subject systems. Without conscious and deliberate action these deadly inequalities would not only be preserved but continue to grow. Alarming disorders which no *laissez-faire* sets right manifest themselves. Today the global population is 10% more than what it was before the Second World War. In 1947-48 calorie rations per person (on a world-wide level) were still 5 to 10% lower than pre-war standards.<sup>10</sup> Since 1938 industrial output has increased 50% while the production of raw materials and food products has increased a mere ten per cent. Though half of the world still does not eat its fill and lives in great misery,<sup>11</sup> official economists already foresee, barring war, over-production and a crisis in trade.

Finally, and this is undoubtedly the most remarkable point, a century and a half of scientific discussion and very intensive intellectual endeavour, have not enabled humanity to formulate an economic system, intelligible to everyone, on which leaders might agree. The Soviet standard floats over 20% of the earth's surface, while the other 76% is rallied to the United Nations' banner. Thirty-one per cent of the world's population is officially committed to unstinted planning while sixty-nine per cent favours the combination of a market-economy with flexible-planning.<sup>12</sup> The menace of annihilation should

hasten us towards an efficient and non-doctrinaire economy. There is indeed a widespread yearning for such economics but the methods for achieving it have neither been found nor attempted. Forgetful of basic things, mankind dedicates itself to vast and minute preparation for fratricide. Neither logical nor practical evidence seems to dispose man to adopt a basic economy judged by results, largely independent of special types of organization, wholesomely distrustful of misleading orthodoxies.

Such is, briefly, the balance-sheet of modern economics, which sprang from the application of science and technology to problems of man's material existence.

**W**ESTERNERS FIND THIS a surprising and shocking statement because, consciously or not, they are imbued with a spirit which proceeds from national avarice;<sup>13</sup> and it is in this perspective that they judge economic thought and activity. The term "national avarice" is used here in a very precise sense and denotes a behaviour which is summed up by two characteristics.

The national output of a country benefits only its nationals. Just as an individual enjoys the fruits of his labours and is considered within his rights to isolate *what he produces* and just as he obtains and employs it by applying the rule of nothing for nothing, it is admitted that it is always easy to isolate the nation's output, and that since it has been laboriously brought into being, its exchange must also be made difficult. An outsider is devoid of the least right to enjoy the most minute portion of it. Thus, the order of individual property becomes analogous to collective national property. This social belief would seem solidly grounded in common sense as long as experience does not impose recognition of the difficulty of isolating the product of a nation in the same manner as that of an individual, and that neither the creation nor distribution of national income is fully accounted for by pure exchange, and that extreme hardships during or after a war, or in a peaceful period of history explain, at the same time as they justify, the benevolent transfer of the national output to men foreign to the nation. We are little disposed to recognize this. It is considered sane and prudent to treat such new ideas as strictly limited, exceptional and temporary deviations.

Furthermore, within its own borders each nation will apply a supposedly neutral and objective formula for increasing production.<sup>14</sup> Through the price mechanism, its resources are distributed in the best possible fashion. Capital is brought to a maximum by un-coerced savings, given rigorous orientation by relative taxes on profits. The limitless decrease in wages and employment re-establishes, by means of misery, deterioration and eventually death, the equilibrium between supply and demand for labour. Each individual is entitled to the fruits of his own efforts and no more; in exchange for his products he receives money or goods. To give away part of the fruits of another person's labours would be dangerous and insane. This is the reasoning which constructs homes in which the weak suffer and die while real and monetary capital accumulate.

There are then, two qualities in national avarice. It gives nothing for nothing. It sacrifices life for things.

It is much more virulent than individual avarice because the most liberal of nations is endowed with a State which exercises the monopoly of legalized violence. The police, marines, the fleet and sometimes even spiritual forces are mobilized for the establishment or modification of so-called political frameworks within which merchants can carry on their business, because even the most liberal nations draw all possible advantage from a kind of collective transfiguration or moralization of greed when it may be called national. Earning for oneself is respectable; earning for one's nation is a pious work. To stone a worker, or thrash a Negro or Oriental is sometimes cruel as a requirement for a firm's equilibrium, but to do so in the name of one's country is deemed an act of realistic politics. It is never pleasant to see someone suffer, but suffering is lost in the numerical averages, and statistics of corpses are not shown on an increasing curve averaging total revenue. The mercantile glories of the 19th and 20th centuries help us forget the wounds of the ghettos and the shame of colonial establishments. Entire peoples, working-classes included, celebrate in good faith victories of national greed. The roots of a false confusion of the actions of some Europeans and Westerners with the economic progress of mankind need be sought no further.

This ever-recurring, listlessly repulsed, illusion is now being painfully besieged by facts. More attentive people are being shown how economic progress based on perfection is already unfolding in contrast to technological and commercial advancements. The Economics of humanity, "the patriotism of the Species" which the great Hournon dared propound, are indeed phrases that make us smile. But there are no other terms to describe clearly the revolution at work in the world. Let us not deceive ourselves. Economics of self-interest is shaken and beginning to give away to a system based on the *whole man and on all men*.

One would like to hasten, however little, an awareness of this transformation<sup>15</sup> by making three leading propositions understandable.

1. Twentieth-century economic reckoning has seen an irresistible and undeniable emergence of human costs. Poor and wealthy countries alike are faced with defraying the costs of human life.<sup>16</sup>

2. National avarice still creeps into the formulation of development programs, but in the preparations for war and re-armament it employs for works of death the same methods it could and should use for works of life.

3. The economy of Service on a world-wide scale, the only one that from a human perspective one may follow out to the end, has already summarily discovered the frame-works, institutions and procedures requisite for its efficiency.

#### **THE EMERGENCE OF HUMAN COSTS: TWO PARTS OF HUMANITY CONFRONT THE COSTS OF MEN**

**“T**HE LIVING MASS IS SACRED," wrote Henri Barbusse. The world-wide dimensions of the task and its basically religious character are thus evoked with concise force.

Here are the mass of living men. Economics does not permit each of them a scientifically possible hope of life, of battling against sickness, or a minimum access to knowledge. A public authority—we are *not* saying a national State—makes use of methods suitable for covering the costs which allow the working out of these three conditions which are now lacking. It bears the principal costs of the human condition of life.<sup>17</sup> More briefly (and except for special cases), it covers *human costs*.

This is essentially a simple attitude. Among living men, some are able to pay these elementary costs out of their current income or from their reserves; others cannot. An authority pays on behalf of the second group; it incorporates into the general costs of the group these *antecedent costs* which at their source are also independent of the total product. Some of these expenses, such as those which go to the incurably diseased, or to children who die before becoming producers, never increase real income. Others will powerfully increase real income, but by ways and over periods which are difficult to determine with precision, like those who help in the recuperation of energy for work, who raise the potential productivity of workers, or who develop the creative capacity of minds.

The first of these two groups is the more characteristic. It gives us an assurance that humanity is beginning to have greater respect for itself. It is an obvious repudiation of that economic doctrine which is oblivious of any action which does not result in material recompense. This implies a specific risk; if "civilization ends in the degradation of the species" (Charles Richet), and if the absence of civilization reduces man to an almost animal state, human economy menaced by the crowd of those who are not yet men, and the throng that is in danger of being men no longer, meets its particular difficulty. It must be all together wise and generous, and demonstrate all that the mind adds to the heart, while taking nothing away from it. This tension which transforms the very *meaning* of economics is a powerful stimulus of perfection defined beyond all the measurements of economic progress drawn from criteria related to average yield, to characteristic material structure, and rates of increase in the supply of goods.

These human costs have been conceived in Western societies as antecedent costs of salaried and dependent labor, or more concretely, of work performed in a factory.<sup>18</sup> Industrialization imposed this preliminary outline. Still human costs are not reducible to the costs antecedent to the maintenance of workers; they go beyond the circle of industrial workers, they concern every human being whatsoever because he is a human being and not because he is engaged in a determined activity. Nowadays they are of interest to enormous masses of human beings who have neither the practice nor the vaguest notion of work in a factory, but who die, suffer, and remain in ignorance. Westerners have understood human costs as a result of their experience with modern industry; but these costs go beyond all types of organization and every specific philosophy: they flow from the elementary relations between man and his environment.

Moreover, there are only disadvantages in confusing these costs with what are called social costs or the costs of Social Security.<sup>20</sup> These expressions, which

have an obviously precise meaning, suggest institutions which although they may have eventually outgrown it, were originally linked with salaried work and dependent on the factory. One might still believe, wrongly but in good faith, that Social Security is a collection of institutions of various classes or categories. Besides, the organism and procedures of social security are defined by nations; they are the object of a debate in which the avarice of nations, both internal and external, is revealed. A level of social security is one aspect, among others, of the preferential advantages that national groups hope to reserve for themselves. Quite different in its direction and dynamism is the policy which aims at settling man's accounts on the level of the Species and by appropriate means. This policy alone brings about an alteration in the central aim of modern economics.

The difference merits all the more attention since one of the principal difficulties met by an economic policy based on all of humanity consists in the gulf between economically strong nations and economically weak peoples in their common effort to meet the current expenses of man.

Human costs have progressively and gradually emerged in nations which are economically strong. A long delay of inquiries and experiences was necessary before the leaders, because of humanitarian spirit and political sense, raised the question, and before even those involved gradually felt confirmed in a right which they never dared think of at the beginning. Limited at the outset, and later enlarged—the achievements still leave large segments of the population, those that have suffered least or those with least political strength, untouched. The raising of living standards suggests and allows for the intensification and refinement of the methods employed. On the whole, the relatively comfortable poverty and the relatively tolerable misery of Westerners stands out against the great collective sufferings of entire continents. Of course, this does not mean that it has been possible to eliminate the centers of sub-human economy even from the humanly progressive economies. In these efforts the latter are faced with the losses involved in the transition period between an unbridled capitalism and a humane capitalism: the experience is undertaken without the systematic pursuit of surplus-production, and before the new motives of collective effort can assure the easing of pressures formerly exercised by social fear. Besides, the fact of aging populations in the advanced economies<sup>21</sup> endangers the progress that has already been made, both directly by increasing the burden involved in old age and sickness, and indirectly by a certain weakening of the inclination to action and of the spirit of initiative and enterprise.

The avarice of older nations finds, in these difficulties, a pretext to criticize and challenge the system which it opposed from the very beginning and in every phase of its development. It is prolific in arguments calculated to cast doubt, at every turning, on the possibility of meeting human costs. These internal antagonisms are perfectly amenable to a tacit agreement of members of the nation on a sort of unarmed protectionism directed against all outside advances, be they in the form of a vigorous competition or a call to collective action, which would endanger the standard of living of the whole nation or a segment of the nation.

In economically weak countries, the dynamism of human costs and the hostile reaction of national avarice take on a completely different form. There is such a great effort to be made that the leaders are discouraged. New-born nations, only too familiar with the abuses of foreign initiative and capital, view with suspicion even indispensable outside assistance. The difficulties are increased by the lack of social conscience in feudal or semi-feudal classes, political disturbances, and the losses suffered during the transition from one class to another. The avarice of the new-born nation, which is often forced to assume a State mercantilism, is translated by an aloofness to a wider solidarity, and an egoistic concentration on the recently discovered possibility of an autonomous future. This avarice finds too many pretexts in the difficult equilibrium which must be effected between the additional mouths to be fed and the painfully won surplus of production.

Whether the economies are strong or weak, nations have their own individual forms of avarice and resistance to the progressive accomplishment of an economy for mankind. Both want to defray their living costs as much as possible and are thus prevented from cooperation which might not be salutary.

This emergence of human costs is an event which will probably assume an importance in man's history comparable to the abolition of slavery. The resistance in both cases comes from those who benefited from the abuses, those who can not imagine the future, and from those who consider, with a disinterested prudence, that the future should have the exact precision of the "ready-made." The emergence of human costs and their increasingly clearer recognition on a broader human level produces and achieves the disappearance of the slave. They are a sign that mankind no longer accepts either the simple solution of the "struggle for life," or economic adjustments through waste of human life. No man would feel alone in a Humanity which had become fully self-respectful and which took suitable measures to serve this conversion. The most elementary and material conditions facilitating the historical possibilities for a communion among the living would be initiated. It is already a great deal that a movement has been begun, that its requirements have been stated, and that a few minds adhere to its goals. Yet if the goal is to be reached, an economics of Service must be built on a world-wide scale, once the peak of the storm is passed.

#### NATIONAL AVARICE AND THE POLICIES OF DEVELOPMENT AND REARMAMENT

**I**N THE ABSENCE of a world government or some council which would incarnate it, the leaders of the world bear full responsibility.<sup>22</sup> Everything depends on their vigor and the shock that they can communicate to the masses. Will man show himself capable, in the middle of the 20th century, of renouncing killing in order to protect and increase life? Will human reason and the will to live win out over the hardened avarice of nations? Will men attempt to measure their differences as well as their underlying brotherhood by the concrete means of a collective undertaking?

The development programs are insufficient for the task,<sup>23</sup> even if rearmament did not block them.

It is, indeed, only right to understand, first of all, the novelty and extent of these projects.

By a respectable combination of well-understood interest and idealism, the United States, the preponderant economy of the 20th century, has begun to assume the responsibilities. The official teaching there still professes that the exterior equilibrium of the economy is automatic, but practical decisions no longer reflect this orthodoxy. The world program of Mutual Aid, under the modest title of technical assistance, puts into operation the principle of mutual aid inscribed in the United Nations Charter. Europe still does not fully understand the revolutionary extent of Point Four, in the country where not so long ago Theodore Roosevelt put forward the "big stick" policy. We underestimate the resistance this generous undertaking had to overcome every day. In the Colombo Plan, Great Britain demonstrates once again her extraordinary realistic political courage and genius. Forced into a vast retreat in Asia, the economy which held sway in the 19th century groups the interests and goodwill of South and South East Asia in the regional solidarity of her Commonwealth. The Empire which shed a great deal of imperialism and survived through an alliance of political understanding and service retains all its greatness and part of its efficiency.

Both of these imposing undertakings are nevertheless handicapped by a double insufficiency.

The plans are neither set nor even rigorously co-ordinated. One remains an English project and the other an American plan. Everything takes place as though the old and pernicious doctrine of spheres of influence were still the basis of operations; and as though the dominant economy of the 19th century, and its 20th century successor, continued a secular competition in their generous political works. They appear changed, somewhat converted, but not without mental reservations and secret gardens. The white man's common response to the races of colour is not yet that of an army merely concerned with saving lives, guiding growth and atoning for past extortions.

These projects, I dare say, contain another ambiguous meaning. We are fully aware that giant lethargic economies are not aroused by words nor even by good works. Nevertheless, because of difficult circumstances and even more because of human frailty, the methods of these programs are extremely complicated. The fight against Communism interferes with the concern to stimulate transformed economies. The fervor in advancing the common good is tempered by the circumspections of capitalist interests. Could it be otherwise? But what a brake this imposes on the necessary enthusiasm!

If we hold that the chain of rearmament and war is inevitable, then only this can be said: the attempt to develop a world economy will be consumed by the mobilization of this economy for battle; and the glance cast at infant economies was merely aimed at placing them on the military operations map. The outcome can still be quite different, but it is my opinion that the emphasis should be placed elsewhere.

We are very deeply struck by two facts which contain great hope. Re-armament reveals the scope of the sacrifice Western peoples are capable of making when they deem it vital. Rearmament unfolds as a sort of dress-rehearsal of the steps which should have to be taken to establish an economy of Mankind. The extent of the effort to be put forth for life is very inferior to the effort actually being made in preparation for death. The technical questions to be solved on behalf of man's survival are the very questions which are being answered in the preparation for war. The machine which, instead of crushing, can protect man and gather in the harvest, is already set up. Weapons would become instruments.

In 1950, the national income of the United States reached some 250 billion dollars; that of all the countries of Western Europe together was about 150 billion dollars. This total income of some 400 billion dollars from the developed economies of the free world, or five times the 80 billion dollars which constitute the total of all the under-developed countries taken together,<sup>24</sup> this is the flux of annual resources we should count on either for rearming or for providing man's needs.

The total rearmament costs, very variable according to countries, are on the whole not less than some 40 billion dollars,<sup>25</sup> or 10% of the total national incomes. What would be the cost of a policy directed at rescuing man? It would, of course, depend entirely on its objectives, and contrary to what one might be entitled to believe, studies on this subject are neither numerous, precise nor systematic. There is an estimate by the United Nations which might indirectly serve our purpose for the moment.<sup>26</sup> Under numerous and complicated conditions and with an enormous margin of conjecture, the amount of capital needed annually by under-developed countries to increase their yearly per capita national revenue has been calculated: a total of 19 billion dollars was arrived at. From this must be subtracted the amount of annual saving formed in the ensemble of the countries in question, that is to say their ability to invest by tapping their own resources. In very generously setting this last amount at 9 billion dollars, it is found that some 10 billion dollars should be supplied annually by developed economies. Consequently, with a quarter of the resources employed for rearmament, the free world could increase the yearly per capita national income of under-developed countries by two per cent, and with half of the re-armament resources, it could embark on a much more ambitious policy.

Let us look at the facts from a different slant. With 10% of the total income of developed economies of the free world, a spectacular development program is arithmetically possible, which in all likelihood would far exceed the underdeveloped countries' useful capacity of absorption, and engage the governments of privileged countries in the difficult measures of allowing compensation for such production as ordinary commercial methods could not realize. With 5% of this same total income, a revolutionary and very workable program is possible; with 2.5% a moderately-paced policy can be set in motion.

Now, it will not be forgotten that in 1920, the total flow of capital into under-developed countries did not exceed 120 million dollars and that even today it is probably closer to one billion rather than one-and-one-half billion.<sup>27</sup>

Consequently, with 2.5% of the sum of national incomes, the life-saving flow of capital into under-developed countries would be increased to more than six and a half times its present amount.

It will perhaps be agreed that these figures are not without eloquence and would opportunely lay the foundations for an immediate program.<sup>28</sup> It would be important for the United Nations to present an official disarmament proposal to Soviet Russia, with assignment of a large portion of present armament expenses to a common fund for world development. This initiative, which, in spite of accumulated disappointments cannot be unworthy of a trial, is indispensable to the so-called free world's peace of mind. If it succeeds, it contains embryonically the greatest event in the history of man. Humanity on the brink of the precipice recovers its balance and transforms a terrible menace into an immense blessing.

The technical problems to be solved remain, to a considerable extent, the same.

The definition of the expense to be made is necessarily difficult and arbitrary, whether it be a question of rearmament or of collective preservation and development. The incidences are in both cases difficult to redeem and the boundaries between common and individual advantage extremely uncertain.

A too rigorous book-keeping would sterilize the effort before it could be undertaken.

In both cases the contributory ability of nations is determinable by their real income, and it is well known that the choice of the index to be reduced to real terms is a statistical puzzle. The burden, which could not be proportional must be progressive, hitting progressively at the relatively higher incomes. We are all familiar with the discussions which crop up around this progressivity.

In the long run the unit of charges and distribution of tasks would not be any more evenly arrived at in an offensive prosperity than they are in a period preparing war. In order to act quickly, the very same types of compromises already reached in all of these domains should be kept and employed.

Only when this rehabilitation is effected will the informed leaders of the world be able to consider that their policies have a fully justifiable end in view, because only then will man have set out to go beyond murderous capitalism and homicidal nationalism.

To transform the rearmament budget into one of collective need and preservation is the necessary but insufficient condition of an economics of Service on a human scale. Our final task must be to indicate, out of the maze of present confusion, the lines of growth and the beginnings of such an economy. I would bring to the attention of whoever might be too readily disposed to denounce utopia, that none of the characteristics of this picture is borrowed from an ideology or doctrine. Each is drawn from the unquestionable observation of present facts. Nothing has been left to the imagination; ideas, attitudes and practices whose presence in our century cannot be denied have been gathered and organized.

**AN ECONOMICS OF SERVICE ON THE SCALE OF HUMANITY**

**T**HE DOCTRINE of the economically weak applied to peoples and not only to individuals can well incite the irony or the furor of a certain liberalism. It is an invasion of concrete 20th century politics. The victorious nation sends food and medicine to the vanquished populations. The dominant economy allows its partners to benefit from its reconstruction programs. Colonialism no longer admits its name and cannot act without shame. It organizes its partial existence by putting forth a plan of progressive cooperation and emancipation. A great change undoubtedly marks the practice of these innovations. The vocabulary of personal interest and national sovereignty is still preferred and expresses only too well remnants of outdated attitudes as well as inertia. Nevertheless, it would seem as though too many minds were already awakened and informed for an international economy of the strongest to be practised in the future without restraint. The mercantile exchange economics and the aggressive economy of fear which have for so long characterized relations between peoples have been subjected to a process of erosion which makes it possible to lay down the unshakeable bases of an economics of Service. The capitalist market and national states are stripped of artificial prestige; they are taken for what they are: instruments of man's adaptation to his environment. Also the world-wide economy which is taking form and which we must make a reality is trying out *territorial, institutional and procedural frameworks* which definitely remove us from the accomplishments of the 19th century.

A) The economic space<sup>29</sup> of the world is a network of forces and exchanges woven around poles: poles of production of raw materials and sources of energy; poles of strategic industries, considering the technics of the time; privileged cross-roads and nests of world-wide traffic. To universalize the economy is to maintain or stabilize the communications and cooperations between these poles, in spite of the monopolies of national politics. But the location of these poles in geographic space is not such that the greatest present or potential wealth is close to the most pressing needs. A regional compromise will be sought between the spaces of need and the spaces of potential production: in this manner we will arrive at a definition of a world region of development. National boundaries will be of little importance and will constitute obstacles more often than advantages. For example, here is the Middle East. Real per capita income here is between 50 and 90 dollars a year. The insufficient saving is rendered sterile by hoarding. The economic poles are the centers of petrol production and the key regions of the Suez straits. By re-enforcing co-operation between these and the other poles of the world, the Middle East can become a region of development and local miseries can be progressively eliminated. The tasks to be undertaken are irrigation and full exploitation of entire valleys, the creation of general networks of transportation and communication, the creation of supra-national credit organs, and the eventual establishment of supra-national centers of foreign exchange. All of these are initiatives which will not fit into national partitions.

B) The principal institution of the regions of the world in search of the economic structure of their survival and prosperity is the Development Center.

The initiative for its creation in each world region of development would come from the United Nations. The representation of under-developed countries, the balance of the powers of the dominant economies, the content of the statutes compelling the system to assign a definite portion of its resources to covering human costs, would unambiguously give proof of a decision in favor of an economy of service, a special consideration accorded to social development and a determined will to favor the progressive independence of the countries concerned, taken together. The Regional Development Center would have to define its relations with the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, whose structures and initial operations it would desire to modify. It would in no way replace the contribution of private capital, but would on the contrary be capable of creating for both the lender and the borrower the most favorable conditions for the movement of capital. It is to the greatest interest of the lender to deal with an informed and powerful supra-national organization rather than with weak or anarchical nations, or creditors of doubtful ability and solidity. The borrower has an evident advantage in receiving his funds from an organization through which the conflict of imperialisms is amortized and the influence of capitalist interest at least tempered. Projects of this kind have been discussed, and not only overseas, because—all differences understood and well indicated—the projects of European investment banks or Centers of Development are nothing more than Development Centers in the service of certain old Western countries.

C) It will suffice to look at reality to perceive finally, after the framework and central institution of the economy of Mankind, the new methods of applying it. Fifty years ago they might have appeared to be challenges addressed to the reigning orthodoxy. They have now established themselves in our practice and customs, without our yet having fully understood their revolutionary influence.

The 19th century was impregnated by immense private combines of national influence. The successive waves of innovations effected by entrepreneurs (supported more than has been admitted by the governments) have increased immensely the available product. The 20th century changed the fundamental conditions of technics and economics. Who would dare think that atomic and tide-driven energy could have been launched and exploited by individuals alone? Who would say that intra- and inter-continental means of communication are the exclusive works of private companies? Would one want to entrust the battle against miserly nature and the somnolence of entire nations to joint-stock companies? The truth is that only public or semi-public supra-national innovations can stimulate 20th century economy and obtain massive increases of real income, from which the share of the whole man and of all men would be set apart in advance.

In this movement to increase the total product on an unusual scale, the redistribution of private incomes and products takes on its full meaning. Contrary to what is still propounded in many text-books, there has never been an economy in which income was formed solely by free exchange and market competition. Even in the periods of extreme liberalism, power relations between social groups, between the dominant and those dominated, and the

authority of the State, that is today of concrete governments, outlined the framework for the formation of incomes and, through classes, changed their respective levels. These formerly hidden influences are now located and already oriented, as far as national avarice allows. The economy of Mankind implies enormous redistribution of production within older nations, within infant and economically under-developed nations, and between nations. For the modern economist, it seems no longer necessary for the recipient's share to be determined by the point at which the market, with uncertainty, locates the product. The product reveals itself dependent on more and more extended economies exterior to the government. The product of the enterprise is dependent on the industrial output, which depends on the national product, which depends on the output of the region of the world to which the nation belongs, which depends on the articulated ensemble of the regions of the world. Each particular product is the result of decisions taken by a particular unit, but also of decisions taken foreign to this unit's decisions or conduct. Collective forms of production command the redistributive forms of distribution.

Finally, credit in kind or in money, without return of the principal or interest, while scandalous for an economy based on "nothing for nothing," has acquired general acceptance in international practice. Its scope is less significant than the critical revision it entails. Many arguments produced in favor of onerous credit and held as irrefutable in individualistic economics, become more than questionable in the light of collective economy. The reimbursement of the principal and the payment of interest are indispensable to the motivation of loans in an economic world where nothing is done for nothing: the lender regains his capital and is compensated for his temporarily relinquishing it. But if, in a nation, the State is capable of levying a tax on a portion of the product and if it can invest this in the exterior, it can renounce the principal and interest, in view of advantages, material or non-material, medium or long term, which in importance exceed classical financial operation. The differences in the tax-rate, it was still said, determine employment and bring about the maximum use of saving; but in the vast regions where, properly speaking, rate of interest and of profit do not yet exist, total decisions on programs are practically inevitable. Free imports, it was argued, risk encouraging waste: but appropriate control methods can in fact combat this, and a not too rigorous but effective utilization of capital must, in any case, be established, in view of the waste of human life and energy which it eliminates or reduces.

The transfer of capital from regions of the world where it is relatively abundant to those where it is painfully scarce can lead to increases in productivity, through methods largely independent of individualistic procedures which have been the European's traditional formula for enriching himself. The medieval Christian teaching on interest finds in the 20th century rather unexpected confirmation, and at the same time a pressing occasion to be re-formulated by renewing itself.

**T**HE ECONOMICS OF MAN, in the force and fullness of this expression, far from being able to invoke a long and sure tradition, is at its first decisive test. It has not yet begun, but it is beginning.

The economy of avarice has owed part of its localized efficiency to the mobilization of the rather banal and ultimately weak forces of the desire for monetary profit. It would probably be imprudent to say that it has drawn all the advantage possible from personal interest. Personal interest is, practically and philosophically, a notion which shatters material and monetary wealth. It does not seem to be possible if the gratuitous act is excluded by principle and at the beginning.

The economy of yesterday has shown herself still partially competent in the invention of market procedures. But we must remember that it menaced the market itself by refusing to make a close examination and accept the realities on this side and beyond the market. It must be recognized, too, that in order to function, the market must first of all exist and that it cannot be created by the methods it uses to perfect it when it does exist.

If we look at the entire world and the men who inhabit it, we are led to think that in the end, the most disinterested economists, ill-inspired by a myopic concern for realism, have erred in their diagnosis of the achieved and possible evolution of Humanity.

The economy for the whole man and of all men has not allowed itself to be subdued by the schemes of mercantile economics. The economic world has never been and probably never will be a network of onerous exchanges. To interpret it without weakness and in order to put a human stamp on it, we must rediscover, beyond *Exchange Economics and economics of fear, the economics of giving*.

And for all those of our mind, this search is a means of making bearable the terrible anguish which seizes us when in the bosom of the murderous and criminal economy in which we find ourselves we dare pronounce the fearful and sacred words of Communion of the Living.

*Translated by LEON KING*

<sup>1</sup> C. E. A. Winslow, *Le coût de la maladie et le prix de la santé*; O. M. S. Genève, 1952, p. 12; according to Point Four, *Cooperative Program for aid in the development of economically under-developed areas*, Washington, D. C. (Publication 3719, Economic Cooperation, Series 24).

<sup>2</sup> H. W. Singer, "Economic Progress in under-developed countries," *Social Research*, March 1949, p. 2.

<sup>3</sup> Complete and detailed statistical tables can be found in *Statistiques épidémiologiques et démographiques annuelles*, 1939-1946, 1st part, "Movement de la population et causes de décès," "Organisation mondiale de la Santé," Genève, 1951.

<sup>4</sup> For more details, see *Données statistiques sur l'analphabétisme d'après les statistiques nationales existantes*, U.N.E.S.C.O., 1950.

<sup>5</sup> *Partners in progress*. Summary of a report to the President, by the international development advisory board, March 1951, p. 10; François Houillier, "La terre peut-elle nourrir l'humanité?" *Etudes*, Feb. 1950, pp. 158-159: "In China the famine of 1849 produced 14 million victims; that of 1878-9, 9 to 13 million; 100 million in all for the 19th century."

<sup>6</sup> Publications of the S.D.N., Dr. R. Sand, Paris, P.U.F., 1942.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. some examples cited on p. 17 in François Perroux, *Science de l'homme et science économique*, Paris, Librairie de Medicis, 1943; C. E. A. Winslow, *op. cit.*, p. 85, for social categories; for nations, p. 86.

<sup>8</sup> C. E. A. Winslow, *op. cit.*, pp. 14 and 15.

<sup>9</sup> Fairfield Osborn Our Plundered Planet.

<sup>10</sup> C. E. A. Winslow, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

<sup>11</sup> François Houillier, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

<sup>12</sup> *Partners in progress*, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. F. Perroux, *Notes sur les coûts de l'homme; Economie appliquée*, Archives de l'I.S.E.A., 1952.

<sup>14</sup> For a good criticism of this, see J. L. Fyot, *Dimensions de l'homme et science économique*, P.U.F., 1952.

<sup>15</sup> Specialists know the fine report of Gaston Leduc, "Le sous-développement et ses problèmes," *Revue d'Economie politique*, 1952. They also know their debt to the scholarly and fresh works of Maurice Bye, the first results of which are published in two *Cours de Doctorate* (1950-1, 1951-2), (mimeographed, Paris, Domat-Monchrestien).

<sup>16</sup> "Human costs" is a term that can be ambiguous. Two American statisticians, Mrs. Dublin and Lotka, have calculated the price of a man, in *The Money Value of a Man*, New York, 1930. They are trying to determine the cost of his "production." I cannot agree with these statisticians for reasons too complicated to explain here.

In this essay human costs mean antecedent costs assumed by the public power in the midst of a determined human group, in order to insure the conditions of life fundamental to all human beings. The content of this expression should become clearer later on.

<sup>17</sup> The author would feel honored if this analysis were considered as an economic commentary on the theory of *basic goods* presented by Jean Mouroux in his lesson on the hierarchy of goods. The economist has a great deal to gain in reading attentively a book of the same author, *Sens chrétien de l'homme*, Paris, Aubier, 1950.

<sup>18</sup> Cited by Jean Rostand, *L'homme*, Gallimard, 1936.

<sup>19</sup> J. M. Clark, *Social control of business*, Univ. of Chicago, 1926.

<sup>20</sup> François Perroux, *Note sur les coûts de l'homme*, op. cit.

<sup>21</sup> Report of the Economics Committee; *The economic consequences of the present trend of population*, H.M.S.O., 1950; *Trois journées pour l'étude scientifique du vieillissement de la population*, April 1946 (Alliance nationale, Paris), especially R. Froment, *Le part des vieillards dans le revenu national*, fascicule IV, p. 41 ff. See also, Jean Daric, *Vieillissement de la population et prolongation de la vie active*, Institut national d'Etudes démographiques, Travaux et Documenté Cahiers No. 7, P.U.F., 1948.

<sup>22</sup> Jacques Maritain, "The Problem of World Government," *Dublin Review*, 3rd Q., 1951, declares himself, at the end of a convincing analysis, for a world political organization. He praises, we believe justly, the project for a world constitution published in the March 1948 *Common cause*. He recommends, without delay, the creation of a World Consultative Council, with purely moral authority; each member, elected or designated by the nation to which he belonged, would lose his citizenship by becoming a member of the Council.

Cf. Also Karl Jaspers, "Empire universel ou ordre mondial," *La Table Ronde*, Jan. 1950.

<sup>23</sup> Two good popular pamphlets: *President Truman's fourth point and the United Nations*, by Annette Baker Fox; *The Colombo Plan, a Commonwealth program for Southeast Asia*, by John R. E. Carr-Gregg. On the latter, see especially, *The Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Development in South and South-East Asia, Report by the Commonwealth Consultative Committee*, London, Sept.-Oct. 1950, H.M.S.O., Cmd. 8080.

<sup>24</sup> *Partners in Progress*, op. cit., p. 11.

<sup>25</sup> *Etudes sur la situation économique de l'Europe en 1950*, O.N.U., 1951. See also J. E. Meade, "Some economic problems of Atlantic Union Rearmament," *Lloyd's Bank Review*, Oct. 1951, and Y. Seguillon, "L'Europe face au réarmement," *Economie contemporaine*, VI-VII, 1951.

<sup>26</sup> *Measures for the economic development of under-developed countries*, U.N., May 1951, cf. the chart, p. 76.

<sup>27</sup> *Measures*, op. cit., p. 79.

<sup>28</sup> Aneurin Bevan may be contrasted with many so-called statesmen by the ideas he expresses and the attitude that he takes in his book, *In Place of Fear*, Simon & Shuster, New York, 1952.

# CHRISTIANS AND COMMUNISM IN ASIA

JOHN C. BENNETT

**A**T THE INVITATION of the International Missionary Council, I visited several countries in Asia, from December 1st, 1950 to February 4, 1951, to consult with groups of Christians concerning the problems raised for the Church by the advance of Communism. In this article some of the conclusions drawn from my observations on this journey are presented.

National Christian Council arranged a series of conferences in Beirut, Lahore, Delhi, Hyderabad, Madras, Bangalore, Kottayam, Trivandrum, Calcutta, Bangkok and Manila. In two places the conferences lasted only a day and little could be accomplished. In one other place the conference was attended chiefly by American missionaries, a fact which limited its usefulness. Everywhere else the opportunities provided by the conference were excellent. That at Bangkok was a small international meeting with delegates from Thailand, Malaya and Burma. The conference in Manila drew delegates from the country at large and proved to be the largest and most lively of them all.

At each conference I sought to do five things. In the first place, I tried to explain some of the elements in Communism, giving special attention to the philosophy of Communism, to Communist political theory, to the Communist view of religion, to the development of Communist totalitarianism, and to an analysis of the basic issues which divide Communists and Christians. Secondly, I tried to draw from the group an account of the situation in the country or region where we were. Thirdly, I discussed the Christian response to Communism in terms of faith, theology and apologetics. Fourthly, I raised the problem of political and economic alternatives to Communism in the particular country and gave what suggestion I could concerning the light which Christian faith and ethics throw on the choice of an alternative. This, as will be indicated later, is the hardest question to answer in Asia. Fifthly, we had a report of a committee drawn from the conference concerning next steps in the area as the basis for the final discussion.

The first suggestion which I bring to those responsible for missionary strategy is that much more study and thought are needed along these lines in the countries which I visited. There was no very widespread knowledge apparent about Communism, except among some of the younger Christians whom I met.

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in India. There, the Christian Council, acting in co-operation with the Student Christian Movement, has set up an institute for the study of Communism and of its methods of penetration and, even more significant, of the social conditions which invite Communism. There was little social conservatism to be discerned among Christians. In no country visited was there an unwillingness to face these social issues, but there was undoubtedly a lack of preparation to deal with them. Very little thinking had been done on the contribution of Christianity in this sphere or on the precise function of the Church. What should a church which is a small minority do? The suggestion was put forward (with how much justification I do not know) that the fact that the missionary must hold aloof from national political and economic movements may have created detachment from these movements among the national Christians themselves.

In every country there should be a group of Christians who become thoroughly sophisticated in regard to Communism, who know about Communism and who are aware of Communist tactics. They should have all the information on what has happened in countries which have been under Communist rule, especially in China. In every country there should be a group of Christians (in which laymen should be included) who are thinking together on the problems of their country, on the responsibility of Christians and of Churches in relation to those problems. One constructive possibility might be the establishment of an oecumenical institute in Asia on the lines of that at Bossey.

**T**HERE IS A DIFFERENT FEELING about Communism in Asia from that prevailing in America and in most of western Europe (though there are some similarities to be detected between attitudes encountered in Asia and those that are common in France); and I now regard it as one of my chief functions to help American Christians to see the problem of Communism as it appears to Christians in Asia.

Not many Christians in Asia have Communist convictions or even sympathy with Communism, but they ask different questions about it from those which are heard in New York. The Communist movement in India is not as strong as it was a few years ago. There are pockets of Communist activity, but as a national movement it lost much ground because of its policy of violence and it has been badly split. My contacts with students were not sufficiently numerous to enable me to generalize, but one gains the impression that among Christian students Communist ideas and slogans have less influence now than a few years ago. The present strength of the Communist movement is not a major ground for concern.

There are, however, two grounds for concern which should be emphasized: a tendency (and I am referring only to Christians) to assume that Communism will be much less repressive in Asia than in Europe, and a widespread fatalism about the inevitability of its coming, combined with a rather passive attitude towards it.

The first tendency is based in part on reports from China. Chinese Communism still enjoys a great deal of moral prestige in India. Thai Christians

have a different attitude because of the threat of Communist infiltration through the Communists in Thailand. In the Philippines there seemed to be great confusion on this question. There, also, fear of the Chinese is common, but everything is complicated by the fact that the Protestants in the Philippines are more afraid of Roman Catholicism than of Communism. In India, the first reports from Communist China have seemed to many Indian Christians favorable. The Communist capacity to overcome political corruption has won admiration. Pressure on the Chinese Church did not become obvious until recently and I do not know what the effect of that is now. It seems probable that it will be given a political rather than an ideological interpretation and that it will be associated with events in Korea. The general rejection in India of the United Nations policy in Korea since the crossing of the 38th parallel has evoked much sympathy for China in that connexion.

A deeper cause for optimism about Communism in Asia seems to be the fact that Indians and others have for so long seen in the West the chief source of the evils on which they have concentrated attention. They have been struggling against imperialism. In that struggle the Communists have played their cards well, but more important than that is the widespread assumption of Asian innocence in comparison with the West. That fact was strikingly apparent at one conference where the delegates discussed at length whether or not an Asian country can be imperialistic; and though they finally decided that this might happen, the discussion revealed an unconscious premise concerning this Asian innocence. This outlook is quite natural, because it is imperialism from the West which has aroused the greatest feeling. Also, the Communist teaching on the relation between capitalism and imperialism, which has a great deal of truth in it, has caused many to assume that there is equal truth in the idea that a non-capitalist country will not be imperialistic. Communism is by definition non-imperialistic! It is an easy step to the following propositions: countries which go Communist will not be controlled by Russia because Russia is not a capitalist country and has no imperialistic motives; Asian countries which go Communist will at least be free from the greatest of all national sins, imperialism. The question is asked: can as much be said for America? The fact that America is capitalistic arouses deep suspicion. When anyone speaks of Communist totalitarianism, about which so little is known in Asia and which, as indicated above, is not greatly feared, it is natural for the subject to be changed and for the known evil of imperialism to be emphasized.

In dealing with this problem I was, as an American, undoubtedly handicapped. Someone from a country with too little power to be feared and one which does not, first of all, suggest capitalism to people in Asia, would be more convincing in dealing with the threat from Communist totalitarianism. No one should discuss Asian communism with dogmatism. There is ground for hope that in the long run the vast population of Asia and the distinctive cultures of Asia will prevent Asian Communism from being a mere reflection of Russian Communism. Conflicts of interest may yet separate Russia from China. But it would be unwise for any Asian country to assume that it will be able to preserve national independence or any measure of spiritual and cultural freedom if it passes under the control of Communism. This warning is essential even if it is not combined with dogmatism about the future.

**T**HE SECOND TENDENCY is the fatalistic and somewhat passive view of the advance of Communism. People who were strongly opposed to Communism often said that they believed that there was no way of arresting it in Asia. I found this attitude in all the countries which I visited, though Thailand differed from the other countries in that Communism was not an internal problem but almost entirely a threat from outside. It is easy to understand this fatalism. Most of the countries in Asia have such desperate poverty alongside the riches of a few. All of them are plagued with political corruption. Some of the people in the national government in India are much admired, especially Pandit Nehru, but it is known that they cannot depend upon their own local agents. The countries in the Near East are in a still worse condition. Even Thailand, the happiest spot in the East, faces this same problem. The worst feature of political corruption is that the agents of government are bribed by the vested interests which resist change, so that any radical approach to the problems which give Communism its opportunity is blocked.

The fatalism to which reference has been made takes its form of doubt concerning the possibility of discovering any alternative to Communism. In India there seems to be much disillusionment about the Congress; and as thoughtful people faced the problems of India they wonder if anything but Communism can even promise solutions. It is easy to say that Communism makes only false promises, but at least they have great relevance. Communism, moreover, is a power movement which seems able to get things done. We can expect a great many non-Communists, including many Christians, to take rather a passive attitude towards Communism as a result of the feeling that at least it may rid their country of ancient evils for which no other political movement has a sufficiently radical programme.

The question often arose whether, granted the oppressive side of Communism, it would not perhaps purge a country of feudal landlordism and, a generation from now, leave the vast majority of the people better off than they are today. It was assumed that the more oppressive features of Communism would disappear. That is a hard question for a man from the West to answer. The plain fact is that ninety per cent of the people in India have nothing to lose, whereas we in the West have much to lose under Communism. I often wished that I could put most of the members of the United States Congress on the spot where they would have to face that question in an Indian setting! One could argue that if Communism wins power it will bring great disillusionment; that, even if people do not now have much to lose, a Communist society would prevent the development of forms of spiritual and cultural freedom by which these people would gain much that is precious. That argument only convinces those who have had experience of such freedom. One could emphasize the danger that a country which goes Communist may lose its national independence, but even that is not very convincing in view of what I have said regarding the attitude towards Asian Communism.

Before leaving this subject of fatalism in the attitude towards Communism, it should be noted that this fatalism usually assumes that Communism

is without problems of its own. One way of avoiding fatalism is to realize that the Communists are not omnipotent, that they may not even desire to become responsible for the problems of India and Pakistan in the near future. Doubtless they want these countries to be sounding-boards for propaganda. They will try to use them to confuse the West. But it is quite another matter to take responsibility for dealing with the poverty of India. This fact that Communism has its own limits should at least prevent us from taking a fatalistic attitude towards its advance. Such fatalism may become a major force in bringing on the thing that is feared. There may be more time than we now think; and it would be a mistake to shorten that time by giving up now any real effort to find alternatives to Communism.

**T**HE QUESTION of the anti-religious teaching and policy of Communism and of the effect of these upon the attitudes of Christians in Asia is often raised. On the surface there would seem to be an absolute conflict on this score alone, not only between Communism and Christianity but between Communism and the non-Christian religious. The difficulty is that Communists do not parade their atheism at first. They emphasize chiefly national grievances and the anti-religious policy comes later. This is one point on which Christians need to be more fully informed.

In several of the conferences the question came up as to whether or not Christians should unite with the adherents of other religions against Communist atheism. We seldom found a clear answer to that question. My impression is that most often the answer was 'no.' Certainly this was true in the Philippines, where not even Protestants and Roman Catholics can unite against Communism, for there the Spanish form of Roman Catholicism which is dominant is regarded as a major source of the evils which drive people to Communism. Christians, together with adherents of other religions must, of course, co-operate to find alternatives to Communism; and there may be occasions when parallel action by Christians and religious groups connected with other faiths might call attention to some of the effects of Communism on religion. I doubt the desirability of a united front against Communism on the part of Christians with the official representatives of other religious communities. The question needs a great deal more thought. I fear the tendency for religious crusades against Communism to become instruments of the reactionary forces which keep alive the very conditions which invite Communism. Christians do decide in some situations that Communism is the least evil political alternative open to them. I believe that when they do so they deceive themselves about the possibility of influencing the way in which Communism will develop in their country. But we must take account of this fact, that Christians do conscientiously at times give support to Communism at the political level. The churches in countries where this is likely to happen should at least be fully informed on what is at stake. One of the deepest sources of misunderstanding in the ecumenical community is the fact that in some countries Communism is a real temptation to Christians, while in others it is not even considered as an option.

I could not suggest an alternative to Communism except in the broadest terms and with the full knowledge that no political movements exist which can be trusted to implement it. For reasons which I shall explain later, Christianity as such can provide no political or economic alternative. These countries will have to find their own way. Western ideas of constitutional government have been taken over, but such government can easily be made ineffective by corruption or by legislative inaction. It can easily become the instrument of powerful interests which prevent any radical dealing with the basic problems. American capitalistic propaganda leaves people very cold and American prosperity makes solutions recommended by Americans seem irrelevant to the conditions of a poverty-stricken country. British socialism has much to commend it, but the socialist movements in Asia do not make a very strong appeal. We may be thankful that the leaders of these countries, especially India, Pakistan, and the Philippines, believe in freedom of expression. I visited the office of the Home Secretary in charge of the police in an Indian State where there is a great deal of Communist activity. I accompanied an Indian pastor who is a citizen of that State. He criticized the police system of that State to the Home Secretary with as much freedom and with as little apparent risk as if he had been in London or New York. This freedom of the citizen does exist and it is precious, but by itself it solves none of the problems which give Communism its chance.

One of the hardest things which one has to say in interpreting Christianity is to explain that there is no distinctively Christian alternative to Communism except in the sphere of faith and theology and of ultimate ethical judgments. Christianity and Communism are not correlative: they do not cover the same ground. There is no *Christian* economic system and there is no *Christian* political strategy or movement of power. This is more obviously true of Protestantism than of Roman Catholicism, but even in the latter confession economic and political emphases differ from country to country. The Christian—again, especially the Protestant Christian—must discover or help to create an alternative to Communism for the solution of his country's economic problems. He must co-operate with non-Christians in the most promising political movements. (Christians will not agree on any one movement). He should be driven by his Christian faith to do these things, but the guidance which his faith can give him for particular political and economic decisions is limited. The Church as Church cannot settle these questions for him. But the Church as Church can do three things which it is not doing with any degree of adequacy anywhere: it can bring a great deal of Christian guidance concerning the human consequences of existing policies and institutions, concerning goals for a society, concerning the dangers in various panaceas which are offered. It can develop procedures by which Christians, especially laymen, can more readily consult with one another on these problems, in a way that will help them to get hold of the necessary facts and that will encourage them to come to decisions. It can seek to purge the life of the Church itself from the chief forms of injustice, the chief barriers to fellowship which are so obvious in its own life. These three things, at least, it can do.

Let me illustrate all three of them in terms of a practical suggestion which I often made in the conference in Asia. One basic problem everywhere is the

problem of land reform. There is a good deal of Christian guidance on the religious meaning of property, on the ethics of systems of ownership. Against that background should not churches in these Asian countries provide for nationwide consultations among Christians on the problem of land reform? Such consultations could bring out facts and Christian criticisms of the existing institutions. They could even define immediate goals for a region, goals as specific as those which are called 'middle axioms' in contemporary oecumenical discussion. They could consider the practices of churches themselves and suggest next steps within the life of the Church. (This, admittedly, would be the most hazardous undertaking!) All this would only be a start in co-operative Christian thinking about the problem of land. It would parallel a good deal of such thinking in some of the western churches concerning the problem of unemployment, which has comparable importance in industrialized countries. There are technical issues and issues of political strategy on which churches cannot finally pronounce. But to have much stirring of the Christian conscience on this subject and to establish a process by which facts and the best thinking about the problem would become well known within the Church would form significant contributions by Christians to the development of alternatives to Communism.

**I**CAME AWAY FROM ASIA with some fresh convictions about the importance of evangelism. A previous visit to Japan in the summer of 1950 turned my thinking in this direction, because I was surprised to discover how far missionary work there was tied down to institutions which do little to evangelize the people or which directly serve the Church. I had a similar impression on this second journey. The small number of conversions which have taken place in the past twenty years in excellent Christian schools and colleges troubled me. I admired the institutions greatly and could understand the value of their indirect contribution to the life of the Church and of their direct contribution to the life of the nation, but I am still puzzled by the failure of the uniqueness of the Christian Gospel to get through to students. I asked the head of one college if he observed a tendency for students after graduation to move towards the Church and he said that any movement was usually in the opposite direction. I realize that some cultures place such obstacles in the way of conversion that only a person of rare independence and courage can make the break. But I am still troubled. I raise the question whether the theological revival in the West in the past two or three decades may not lead to a presentation of the Christian message in such a way as to make syncretistic responses less likely. I realize that this is the most difficult of all problems and that my knowledge of the situation in no one of these countries is sufficient to give me a right to suggest a way forward. It is enough to bring a sense of shock that things are as they are to the attention of those responsible for missionary strategy.

There is one aspect of this problem which is closely connected with the chief purpose of my visit and that is the relation of evangelism to Communism. On that point I speak with less hesitation. I am convinced that Communism

may prove for many individuals to be a half-way house to Christianity. It is also true that Christianity has been a half-way house to Communism for many already; and it may not be an accident that Travancore, the part of India where there are the largest number of Christians, is also one of the chief centres of Communism. But here I am interested in Communism as a half-way house to Christianity. As people become disillusioned about Communism, it is doubtful if they will find their way to Hinduism or Buddhism or Islam. Each one of these religions is too indifferent to the problems of human history or too reactionary in its approach to them. The disillusioned Communist may find many of his aspirations fulfilled by Christ. He may, of course, like the characters in Mr. Arthur Koestler's *The Age of Longing*, find no positive faith at all, but this need not happen. Communism may sweep away much of the syncretistic fog and make choices clearer than they now are. There is a close relationship between Christianity and Communism which is quite different from the relationship of Communism to any of the other great religions. A Christian who sickens of the futilities and complacencies of organized Christianity may find Communism a more promising movement because it seems to have a programme so relevant to the needs of the people. But there are many today who sicken of the cruelty, the indifference to truth, and the absolute pretensions which they discover in Communism. Where are they to go?

The answer depends in part on the presence of a Christian community in their nation which is able to bring them to the revelation of God in Christ which transcends and judges the churches which they have known. It depends in part on the presence of Christians, nationals and missionaries, who understand why they became Communists and why they are now troubled by disillusionment, who can show them how they can find answers to some of their questions in Christian faith and theology and who embody in themselves all that is best in the Communist concern for justice. I know of one mission board which has brought twenty of its missionaries together from all its fields for four months to study Communism and to prepare themselves to meet exactly the kind of situation which I have described. This action needs to be duplicated by other boards and societies. Communism seems to make great advances and to be very strong. It causes much anxiety among us and we do not see far enough ahead to imagine how it will come to an end. But the one sure thing is that as a total system it will come to an end. This Stalinist form of Communism is too false and inhuman to bind many nations to its pattern of life for an indefinite period, especially nations whose national interests conflict with those of the Soviet Union. When it does come to an end or become transformed so that quite new possibilities emerge, the Christian world mission may have a greater opportunity than ever. Before it comes to an end there may be many individuals in countries not controlled by Communism who can be helped to find their way to the Gospel.

# THE CATHOLIC AND SCIENCE

LUCIEN MORREN

**W**HEN SUCH A SUBJECT as the Catholic and Science is broached, it appears indispensable to begin with a very general observation, with a very definite affirmation, of the complete distinction between the particular domains of Faith on the one hand and of science on the other; and to do so at the risk of appearing to break in doors which are open.

Faith has God for its object. Its domain is the transcendent, the absolute. Science, on the contrary, studies phenomena and their relationships. Its domain is nature, the contingent, the relative.

For this reason, rigorously, if care is taken to keep strictly in the domains which are proper to them, there would be no relations between Faith and Science and, consequently, *a fortiori*, if there could be no direct relations there could be no conflicts.

But that is a little like what the theologians would call the thesis. In the hypothesis, in historic reality and also in the present, it must definitely be asserted that this ideal position is not always held, that it is indeed held only with difficulty.

There are many reasons for this and in particular some very understandable psychological reasons. It is one and the same mind which has to know both scientific and religious truths and both must be formulated in a single language.

In fact, historically, science, philosophy and religion were intermingled in the first stages of thought and it is only by the refinement of thought that the distinction between the two domains has been assured and the necessary clarification secured. But man does not easily free himself from his heritage and one should definitely recognize that a singular vigilance and strong discipline of the mind are necessary to discern the frontiers at every moment and to keep separate, in our intellectual survey, the contributions which are conditioned by philosophical attitudes, which also are frequently, and so easily, unconscious. A continual critique of our efforts is therefore demanded.

It is necessary also to observe that a proper differentiation does not signify a separation of the disciplines so radical as to lead even to a mutual ignorance. We may note in passing that this would bring about a significant increase in the chance of confusion; for the best way to delimit a frontier is to be familiar with each of the areas that the frontier separates.

Therefore, so far as differentiation is concerned, there is a definite place for indirect relations among science, faith and, more generally, philosophy.

We will not look at these three disciplines in a triangular relation but uniquely at the relations where science intrudes. From that standpoint these

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indirect relations will readily take either the form of suggestions in support of or counter to a philosophical or religious attitude, or the form of an invitation to transpose, on the philosophical or religious plane, angles of vision that scientific progress develops.

We propose to illustrate by examples each of these forms and particularly the suggestions in favor of a world destined to finality and, in the second place, the new light that "complementarity" appears to us to throw upon some old problems.

**B**UT THE RELATIONS between science and Faith do not always remain so serene. It often happens that the limits which circumscribe them are misunderstood; we find in practice that conflicts are born at certain moments in history and in certain minds. It will not be profitless to pause a moment to consider this.

If we wish to examine more closely the occasions on which these conflicts have arisen and to illustrate some of them that history has known, I would have recourse to a picture. Of course, every picture carries within itself the danger of simplification, even to being false from a certain angle, but the procedure is so current in technical circles that I may be pardoned for not rejecting it. This picture, quite simply, is that of a chain whose points of support are out of reach.

The proper field of science is to experiment on the links within our reach and then to push as far as possible their study and that of their connexions. But, such questions as "How is the chain hung?" and especially "Why is there a chain?" are to be sought and illuminated by revelation.

At that point conflicts could develop in two different ways:

1. Arising from science, as a result of certain *hypotheses* (and it is on this word "hypothesis" that it is necessary to insist) formulated in an attempt to explore the chain outside the experimental domain.
2. Conversely, conflicts can be aroused by religious consciences which draw wrong conclusions in the scientific order from revelation.

When one examines the questions around which the great debates have concentrated, one recognizes among them two of principal although quite unequal importance. They are the Person of Jesus and the origin of man. The reason for this preeminence is understandable for they both mark the exceptional intervention of God in time, I was going to say, right in the midst of the links of the chain. But these interventions have as their essential effect the addition to observable phenomena of a supernatural or spiritual order. It is clear that those intrusions themselves escape as such all scientific observation. It is their manifestation and their consequences which will furnish both observable material and occasions for debate.

The problem of Jesus inserted into history gives rise, it must be said, to critical problems for history, but this primordial aspect of the relations between Faith and Reason is outside of our present concerns.

The origin of man, quite distant though it be, is placed within a period which is more than covered by paleontological researches. If it escapes all ex-

perimental investigation it is naturally implicit in the hypotheses that stem from fossil discoveries. But we must note that science only starts when there is a population. It cannot reach the individual. That is why the problem, constantly posed by the opposition monogenism-polygenism, would appear to be better formulated in the terms monophyleticism-polyphyleticism, that is to say unity or plurality of stocks; and it must be conceded here that only the hypothesis of monophyleticism seems to accord with the theological demands concerning original sin, as the encyclical *Humani Generis* has just recalled. The contrary hypothesis, which is, in addition, far from being scientifically favored, would appear then to be a possible source of conflict of the first type that we have mentioned. I say possible, because the language of the encyclical is quite guarded, and, without descending to relativism, it should be emphasized that the letter refers to the actual state of development of thought, theological as much as scientific.

The same encyclical puts us also on guard against an improper generalization of the idea of evolution, which in a monistic perspective would submit the universe to a perpetual evolution. Here, it is obvious that one is passing beyond the scientific domain. In addition, the major friction of the opposition to faith made in the name of science does not even arise from scientific hypotheses but fundamentally from philosophical attitudes which do not always appear to be explicit in the minds even of those who hold them. Witness scientism, that one might have believed to be dead in this day and age, which Marxism is reviving under the pretense of establishing an equation between scientific method, dialectical materialism and truth, this last being understood in its strictest sense.

If we now consider certain sources of conflict of the second type under consideration, deriving from an improper interpretation of revelation, we will discover, for example, the maladroit reaction of too many Catholics to Darwinism. Certainly, this theory has been wielded by the scientists against the Christians, but too many of these latter have reacted by accepting the debate on poor terrain, without discerning any better than their opponents all the ambiguity in a false problem. We may mention also the conclusions which are actually an extrapolation of the experiments of Pasteur concerning the so-called demonstrated impossibility of spontaneous generation, and, more seriously still, the linking of this impossibility with Faith. There is in this connexion a piquant detail, in that it is forgotten, in such zeal, that Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas were partisans of spontaneous generation.

The most notorious example of this type of conflict remains assuredly the condemnation of Galileo. But if, for numerous souls, the event was a sad one, it is none the less certain that what we know today to be a resounding mistake of the Holy Office has been the inspiration, in the sequel, of much salutary prudence and has contributed to the better delimitation of the respective domains. In fact, whatever may be the dramatic character of the conflicts for their actors, and whatever sad repercussions to which they lead, it can be affirmed that the conflicts have been, perhaps, once they have been overcome, the inevitable occasion of progress in human thought. One is tempted to say that they even bring it about by virtue of their causative character.

Above all, let us throw stones at no one and let us not demand of the 17th century the precision which we possess today. At any rate, the believers have found by experience that to wish to find in the Sacred Scriptures a revelation in the scientific order is actually, in the literal sense of the term, to profane the Scriptures; for it is to attribute to them a profane object; it is also, in the usual sense of the word, sacrilege, from lack of respect for the Divine intention, as the lessons of the past make us more fully realize.

But, it is agreed that the negative aspects of things are not the most interesting and I hasten to broach the principal objectives of this lecture that I have only briefly indicated previously.

Everything that has preceded warns us that the subject will be delicate. It appears to me useful still further to define the reasons for this state of affairs, for they stem from the profound nature of the relations among science, philosophy and religion.

We have insisted on the indirect character of these relations; we have spoken in this respect of suggestions and of angles of vision. Care in vocabulary is important here. These terms are connected with or approach those relations concerning the mode of knowledge by sign or symbol which plays such a fundamental role in the religious domain. For it and it alone permits one to pass from the order of experience to the superior order of meaning while fully respecting the distinctions. For by its very nature this mode of knowledge excludes all idea of constraining deduction. But, at the same time, it demands of the mind attuned to the two orders and which accordingly can grasp the bond between them, a strong discipline of thought whose dynamic activity can so easily cross the frontiers without distinguishing them.

Another aspect of the delicate character of our problem arises also from the connexion of the material to be treated with this symbolic knowledge.

The question is quite complex. We must endeavor to separate the several elements. Assuredly, the extra-scientific questions that science can formulate place us once more at the very core of the religious problem, before this fundamental option between matter itself and its transcendent extension; and they do so perhaps in the only way that a number of our contemporaries can grasp, since these wish only or are able only to consider things from the scientific standpoint. It is the scientific character which even confers on the subject its very special interest for them, and the answers that one gives to the questions appear from this point of view to possess a maximum of communicability for many. But this maximum never attains one hundred per cent. For, on the contrary, in every such use of symbolism, the strictly personal orientation of the mind plays a definitive part and the measure of its intervention is indeed precisely the measure of the residue of incommunicability. Let us remark in passing how interesting it would be to examine everything that connects this personal orientation to fundamental value judgment.

**T**HE CLASSIC SYMBOL that science offers us in support of the spiritual is indeed order in the world. If, from the standpoint of the universe as a whole, the world is intelligently constructed, must there not have been an intelligence to have made it?

Valid as this may be, the argument must be qualified. There is not only in opposition to it the terrible law of usury, which is quite artificial in such a world though often so actual psychologically, but there is also the very grave objection of unhappiness in the world to be surmounted. It is certainly pertinent, but it is not sufficient to observe that disharmony does not spring from pure phantasy and that it remains in some manner bound up with order if only by this final observation that every disturbance presupposes an order which goes beyond the disturbance and may precede it. This is too summary, although it may be perfectly valid. It would be as pertinent to demonstrate the fact that formulating laws is equivalent to admitting order, a point so easily lost sight of by scientists working all the time with such laws; but we will leave this task to the philosophers.

We wish both to remain on ground more familiar to science, which always builds on something given, and to examine what the scientists have to tell us.

Numbers of those who react readily to paths of synthesis refuse to let themselves be hypnotized by these difficulties of which we must surely take account and to which we shall return, but which nevertheless are secondary and minor, and to which that which is primary and major and also ordered cannot be subordinated.

From this point of view, as you can well imagine, astronomy is an ideal field. If we question the great masters we hear Eddington assure us that he cannot conceive the world without an anti-chance; we listen to Jeans affirm "that the universe resembles more a great thought than a great machine. Mind does not appear to be an accidental intrusion into the realm of matter; we begin to suspect that we ought rather to hail it as its creator and director."

Undoubtedly the new theories, such as that of the expanding universe—in which my eminent colleague, Canon Lemaitre, has played such a role that one can salute him as the premier cosmogonist of our time—these new theories have strongly favored such a climate of thought.

You are not unaware that this grandiose view, the experimental foundation of which is the distribution of velocities of the nebulae deduced from spectrographic measurements, envisages these nebulae as coming from a primitive nucleus. The universe in this view began by a prodigious explosion.

Like every point of view bringing unity into the world and especially introducing, at least in our field of vision, a beginning, a point of departure, these concepts are well adapted to orient the mind towards a Creator. But if astronomy thus places before us the problem of origins, the consideration of biological evolution poses the great problem of end, of *finality*.

How can one fail to be struck in such an area, if one takes an overall view of things, at the marvellous progression by which this evolutionary process unrolls?

Here also it is indeed the major order of things, and, let us add, the aspects of finality which actually determine, if we look closely into the matter, the spiritual orientation of many scientists. In the domain of the biological sciences and its neighbors the names of Cuénod, Nicole, Carrel and Lecomte de Noüy come immediately to mind. Actually, for these four people this orientation has led to a conversion to the spiritual.

But, on the other hand, organic development has remained the seat of the greatest controversies, for it is indeed in this field that the most acute problem of disharmony arises. Any synthesis will have to arrange a place for disharmony and integrate it in a satisfactory fashion for want of a justification which in all likelihood will always escape us. We shall return to this question a little later.

Let us note, first of all, that the materialists generally emphasize physico-chemical determinism permeating biology.

This point gives rise to several different remarks. First, there is no question of criticizing this determinism as a basis for experimental biological work where it imposes itself as if by the nature of the scientific task. Secondly, if it is obvious that all progress in this direction reduces by so much the tendency to look for external causes, here is the place to emphasize that to be willing to make use of it to determine philosophical positions would be a crying example of confusion of the two domains and a wrong use of science. A Christian would see it simply as a development of the principle of action from secondary causes.

Let us add this observation: it is undoubtedly the belief in an unbridled extension of physical-chemistry which, in the form of an evolutionary materialism, nourishes the scientific atheism of today. Well, let us admit for a moment, by way of pure hypothesis, the most complete triumph of which certain people dream. Let us admit that it is established that a sufficiently complex molecular aggregation produces by itself a living being; and that the evolution of this living thing, in the end and by its own resources develops a mind, leading, let us be audacious, even to coordination and invention, that is to say, intelligence. It would still remain that such a perspective would by its very nature exclude the idea of value; every idea of value, every recognition of good and of evil would still remain undiminished by such a postulate. There is still an unassimilated residue. That is also perhaps why, alas, these ideas of value, of good and evil, no longer have any meaning for certain people. Here is the moment to recall the well-known quotation from Claude Bernard: "If determinism makes us the master of nature, it does not explain nature to us"; and the more profound echo in a little Protestant book: "It is agreed, from the standpoint of Science, that God explains nothing. But He is the reason for everything."

**I**N ADDITION, it would appear that the world of phenomena does not permit its description by so simple a scheme. More and more there appear paths in which continuity and specificity progress in parallel. We shall see this better later. Let us therefore approach the facts and let us listen to contemporary savants treating a problem as complex as is the living thing. We will then find, according to the belief of biologists of differing tendencies, that the mechanistic position, which would *reduce* the whole organism to pure physical chemistry, in spite of very real success, appears to be far from being able to account exhaustively for the organism.

Certainly, in *dissection*, or when *analyzing* the way in which the several functions act, one apparently finds only physical chemistry; there is an astonishing yield of results, tissue cultures, even organs, grafts, artificial fertilization, sex inversions, not to mention the admirable work of the Rockefeller Institute on proteins. Quite recently, actually about last year, the extraordinary maintenance of life in organic tissues cooled for some time in liquid nitrogen has been experimentally demonstrated; and already we can foresee passionate debates concerning the significance of such facts. But, in spite of these successes and, sometimes, because of them, there remains a certain inadequacy in explanations based solely on physical chemistry. We are told of the very specific behavior of the living thing, the problem of adaptation that the cell achieves, the self-regulation of the physical properties of its membranes or selection in assimilation, which compel the biologist Guyenot to say: "In fact, whatever name you give to the thing, the organism exercises a choice, and no other system in our physical chemistry does as much."

There are two important assertions in this quotation. The organism exercises a choice. Let us remember that, for it will be useful to us shortly. Then: No other system in our physical chemistry does as much. These lines are the more revealing because they have been written by a scientist, unconcerned with the spiritual, but who recognizes that the living organism presents problems "insoluble by the data of physical chemistry" and who consequently has to pin his hopes on the physical chemistry of the future.

This singular characteristic of living matter becomes all the more apparent as a total view of living things is undertaken, as one looks at the organism as a whole: "What a surprise" Guyenot adds "that, at the start of embryonic life, we should be able to see an organism provided with members the majority of which are there before ever having functioned, and all of them participating in the realization of that harmonious and ordered unity that constitutes a functional living being. The causal system and the resultant have no common measure; they belong to two orders of phenomena differing in quality."

The causal system and the resultant have no common measure. Do we really need to take many steps before we hear Conklin saying that the needs of the future organism are anticipated at each step and affirming that its development is the most beautiful example of finality that nature offers to us. From the beginning to the end, it seems to be directed towards a goal.

In the same vein Carrel declares that "an organ is produced by cells which seem to know the future structure."

This is also the place to recall the great work of Cuénot, who recently died. Starting from his remarkable work on adaptation, Cuénot came to a very general view as to destiny, his own teleology.

For Lecomte de Noüy, chance alone is radically incapable of explaining an evolutionary phenomenon which maintains a steady progress, ending in mind in spite of apparent checks and by no means few imperfections.

Let us pause for a moment with the ideas of this particular biologist whose journey in thought towards a spirituality ever more accented and transcendent is to be found in the four successive books in which these ideas are set forth.

These books which have had a large distribution have also been abundantly criticized. The University of Lausanne honored him for these books; they have been decried by others. A little excitement of this kind permits people to make a better judgment in the matter and to recognize at the same time the validity of certain criticisms and also the unquestioned merits of the work.

In a very general way Lecomte de Noüy could be reproached for condemning a philosophical attitude in the name of science alone. He certainly demonstrates some very impressive observations of a nature calculated to shake the materialist position, but does he not also forget the big difference between a suggestion, however strong this may be, and a deduction; and is he not also definitively embroiled in what one might call scientism in reverse?

We shall not follow any further this author in his calculations concerning the ridiculously small probability of formation of complex molecules. His method of envisaging this formation as a whole, as a pure lottery, without the intervention of the idea of affinity, neither among isolated atoms nor among intermediary groups, has caused many people uneasiness. We take care not to deny, however, that there might be interesting paths to be delved into, but we are just as glad not to be so engaged.

We prefer, on the contrary, to exhibit a second category of observations on which Lecomte de Noüy supports the existence of an anti-chance and which are very striking. There is in science a profound tendency towards unification. It has been the source of progress and has led to grandiose perspectives. But these latter are in no way diminished, indeed quite the contrary, if one underscores and recalls when necessary the distinctions that must be maintained. There is one to which our attention is forcibly drawn and it is of importance: it is this, that if the inorganic world is ruled by laws which orient its evolution in the irreversible direction of ever greater symmetry and equalization of energy, the organic world itself evolves by a systematic increase of dissymmetries, following progressive structures which finally end in the human brain, the support for conscious mind.

Let us restate in a somewhat less concise fashion this dictum, which may appear to be too abstract. Firstly, every inorganic system, left to itself, tends inexorably towards equilibrium and, hence, to degradation. This law is well illustrated by the example of hot and cold bodies, which by reason of their difference in thermal content possess a potential energy, and which if left to themselves will end by equalization of the temperature, with loss of capacity for use. From this aspect, therefore, symmetry, equalization, degradation. On the contrary, the organic world, from the unicellular organism to the highest mammal with its very rich functional organs, is characterized by a succession of differentiations which indicate, in their totality, a continuous advance.

Who would wish to ascribe to one of those rare and negligible fluctuations, such as the calculus of probabilities recognizes, that radical switch in orientation or direction which appeared, and has been maintained and accentuated during more than one thousand millions of years? And yet it is this towards which one would logically be led if, with an undeniable continuity with lifeless matter that one is forced to underscore, one denied every kind of specificity to living things.

The author recalls two other examples of similar breaks in orientation between connected phases of evolution or, better still, of similar hinges since this word seems to us to designate with felicity precisely the double aspect of continuity and change. One of these, we should point out, is only mentioned. It is still probably too soon to develop it. It is to be found between the structural world of atoms and molecules and that of the elementary particles, electrons, protons, neutrons, photons, et cetera, that it is customary to recognize as governed by special laws which are often foreign to those of thermodynamics.

The second change of orientation which developed long ago concerns us directly. It is the new point of departure in biological evolution marked by the advent of the human mind. With man, capable of moral effort, or reflective discovery, of abstract ideas, capable therefore of actions that can be qualified as "useless," that is to say, which are not absolutely necessary to preserve or defend life, with man mind emerges from matter and it is his spiritual development which becomes the center of interest. It is he who, in the final analysis, confers on the whole of evolution its *value*.

This reveals the masterly framework of Lecomte de Nouÿ's ideas. It is his telefinalism<sup>1</sup> which interprets the necessity of the creative and directive idea, which dominates the whole of evolution, but is interested, actually, only in its end-result, reached by evolution through transitory forms whose very lack of perfect adaptation disposes towards perfection.

This view is compatible with imperfections, with real or apparent checks, even with monstrosities. An illustration is quite suggestive; it compares the march of evolutions with that of water running down the mountains in a series of streams, whose courses are sometimes zig-zag, which occasionally idle or stop en route, forming lakes, but which are subject to a constant urge towards the base of the mountain. It is important that one stream alone reaches the base. Or one could use the picture of a pine-tree in which the knots produced each year are the points of departure for various branches but whose vertical growth is assured by the axial shoot and if this fails one knows that it is replaced by another.

In extension of this view which sees man as an end-point in the whole process of evolution we should develop briefly the theories of Father Teilhard de Chardin, whose point of view is certainly extremely fertile but which I would not dare to qualify as clear and which it would be difficult to expound in this place. Let it suffice to say that Father Chardin sees, in the further extension of evolution, men becoming ever more and more organized and unified; humanity emerging as an organic unity, composed of persons, that is to say of intelligent and free beings, bearing on this account the same responsibility for the extension and end-product of evolution. The impersonal urge of life becomes co-operation. This new level he calls the noosphere, the sphere of the mind.

Thus the world would appear to be stocked with marvellous potentialities which act with greater flexibility the more evolution progresses, right up to the conscious co-operation of man. But already among living things, it seems, action does not always remain purely passive. In the most elementary

forms of life we have seen that certain authors declare that everything happens as though the organism were making a choice. This pliability, this adaptation of the cell, is it not merely the manifestation of a determinism, less rigid, relaxed, compared with that of inert matter, a sort of pre-liberty in the sense of a choice which is unconscious because physiological? I know that our language ought to be prudent in such a domain and that it has only an analogical value. The expression "relaxed determinism" which seeks to interpret this pliability of the organism might well appear to be somewhat of an antinomy. Claude Bernard, himself, who, more than any other spread the word determinism, if he is not actually the inventor of it, found it too rigid to apply to living things and dreaded its trend towards the expression "fatalism," in which he was right. His thought has just been made clear by the publication of recently discovered texts in which he declares "I ought to say that I employed this word, determinism, to state quite simply that all phenomena have determining conditions," and he would have preferred to substitute for it the word "conditionalism" if this word had not seemed to him too barbarous.

In support of this functional difference between living and inert matter we can think of our everyday observation. We conclude, legitimately, that an animal is well-bred or an organ defective by finding in them the qualities that are appropriate to them; but we cannot speak in the same way of a good copper or a bad granite. Such expressions have no meaning except for our use.

Organic imperfections lose their character of irrationality when they are regarded from the point of view of choice in the sense of which we have been speaking. These imperfections or, in general, evil in all its forms physical and moral, which jar both our senses and our sensibilities, constitute the major objections, perhaps the only serious objections to finality and, as a consequence, to faith. The problem is as old as the world. Let us remember that evil has always appeared as the accidental product of or, perhaps better, as the price to be paid among human beings for liberty and solidarity, two possessions which are in themselves among the greatest blessings.

**T**HESE OBSERVATIONS were necessary in order definitively to paint a picture of the world, the object of our investigations, a picture which is extremely foreshortened but nevertheless integral.

Four phases of evolution: elementary particles, inert matter, living things, man.

The elementary particles have their own rules where causality is minimal. Inert matter is subject to the practically rigid determinism of thermodynamic laws. Living things, beneficiaries of a relaxed determinism which can bring physical ill in its train. Finally, man, risen to dignity and to the responsibilities of free will, from which proceeds the possibility not only of physical ills but also moral ills.

Between each of the four phases mentioned a hinge is found, in the sense above defined in our analysis of the work of Lecomte de Noüy, and which it is important to make still more precise by an observation which is of value

for each of the phases: this is that each time a new phase starts and takes its constituent materials from the preceding phase, this latter continued to pursue its own path not only independently but also in the very heart of the new phase. Atoms and molecules built with elementary particles have not caused electrons and individual photons to disappear. Living things, composed chemically of the same elements as inorganic matter, live in this medium. Finally, the human mind illuminates the body that animal evolution has developed and remains then as a contemporary.

If it is sought to make these ideas concrete by means of a diagram, I would willingly borrow the idea of a curve where each hinge would be characterized by one of those points of singularity where the curve separates into two branches. If, to use the language of mathematics, these singularities maintain the continuity of the function, this would signify that each phase finds its origin in the preceding phase and utilizes it for its constitution; on the contrary, for the branch which represents the new phase, the discontinuity of the derivative would be indicative of the change in orientation, whilst a second branch, a prolongation of the initial curve would correspond to the permanence of the anterior phase.

All that is very well, you will tell me, but in the last analysis, where you have introduced relaxed determinism for living things and especially free will for man, does not this finally result in the negation even of the idea of finality? If it permits you to contrive a place for evil, does it not definitely contradict the idea of direction? This concept associates two points of view which really appear to be mutually exclusive and we are asked to accept both one and the other.

We are plunged into the midst of mystery; and this mystery returns in fact in its last expression, to one of those that the rationalists have complained about the theologians accepting already for many centuries, namely the co-existence of the omniscient Providence of God and the free will of human beings.

What I wish to show in conclusion is that if there is no question of eliminating the mystery, contemporary science, by way of analogy, inclines us in a singular manner to accept it; for, indeed, a comparable humility has been asked of us in these last years in the realm of the most positive physics.

We refer particularly to the theory of *complementarity*. Two scientists of the first rank, Bohr and de Broglie have fathered it, have built the structure to account for the two aspects, corpuscular and undulatory, that the elementary particles of physics have assumed.

It is necessary to know, in fact, that light was universally considered in the 19th century as a wave by reason of certain crucial experiments in interference; that same light behaves in other cases, such as the photo-electric effect, as if it were granular and made up of distinct projectiles. Also, the electron, the classic example of a corpuscle, sometimes manifests the characteristic properties of a wave.

On the one hand a *localized* particle, to which, conceptually, the idea of a frequency is foreign; on the other, a wave, that is to say a *diffuse* entity

of which periodicity is the essential characteristic. And the two aspects have to be applied to one and the same thing. As M. Manneback says so excellently: "In the description of an experiment the simultaneous use of the two concepts leads to contradictions. From the point of view of logic, the two concepts applied simultaneously to the same physical entity lead to antinomies; from the empirical point of view their alternate use, depending on the conditions, is indispensable."

De Broglie was the first to attack the dilemma in 1924. His admirable wave mechanics succeeded in furnishing a liaison between the two aspects, but this agreement remains completely analytical, and, what is more, it requires particular abstractions of the concepts. The wave no longer transports energy but only the probability of localization of a particle which retains, of the customary representation, only its point-character, the notion of a trajectory being given up.

Agreed that physics has not said the last word. But, it may be noted that one of the fundamental advances of modern science, the Heisenberg uncertainty principle is so straitly linked with this dualism of physical properties, embodied in the concepts of wave and corpuscle, that it serves to reinforce the dualistic concept. We shall quote therefore, today, a commentary of de Broglie, although more than fifteen years old—a long time in modern physics: "The undulatory and corpuscular aspects are like two facets of an object that cannot be viewed at the same time but one must look at each in turn to be able to describe the object completely. Bohr names these two aspects complementary, meaning by this that, on the one hand they contradict each other, and on the other they complete each other... It is not at all evident, indeed, that we should be able to describe a physical entity with the aid of a single picture or a single concept of the mind."

Such a language, we must insist, is totally foreign to the perspectives of science in the last century. In this respect, the concept is in accord with the whole revolutionary current of the physics of the twentieth century. It is interesting here to interpolate some observations concerning this current of modern physics, for the radical change of climate resulting from the new physical theories and in which these theories are continually elaborated affects the bases of our interpretations so profoundly that it acquires a symbolic value. For, by compelling us to an unheard-of extension of our immediate range of vision, by upsetting all our categories, and introducing us deliberately to the non-representable, does not science today contain the germ of an invitation to a really transcendent extension and to humility in the acceptance of a truly religious mystery?

**I**N ADDITION, HOWEVER, the Catholic will loudly affirm his unreserved admiration for the tremendous effort of thought that has been accomplished in fifty years which has resulted in such progress and such commotion.

The general public hardly suspects the depth of this disturbance in the concepts which are basic to the description of the world.

Planck's quanta which introduce discontinuity into energy exchanges; pro-

found changes already discussed in the notions of wave, particle, trajectory; a marked weakening of the notion of causality resulting from an inevitable indeterminacy and perhaps essential in the world of elementary particles. And what is to be said of the paradoxes of relativity: No longer universal time; the distance between two points and the time varying according to the frame of reference; the mass of a body increasing with its velocity which cannot exceed a certain maximum value which is absolute and invariant; mass is itself energy and, reciprocally, all energy has mass with the result that a hot body is heavier than the same body when cold. General relativity adds that space is not Euclidean but Riemannian, that is to say it possesses a curvature intimately related to gravitation; space is finite but without limit.

One step more and it is the expanding universe, whose radius is increasing with time, and, for the first time, the mind, by scientific paths, envisages the possibility of relating itself to an origin of the cosmos. Can our thought, asks Canon Lemaître, approach, dizzily, this point of departure of space-time, the instant when there was no yesterday, because yesterday there was no space.

This sequence of propositions that I have only been able to name in rapid succession will at least have served, I hope, to let you see the extent to which the framework of scientific thought has been recast, a thought which is basic to so many spectacular discoveries and audacious extrapolations of thought. I especially hope that it will have emphasized the opening of this thought to the non-representable. But we must close this parenthesis and return to the particular case of complementarity, or rather its extension.

Indeed "in the mind of Bohr" (we are quoting de Broglie once more) "this notion of complementary appears to have the importance of a veritable philosophic doctrine. We can attempt to extend the field of its application outside the domain of physics. For example, one can enquire, as Bohr has done himself, whether the idea of complementarity cannot have important applications in biology and assist in understanding the dual aspects, physico-chemical and vital, in the phenomena of life."

Here we rediscover a position where numerous quotations find their echo. We already recalled several of these a short time ago. By analogy, this theory allows us to understand why certain people only discover the physico-chemical aspect in living things (imagine *mutatis mutandis* a physicist who had never worked with interference phenomena); but it also permits us to envisage the lacunae in such a point of view and its inadequacy for a total comprehension of the organism. This dualism that every living thing conceals was expressed by Claude Bernard when he saw in all its functions an ideal side bound up with the plane of creation of the organism and a material side connected with the mechanism of its properties.

Complementarity in unity. More and more it is recognized that the spirit and the material body form a substantial and indissoluble unity, with reciprocal reactions. Our individual and social behaviour is conditioned by a multitude of factors sufficiently determinable that a psychology and a sociology can be elaborated but which will delimit also the field offered to the activity of liberty which is the second and no less real a future of this unified duality. *Nos humeurs influent sur notre humeur* as Dr. Biot recalled, emphasizing this happy

inspiration of the French language. We are assisting at the death of the romantic conception of a quasi-angelic soul independent of the body.

It can be seen how this concept of complementarity and the double movement of rupture and continuity between the phases of evolution already set forth, illuminate each other. The continuity of the anterior phase, physical chemistry in living things, animal life in man, all these correspond to one of the complementary aspects, while that which is specific to a phase, living organization or the spiritual, is bound up with the second aspect.

Now let us return to our primary opposition between finality and liberty. Scarcely a single step further, and on the theological plane, we confront, as we have already said, the secular controversy between grace and free will or between free will and divine prescience. Here, from the point of view of man's liberty "everything happens as if" God did not know the future free actions, whilst from the point of view of divine prescience "everything happens as if" God knew the smallest details of the future.

And, now, listen again to de Broglie commenting on the two complementary aspects in physics: "It is found in fact that they are both useful to a certain extent for the description of phenomena and that, in spite of their contradictory character, they ought to be used alternatively depending on the case" or again "the more or less schematic idealizations that our minds construct are capable of representing certain aspects of things but they are subject to limitations and cannot contain in their rigid frameworks the whole richness of reality."

I ask you, shifting these phrases to the theological argument under discussion, need any words be changed? I agree that it is not always legitimate to apply to one discipline the methods that are suited to others, and in particular, to treat both the absolute and the relative in the same manner. But is it not remarkable that the same language can be used in two areas so far removed one from the other?

In each of them reality transcends our concepts. For, and let this be specially emphasized, it is not a question of introducing contradiction itself into things. Complementarity is first of all and essentially a mark of finiteness of mind. Let us allow ourselves once more an illustration to indicate this. Suppose there existed infinitely planar human beings, whose space was limited to two dimensions. For such beings the superposition of the profiles of the right and left hands would appear as an impossible and contradictory operation. But we know that a child realizes this superposition as he passes to the third dimension.

Observe also that complementarity does not place the two aspects on the same plane. We noted, in passing, that the wave does not convey energy. In it resides the predictability of localizations of the associated particle. Thus, the theory tends to give, I dare not say more reality to the particle, for the word would be very badly chosen, but more consistency. In the same way, in living beings there is a difference in level between the two components of its structure. And what is to be said then of grace vis-a-vis free will?

How not be struck at finding this duality of aspect in physics, in biology, in our destiny, without mentioning many questions where it could equally well be found? This analogy which can be made so much broader gives rise to so many questions.

Dare we then take one step more which the Christian alone will attempt? If, for the Christian, as for others, physical and spiritual realities are the work of God, he perceives by the light of Saint John and Saint Paul that it is by the Word and in Him that everything has been made. Should the human mind, made to discover His manifestation in the universe, not find it there as the reflection of Him who has made of Himself Complementarity par excellence, having united in His single Person the opposition of two natures, creative and created?

*Translated by HUGH S. TAYLOR*

<sup>1</sup> Defined by de Noüy as "a finalism with a very ultimate goal." (Tr.)

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# PHENOMENOLOGICAL INQUIRIES INTO MYSTICAL EXPERIENCE

AUGUSTIN LEONARD

*Remain in the shadows until the angel has called you to go forth.—Taufer.*

**I**F AN EXPERIMENTAL knowledge of God exists, this is a fact of such consequence that it is not surprising to find psychologists, historians and philosophers studying it with as much enthusiasm as the theologians. At the beginning of this century the work of W. R. Inge, *Christian Mysticism*;<sup>1</sup> William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*;<sup>2</sup> Evelyn Underhill (Mrs. Stuart Moore), *Mysticism*;<sup>3</sup> and Friedrich von Hügel, *The Mystical Element of Religion*;<sup>4</sup> detached positive mystical studies from "medical materialism" where, according to William James, they had been swallowed up.

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The theologians on their side, stimulated by Poulin's *Grâces d'oraison*,<sup>5</sup> did not delay, especially after the first World War, in isolating the essence of mystical contemplation from the extraordinary phenomena with which it had been confused, and also in deepening the theological foundations which account for it.

The "Problem" of mystical experience nevertheless still remains open. For the more one surveys the already immense literature of the subject, the more one perceives that unanimity has not succeeded in establishing itself, not so much on the theological principles and spiritual directives to be given to souls who would be called to these states whatever they may be, as on their nature, on their psychological structure, on the diverse forms which they assume in the course of history, on the "type" of knowledge which they represent.

Now, if it belongs to theology to pronounce finally on the legitimacy and the norms of a Christian mystical experience, it remains true that we know this through history and not by revelation.<sup>6</sup> Therefore it is not only legitimate but indispensable to study such experience by a descriptive method. This is the method which will be used here. The following pages do not propose to direct souls along spiritual paths, nor to make a contribution to mystical theology. Their end is far more modest.

1. They are limited to the criticism of certain descriptive interpretations which lead mystical studies to a dead end, even though they have the merit of proposing significant questions.

2. It will be possible afterward to determine what, *on the phenomenal plane*, mystical experience must be; or, in other words, to determine the field in which these terms preserve their true meaning because they designate then a "type" of knowledge which cannot be confused with any other.

### Dialectic of Interpretations of Mystical Experience

**M**OST DESCRIPTIVE or philosophic works on mysticism still depend on a line of thought which has identified mystical experience with a religious experience conceived in a subjective and emotional fashion. This immanentist tendency which sacrifices both the idea of religious experience and that of mystical experience for the sake of a vague intuition without a determined object and without precise character, is found in several systems which have been hatched under Kantian auspices. The moral agnosticism of Kant, opposed to mysticism and yet inspired in part by pietism, by denying the speculative reason the possibility of reaching the transcendent and by rejecting natural theology, opened the way for an immanentism to which Schleiermacher did not hesitate to assign its "mystical" value.

For Schleiermacher the essence of religion consists neither of metaphysical principles nor of moral laws. On the contrary it manifests itself only in a decisive opposition to metaphysics and to morals; "it is neither thought nor action, but intuitive contemplation and sentiment," "judgment and taste for the infinite."<sup>7</sup>

This intuition which is at the heart of all religion is the seizure of the infinite in all the actions which it exercises over us. It is not the nature of things, but their action on us which is the object of intuition. The religious soul perceives these actions as representations of the infinite, for every being, every manifestation of the universe, is an action which the infinite exercises over us.<sup>8</sup> This connection is not due to reflection. It is not the product of abstract thought, the domain of metaphysics. It is directly perceived. Religion "rests content with direct experiences of existence and of the activities of the universe."<sup>9</sup>

This immediate perception of the action of the infinite in the finite awakes in us the lively consciousness of the infinite, because every intuition, by its very nature, is yoked to a feeling; this emotion puts us in touch with the Eternal and the Divine.<sup>10</sup>

In this experience dogma plays only a secondary role. It is not a knowledge of the religious object, but a reflection on the religious feeling which it is content to interpret abstractly.<sup>11</sup> The divine attributes designate nothing either real or objective. They simply mark divers manners of referring to God the feeling of dependence. Dogmas are descriptions of psychological states.

Liberal theology and modernism were impregnated with Kantian agnosticism and romantic sentimentalism. Sabatier, for example, will add to them only an insipidly melodious expression<sup>12</sup> whose echo has been strangely prolonged even till today.<sup>13</sup>

These theories are known. Their brief recall suffices to indicate how every religious experience became a "mystical experience," that is, a feeling independent of doctrines and of institutions, an encounter with the Transcendent, outside of faith and of the Church. This arbitrary identification has given birth to the idea of mysticism which is still prevalent. Before everything else, it is seen as an ineffable and mysterious motion to which the other religious realities add only an accidental superstructure. Even the religious philosophy

of Bergson, where mystical emotion is nevertheless supra-intellectual, remains marked by this historic current.

Mysticism, such as it is conceived in the philosophy of Schleiermacher, will be comprehended in the reprobation of the psychologism which distinguishes many contemporary Protestant theologians whom Albert Ritschl had preceded on this path.

This second current of ideas vigorously rejects the immediate intuition in which the first delighted. But in both cases authentic Christian mysticism is perverted. Ritschl makes way for a mysticism which signifies the destruction of faith, the disappearance of the dogmatic element and of the historic dimension essential to Christianity. But are these the true traits of mystical experience? That is the question which presents itself.

Religious experience, far from being identical with it, is here actually opposed to mystical experience. The center of Ritschl's theology is the absolute value of the historic personality of Christ as the revealer of God. His point of departure is diametrically opposed to Schleiermacher's. It lies in the reality of revelation. He is opposed to mysticism as to the abandoning of the historic nature of Christianity. Religious experience, born of faith and of regeneration, is not a passive union with God but an active trust in Him. This faith-trust is the supreme value which sets in motion all the faculties of the soul. The pretense to immediacy must be repulsed in favor of all the mediations which render possible the relationship of the soul to God: the mediation of Revelation, of the Church, of the moral law. In refusing these mediations one runs the risk of confusing the real world with the mirages of hallucination. The criterion of salvation is not the *unio mystica* but justification by faith.

Besides, the pretense to union with a non-revealed God—that is, to turn aside from the mediation of the historic Christ—not only ignores the fact that divinity can be reached or known only in the activity of Christ in us, but in addition it depends on a fallacious psychology. True religious knowledge in fact is not of the Platonic type. It is not static and does not visualize an object at rest which one could comprehend beyond its activities. This true knowledge, on the contrary, is of the dynamic type. It is consonant with the epistemology of Lutz, according to which the soul is imperceptible beyond its activities or its functions because when it is passive it no longer exists. Ritschl then opposes to mystical love a faith in the historic Christ which is active, voluntary, intellectual, and practical. Love, according to him, manifests itself only in the works of the Christian life. It is devotion toward men and fulfillment of the law.<sup>14</sup>

Two conceptions, the one favorable to, the other opposed to mysticism, confront one another and participate in a dialogue of the deaf on a subject which remains obscure. The first tendency exalts the prophet who is uniquely concerned with interior revelation, at the expense of the priest dedicated to the homely cult of the letter. The second tendency sends Platonic or pantheist mysticism back to the Academy in order to welcome the prophet, but conceived now as the man of the Bible and of the Church. Contemporary studies enter on one of these two directions, in either of which the incomprehensibility of mysticism is about identical.

A third approach is provided by non-confessional psychology. William James brilliantly represents this type of explanation. In addition, its philosophic thought unites a subjectivism like that of the enthusiastic emotionalism of Schleiermacher and a pragmatism analogous to the value judgment of Ritschl.

Subjectivism leads the American philosopher into according ecclesiastical institutions and theologies an altogether secondary value. The original religious fact is a total reaction of man in the face of life. The structure of this reaction and the object which gives rise to it are equally undetermined. Divinity is attached to anything which provokes an individual response impregnated by a religious character, "primordial truth," for example. This response is in its turn religious, because it is total and is marked by a grave and serious character.

In addition, pragmatism grants to the movement of thought the end which it pursues: to arrive at a state of rest or of faith which permits action to expand. Beliefs are rules of action. So the metaphysical attributes of God, whatever their logical coherence may be, have no significance, since they have no connection with conduct. Man cannot posit a specific act which is distinct from their subject. They are "metaphysical monsters." Moral attributes, on the contrary, have a pragmatic value because they determine our religious sentiments, although theodicy may be as powerless to found these rationally as the others.<sup>15</sup>

For Schleiermacher and his numerous followers, religious sentiment is the unique source of religious knowledge. For James the sentiment is rather the practical consequence that it produces. These effects can be internal or external, and from this point of view the psychologist seeks a religious criterion, still more relative than intuition, in the results of a concrete therapeutic, such as is found in Mind Cure, Christian Science, or New Thought. This relativism is still more accentuated in the face of the object of religion, since God is a finite personality and since James, like Renouvier, does not exclude philosophic polytheism.<sup>16</sup>

In this perspective, mystical states of consciousness form a special psychological mode of that vague and undetermined religious experience, some characteristics of which I have already mentioned. In the eyes of William James four marks, of which two are most important, distinguish these states: the first is *ineffability*. Such states in fact elude expression; they are in great part incommunicable, and from this point of view, they belong more to emotion than to intelligence. They possess, nevertheless, a *noetic quality*. These states of intuitive knowledge discover a truth concealed from the discursive intelligence. They are transitory: the quality which is proper to them can be evoked only imperfectly by the memory. But when they are reproduced they are recognized, and from one experience to another they are susceptible of a continued development in importance and in interior riches. A final characteristic is *passivity*. Activities of the will or even the body, or again peaceful contemplation, favor these states. But in the mystical consciousness properly so-called the will is not active; consciousness undergoes the invasion of a power which dominates it.

William James distinguishes mystical states of a sporadic character from those which are the fruit of a methodic cultivation. Under the first are sub-

sumed such various events as prophetic discourse, automatic writing, the trance of the medium, the sudden clarity which illuminates a text often read and hitherto obscure, the phenomena of false reminiscence, states engendered by poisons and narcotics, and finally the contemplation of nature. The second class are produced rather in the great religious: these are mystical states properly so-called. They are never simple interruptions of habitual consciousness. The memory preserves a more or less lively recollection of their content. It cannot lose the intense feeling of their importance. Besides, these states profoundly modify the interior life of the subject between the occasions of their reappearance. The hypothesis of experimental psychology which could explain them is that of the invasion of the subliminal consciousness into the clear consciousness.<sup>17</sup>

**W**ITHOUT ATTEMPTING to take up again the historic influences, we can now discern three kinds of interpretation of the mystical fact:

1. A profane current of philosophers and psychologists affirms that the experience of Christian mystics is only a psychological phenomenon, everywhere identical, whose relationship with Christianity is accidental and contingent.
2. A Protestant current, which replaces the anti-mysticism of Ritschl, sees in mysticism only an anti-Christian or non-Christian experience.
3. These two interpretations meet in a conception of mysticism like that proffered by Schleiermacher, and from which it is important to disassociate it.<sup>18</sup> These interpretations, with the personal variations of each author, are again found in contemporary studies.

Dean Inge occupies a middle position between anti-mystical Protestantism and rationalism. He does not admit the distinction between the natural and supernatural, but it appears indispensable to him to recognize a sphere of spiritual truths above the discursive reason. Mystical intuition will be "reason applied to a domain which passes beyond rationalism,"<sup>19</sup> or again "the attempt to realize in thought and feeling the immanence of the eternal in the temporal and of the temporal in the eternal."<sup>20</sup> In this perspective the mystical experience *par excellence* will be of the neo-Platonic type; it is a speculation but a "formless speculation,"<sup>21</sup> which plays as large a role in philosophy as in religion. Thus mysticism takes different forms. It is speculative in St. Augustine, Hugh and Richard of St. Victor, Eckhart; practical or devotional in Ruysbroeck, Suso, Tauler, Walter Hilton, Juliana of Norwich, St. Teresa of Avila and St. John of the Cross—the last two, however, not being "typical mystics."<sup>22</sup> Mysticism, finally, makes use of the reading of nature or of sacramental symbols.

In addition Inge does not admit opposition between mysticism and revelation. He is forced on the contrary to note, against Harnack and Hermann, that mysticism is inseparable from the Bible. The doctrine of St. John and St. Paul not only furnishes the basis of Christian mysticism, but constitutes the most authentic realization of it. The theology of St. John on God conceived as Love, Light, and Spirit, and on salvation the new birth in water and in the Spirit, carrying with it an unshakable certitude and what is more,

an assurance bred of experience, is indubitably mystical.<sup>23</sup> St. Paul, to whom Christ reveals himself directly and who preaches a mystery into which one is initiated by a knowledge, a grace, and a love, all works of an interior God, is no less so. Later mysticism will deviate at times by forgetting the characteristics of New Testament mysticism. There the historic character of revelation and the Incarnation, the importance of objective mysticism (that is, the symbolic role of visible reality), the necessity of exterior cult—these are not forgotten.

Religious authority nevertheless does not reside in Scripture nor in the tradition of the Church, but in "the true apostolic succession" which is constituted by the testimony of mystics. Mysticism would be nothing if it ended only in states of consciousness, and not in an ultimate reality;<sup>24</sup> whence stems what Bergson later calls its philosophic value.

Despite his tendency to reduce mystical experience to a philosophic speculation, Dean Inge inaugurates a happy reaction against psychologism, but his very limited religious philosophy prevents him from rendering full justice to Christian mysticism.

The works of Evelyn Underhill are more faithful to the witnesses. The psychological mode proper to mystical experience is not that of intellectual speculation, but it is identically realized in Plato, Jacob Boehme, George Fox, the Mohammedan or Catholic mystics. Mysticism is the expression of the innate tendency of the human spirit toward a total harmony with transcendental order, whatever may be the theological formulae into which this order is translated. This tendency, in the great mystics, gradually takes possession of the field of consciousness. It dominates their life, and in the experience called the "mystical union," it arrives at its goal. This is indifferently the God of Christianity, the World-Soul of pantheism, the Absolute of philosophy. This desire to arrive at the goal and the movement which leads there, insofar as it is vital and real and not purely speculative, is the proper subject of mysticism.<sup>25</sup> In it the human consciousness reaches its most intense development.

Miss Underhill regrets the four marks of William James, and for them substitutes the following characteristics: mysticism is *practical* and not theoretic. The mystic does not resemble the philosopher who pursues knowledge even in his study of mysticism. The mystic exists and he acts. This activity is entirely *spiritual*, and it does not seek knowledge and power by a magical pressure on the invisible. The total gift of the will, *love*, and not a superficial emotion sets in motion the mystical effort. Finally, mysticism includes a *definite psychological experience*, that is, a reorganization of all interior life, a reconciliation with absolute perfection known by a direct contact. It follows that true mysticism is never a seeking of self, however noble it be, and that sanctity is indispensable to it.<sup>26</sup> These four notes are more exhaustive than those of James. Nothing is said of passivity and of the immediacy<sup>27</sup> of mystical knowledge.

James' description contains valuable elements. The transitory character which he assigns to mystical states is the most debatable. In fact, if one prescinds from the accidental phenomena which often surround the center of mystical experience, but which are not indispensable to it, one ascertains, as I see it, that the mystical journey ends in a habitual union between God and the soul. Besides, certain secondary experiences, though not of indefinite dura-

tion, are yet sometimes very prolonged. According to St. Teresa, they sometimes last for a year.<sup>28</sup> It is nevertheless true that secondary mystical phenomena (visions, auditions, transports, ecstasies) are transitory.

The three characteristics described by H. Delacroix are no more exhaustive. He notes the characteristic of exteriority with regard to the self, or passivity; the affective character and transcendence with regard to ordinary consciousness; the active and constructive character of mental automatisms which paradoxically lead to "a superior unification," under the direction "of a passive power of unification and of organization."<sup>29</sup> How, it has often been objected, can an automatism produce a perfect integration of personality and the conviction of a personal union? Besides, the ingenious subconscious, charged with explaining mystical intuition, is only a psychological transposition, without explicative value, of all the traits observed in the mystics.

Delacroix also denies with difficulty the objective part of mystical experience. The high points of human thought are impregnated according to him with a spirit which transcends them: "a vaster reality, God, Totality, Universe, or Principle."<sup>30</sup> If The Other which is supposed in the mystical union is left in such imprecision by historians and psychologists, it is because they separate the mode or the psychological form of this experience from its foundations and its content, without which, nevertheless, it is inconceivable. They arrive at this disassociation through psychological analysis or through comparative history. Impressed by the multiplicity and diversity of mystics they isolate elements which reality always shows us as united.

The most attentive, however, perceive the difficulty of exiling Christian mystics from the doctrine which nourishes them and from the Church which sustains them. It is hazardous to prove that doctrine plays a secondary role in the experience of St. Augustine, St. Bonaventure, St. Bernard, Tauler, Suso, or Ruysbroeck. These striking examples are no different on this point from all the Christian mystics.<sup>31</sup>

Now if Christian mysticism presents itself as a harmonious spiritual structure where intuition supposes faith, where doctrine is intrinsically and essentially bound to experience, the theory of an undetermined mysticism identical in form, rising indifferently in all religions, all philosophies, all literatures, reveals its weakness.

The necessity of not admitting that the God *experienced* by the mystics is identical with the revealed God of Christianity leads to hypotheses for which textual justifications are sought in vain. Delacroix discerns in St. Teresa "the antithesis between a personal God, representable, endowed with attributes, living, who has a history, and an internal God, confused, infinite, which no image and no form expresses, which is outside of being itself, a divine non-being.

"But this opposition, in its complexity and at the same time in its unity, is life itself, the meaning of life in St. Teresa. This is a singularly orthodox mysticism, whose extraordinary Christianity succeeds in rejoining, in rediscovering, ordinary Christianity. It is orthodox even in the most secret twitches of its subconscious, and that is why it has built outwardly the precise God of Scripture at the same time that it has built inwardly the vague God of the pseudo-Areopagite, the unity of neo-Platonism. The former is the guarantee

of the orthodoxy of the latter and prevents it from losing itself in an indistinction which is no longer Christian. The vague and interior God is very dangerous . . . St. Teresa knew how to avoid this precise danger, and preserved on the one side by her rich subconscious life, by the exaltation of her mental images and by her divisive faculty, and on the other by a rare power of unification, she realized momentarily a double state in which the two Gods mutually preserved, consolidated and enriched one another. Such is the intellectual vision of the Trinity in the seventh abode."<sup>32</sup>

Is it necessary to show how such an interpretation strays from the texts? Miss Underhill, who will not be suspected of partiality, discerns it very clearly. She writes, "It is probable that St. Teresa, confronted with this extraordinary analysis, would have objected that her Trinity, unlike that of her panegyrist, was composed of three and not of two persons. His language in reference to the vague interior God and the orthodox exterior God, would have appeared both awkward and false to her delicate and sincere spirit. At the same time she could not have allowed that the unconditional One of the neo-Platonists was an adequate description of the strictly personal Divine Majesty which she found reigning in the most interior sanctuary of the dwelling of her soul. What St. Teresa did was to actualize in her own experience, to apprehend in the 'depth of her soul,' in the midst of her extraordinarily developed transcendental perceptions, the three distinct and personal aspects of Divinity such as it is recognized by the Christian religion."<sup>33</sup>

**T**HE OPPOSITION between "dogmatic faith" and "mystical faith" connotes in the first studies of Jean Baruzi an idealistic background. It sometimes seems that this authority on St. John of the Cross has developed from an ambiguous philological interpretation towards an interpretation which is more specifically religious. Furthermore he has never thought of denying the Christian quality of the mysticism of St. John of the Cross but it appears in subtle formulae as if it were a secondary aspect which it is necessary to pass beyond. The essential thing is the discovery of a method of purification of thought, located outside of all dogmatism in a "creation of the self by the self."<sup>34</sup> At least one is permitted to glimpse the possibility of a metaphysical progress which would produce the "new mysticism,"<sup>35</sup> the sublime itinerary which St. John of the Cross had outlined without being fully conscious of it. The spiritual progress of the discalced Carmelite tended to become a passage from "naturalist psychism" to "intellectualist idealism" as Brunschvicg conceived it.<sup>36</sup> This philosophic transposition of an experience essentially religious hardly accords with the primacy which St. John of the Cross always gave to faith; besides his exegete admits that "faith of the dogmatic order covers over the faith of the mystical order."<sup>37</sup> But this is not without a reservation on the vital bond between the two. It is by "a submission of mystic faith to dogmatic faith" that St. John of the Cross "will consider absolute being as both one and three."<sup>38</sup> For if critical reason can admit a form of spiritual becoming, it yet refuses to name the end of this movement.<sup>39</sup> The being whom the saint seeks "is not found outside the I" but in "an I which has enlarged itself."<sup>40</sup> The critics<sup>41</sup> have not failed to protest against this imprisonment of the sub-

ject in its immanence with respect to a phenomenon the entire meaning of which is to be an irruption of transcendence into experience.

In another study which in my opinion is a deepening of the preceding work, Baruzi questions St. John of the Cross "while he searches the Bible and finds there a total drama which rescues him from the danger of enclosing himself in a description of his own being."<sup>42</sup> The difference of emphasis is perceptible.

The preponderant role played by the Bible in the experience of St. John of the Cross, as in the theological interpretation that he gives it, shows that "grace here rejoins contemplation properly so-called,"<sup>43</sup> or better still that a "theology of grace is here fully in accord with the analysis of the contemplative life."<sup>44</sup> So that mystical experience can no longer appear only as an interior discovery which is joined to metaphysics, but as a profound research joined to "concrete religion properly so-called."<sup>45</sup>

If one were to extend the thought of J. Baruzi, one would perceive that, through the intermediary of the Bible, mystical experience coincides not only with a theology, but with the Word of God itself, which, if the relationship between the Bible and mysticism is not arbitrary, grounds and justifies the experience. John of the Cross, writes Baruzi, was conscious of being animated by the same spirit as that which inspires the Scriptures. Nevertheless there is here a problem with multiple aspects.<sup>46</sup> To what extent have Biblical characters themselves lived the mystical experience and expressed it in the Sacred texts? Most of the time it is with the help of an allegorical method or even of an accomodating sense that the mystics have read in the texts an experience with which the literal meaning does not correspond in any certain way.<sup>47</sup> Besides the "mystical" reading of the inspired books—the allegorical sense which reveals itself only to the "perfect"—has been at the same time the cause and the result of a "mystical" experience.

From a philosophical problematic of mystical experiences, J. Baruzi has led us toward exegetic and theological problems apart from which it cannot be elucidated. So that it is not surprising to see the analyst of St. John of the Cross devote a study to "Pauline mysticism."<sup>48</sup> This study, like its successor on Angelus Silesius, is directed by a double end: the attempt to resolve the ultimate problems in living experiences and not in doctrinal systematizations: the placing in relief of the idea of "religious creation" which the discernment of influences should not blur.<sup>49</sup> Jean Baruzi applies himself to discerning the influence that the "mystical experience" of St. Paul, seen especially in the Christophany of the road to Damascus and the ravishment to the third heaven, has exerted on his theology. Is the demonstration convincing? One may doubt it. For St. Paul does not teach us "explicitly"<sup>50</sup> what the tie is between his ravishment and certain themes of his doctrine such as grace transforming weakness, the divine pre-existence of Christ and the Kenosis.<sup>51</sup> We are therefore reduced to hypotheses. To what extent is even the ravishment a "mystical event in the pure state."<sup>52</sup> Undoubtedly a long and important tradition supports M. Baruzi here, notably St. Augustine and St. Thomas who interpret this text by the vision of the divine essence.<sup>53</sup> But contemporary exegetes are much more reticent. If they do not go so far as to find the interpretation of St. Augustine "curious,"<sup>54</sup> they do stress the error in translation which is his point of de-

parture,<sup>55</sup> and in general they refuse to discover in St. Paul the experiences of St. John of the Cross.<sup>56</sup> When all this is said, it still remains impossible not to consider the ravishment of St. Paul as a mystical experience, or rather as a mystical fact. But this exceptional charism hardly enlightens us on mystical experience in general and on the sense in which the term mystic can be applied to St. Paul.

After the living experiences, Baruzi turns to the doctrine and assigns a mystical origin to the Pauline anthropology of *soma* and *pneuma*. Finally he analyzes the different aspects of a "mysticism of Christ," which he is careful not to oppose, like Albert Schweitzer, to a "mysticism of God,"<sup>57</sup> and he concludes that St. Paul is undoubtedly a great mystic.

Whatever objections one might formulate against M. Baruzi's thesis, it at least has the merit of posing with firmness and penetration the question of the tie between the spirituality of the New Testament and later mystical experience. Now this is a question of the first importance, because in so far as the knowledge and the religious experience of the New Testament are the norms of all Christian piety, it is in its light that one must resolve the problem of the relationship between mystical experience and Christian experience. Theologians formulate the same difficulty when they raise the question of the continuity or discontinuity between the normal life of grace, of faith and of charity, and mystical experience.

Among the adversaries of this continuity are found not only the historians and psychologists who reduce mystical experience to a psychological phenomenon without object and without foundation, but also many Protestant theologians, anxious not to lose the historical realities of salvation in a Hellenistic speculation. Whence arises the celebrated opposition between mystical piety and prophetic piety, between neo-Platonic mysticism and Biblical faith, which has been developed by Söderblom, Heiler, Barth, Brunner, and Cullmann.

**N**ATHON SÖDERBLOM was probably the first to have clearly noted this distinction which was destined for a brilliant career.<sup>58</sup> In all religion, as in Christianity, one always discovers two sharply differentiated forms of piety or of communion with the divine: unwordly mysticism and historic prophetism.<sup>59</sup> It is the idea of the intervention of God in history, of the historicity of Biblical religion and of Christianity, which forms the line of demarcation. From this point of view there is hardly any difference between Christian mysticism and Hindu mysticism.<sup>60</sup>

Friedrich Heiler takes up again, historically, the same antithesis. Mystical piety can be divided into two lines of development, which are represented by Hindu mysticism and Greek mysticism. The Christian and Islamic mystics belong to the Greek tradition, through Plato, Philo, Plotinus, and the pseudo-Dionysius; but this entire tradition can have but one source: the mysticism of India. Prophetic piety, on the other hand, stems from the Biblical patriarchs, leads to Jesus, continues in Paul and John, and lives again in the biblicism of the Reformers.<sup>61</sup> It is evident that this thesis, especially when it is applied to Christian mysticism, must be somewhat altered: "The great lines of the development of mysticism and of revealed religion continually cross, intersect

and unite."<sup>62</sup> The concrete history of St. Augustine, St. Bernard, Mechtilde of Magdeburg, St. Francis of Assisi, among many others, hardly bears witness to any opposition between faith and contemplation. It would be difficult to maintain that these, and the Christian mystics in general, have been ignorant of personal piety. Still we remain confronted by two very distinct religious types, for mysticism still in itself is not specifically Christian. In a word, mysticism is monist, while prophetism is personalist. It would take too long to criticize in detail the contradictory characters, extremely debatable, presented by Heiler. Hardly any would pass without discussion: for example, the identification of the culminating point of mysticism with extraordinary experiences,<sup>63</sup> when actually these phenomena often end at that moment; the femininity of mystical natures; the intentional search for the experience. In generalizing on very varied facts, Heiler leaves in shadow many distinctive traits of Christian mysticism, where men are much in evidence and in which the experience is never pursued for itself, for the good reason that man cannot attain it by his own efforts. "Certainly," concludes Heiler, "the contradictions which separate these two types have very often been suppressed in history, or at least diminished in the most ingenious way, by Augustine and Francis; but it is impossible to suppress this contradiction in its entirety. It is too strong, it forms a veritable abyss between religion which affirms personality and religion which denies personality, between the experience of God in history and the experience of God independently of history, between revelation and ecstasy, between prophetism and monachism, between the effort to transform the world and flight from the world, between the Gospel and contemplation."<sup>64</sup> But soon a considerable reservation makes an appearance: "It is extraordinarily difficult to determine in what prayer of the mystic type consists, granted that it is always influenced in one way or another by popular religion, or by prophetism."<sup>65</sup> Isn't the answer that mysticism cannot be isolated from other elements of religious life, and that it becomes unintelligible if it is envisaged as a psychological attitude without internal connection with its object and its religious content. Undoubtedly there is a difference between prophetic revelation and mystical union, but both phenomena are situated in a larger religious context, outside of which they are deprived of significance.

Karl Barth, each time that he alludes to mysticism in *Römerbrief*, opposes it to the action of God, to the Christian realities of sin and of faith, as an illusory human attempt.<sup>66</sup> Buddhism, pietism, and mysticism are equally among the "works" which faith abolishes (*Romans 3, 27*). They are lost trails where one is outside the reach of divine interventions, in the particular sense—humanly imperceptible—which Barth gives them.<sup>67</sup> Finally, the mystic is comparable to the skeptical philosopher. The depth which he aspires to reach can be the secret of the world or of his own soul; but what has this depth in common with the profundity of God? Nothing, except the name.<sup>68</sup>

Emil Brunner also opposes mysticism to Christian faith.<sup>69</sup> It is true that, after the fashion of Rudolf Otto, he admits that the mystics differ from one another, but these nuances are all situated within the barrier which separates Christian faith from each and every mysticism.

The most frequently raised contradiction between Christian faith and mysticism is that between a revelation given within history and an escape towards

a timeless absolute. The mystic and the prophet are not only two irreconcilable religious types, but the representatives of two human tendencies which it is not possible to bring into harmony: philosophy and religion. Oscar Cullmann has shown that the cyclic conception of time is proper to Hellenism while the linear conception in which salvation can be prepared, granted, and realized in history belongs to the New Testament. Furthermore, the qualitative distinction between time and eternity would be a Greek idea totally alien to Christian thought. So that Christian experience will always be tied to history whose unfolding envelops all the goods of salvation with reference to the central event: the Incarnation of Christ. According to the Greek conception, on the other hand, "man in order to satisfy his need for revelation and for deliverance, can only have recourse to a mysticism in which time does not exist and which is expressed with the help of spatial concepts."<sup>70</sup>

Such interpretations reject the conception of a mysticism undetermined and without dogmatic foundations, perceived most frequently under the aspects of Hellenistic mysticism, but they admit this conception of mysticism as self-evident and they make no attempt to verify it. This is the task imposed by another tendency which shows the unity among faith, the Church and mysticism, in the case of Christian mysticism; but this time the problem of the continuity between normal Christian life and mystical experience is resolved in the direction of identity, and the specificity of mystical experience is attenuated to the point of disappearing. Such is the direction already indicated by Von Hügel.

**V**ON HÜGEL INSISTS on the unity among mysticism, dogma and the ecclesiastical institution, but he reconciles religious experiences with mystical experience to the point of identifying them. Religion is built only with the aid of a mystical élan, a doctrinal speculation and a communitarian institution which subsist in it as varied elements in a state of tension, but also with a vital unity. To suppress one of the elements amounts to abolishing religion in its richest meaning.<sup>71</sup>

The mystical element of religion is constituted by an ontological presence and an active penetration of infinite Spirit in finite spirit. This presence manifests itself indirectly in the sense of contingency and of finitude which weighs on man when he reflects on the scope of his desires and of his acts. It is not a question however of deducing all our ideas from the intuition of God, as ontologism attempts to do, but to find in our operations a reflective impulse which, on touching the threshold, hurls us toward the divine. This mystical seizure does not spring from a distinct faculty, "from a purely mystical mode of apprehending reality." "All the errors of exclusive mysticism come from the attempt to constitute mysticism as a genre of human experience which is entirely separated and completely self-sufficient."<sup>72</sup> On the contrary it is necessary to insist on the fact that the mystical element cannot be cut off from other religious realities. This bond is revealed if one discovers in the whole soul an even implicit attraction, a spark, though stifled and intermittent, of the sense of the infinite awakened by the manifestation of contingency and of finitude, one which burns with a vivid splendor at much higher degrees in certain

natures animated by heroism and sustained by grace. True mysticism is a partial mysticism and not a "pure" mysticism. Its dignity does not consist in being the all in a soul, that is in driving out and replacing all the other elements of religion, but in being something in all souls.

The thought which inspires the synthesis of Von Hügel implies that religion is always mystical for one part, and that mysticism is necessarily religious. The religious soul which finds its principal nourishment in a history, a tradition, a doctrine, always possesses a mystical touch, and conversely a true mystic cannot deploy all the breadth of his contemplation without being rebound to the contingent world, to the events of history, to the social community.

The difficulty of this strongly balanced religious philosophy resides in the imprecision of the initial mystical experience which would be found in every soul. As soon as it is even only a hardly perceptible spark, it suddenly becomes an immediate experience of the divine.<sup>74</sup>

In the first case one would be confronted with quite tenable psychological views. It could be present in the human spirit like a stepping stone to mystical experience that one could consider under the psychological or metaphysical aspect. Perhaps there exists a mode of psychological activity which would enter into action at different levels of being,<sup>75</sup> for example in the reflexive knowledge of the soul by itself, in the affective communication between persons, in esthetic intuition: profane analogies of mystical experience. If there exists a structure of soul that mystical experience utilizes even while transcending it, we might explain for one thing the multiplicity of mystical experiences at various levels. This in no way implies that there exists a single experience which is everywhere identical. On the contrary, the experiences remain essentially diverse, qualitatively different,<sup>76</sup> especially in the hypothesis of a supernatural intervention, although an analogical resemblance—a partially identical psychological mechanism—places a common element among them. In the second place, if mystical experience can be reconciled with modes of real knowledge, we would understand that, no more than these, could it be completely independent of notional knowledge. As Blondel has profoundly analyzed it, the pneumatic and the noetic forms of knowledge are involved together in a permanent way, even if man alternates from one to the other.

From the metaphysical point of view one might equally detect in the human being an "initial mysticity" immanent in the very nature of spirit,<sup>77</sup> and especially at its first religious awakening. As in theology, the mystical experience will appear in the line of expansion of divine energies enclosed in grace, faith and charity. Whence the error of Bergson when he radically separates the dynamic religion of the mystics from static religion abandoned to the instinct of fable-making and to social pressure.

Von Hügel therefore is right in insisting on the initial mysteriousness inherent in all religion, but he deceives himself when he transforms it—it is the second case we are considering—into an authentic mystical experience. The sense of contingency and finiteness is not, of itself, an immediate experience of the Spirit.<sup>78</sup> Thus the criticisms of Père Grandmaison have been justified. Von Hügel is wrong, he writes, to define "the mystical element properly so-called by means of something which is only a distant anticipation, or at most

a mere glimmer. To authorize this option, he finds himself next obliged to give a very over-estimated description of the first elevations of the religious soul, a description which is not justified by experience."<sup>79</sup> Père Grandmaison continues by characterizing the two experiences: "There, I believe, is the basic confusion; it consists in presenting as accessible, normal, universal—practically admitted as such by every healthy and superior soul—a perception which is, under this immediate experimental form, an actuality for a very few persons and only then at rare moments. Between this joyous perception and the verification or the feeling, even when very sincere and profound, of the insufficiency of the creature, and of our end in an infinite God, all those who have made certain test of the two place a great abyss. On the one hand, distinct knowledge, in part already intellectualized, easy to reproduce; the soul remains mistress of its steps and can render account of them; the perturbation, in order to become deep and remain fruitful, requires evocation and sustenance. In the other case, a confused instinct, a sudden motion reaching the depths of the soul; in some way, the habitual operations of the soul are suspended, and there rises an assured sweetness, a fomenting of imperious desires. A feeling of something new, powerful, ineffable. It is less a sight than a contact, a taste, a touch; and yet it is a perception which brings the soul into the presence of an infinite power. The agreement of all the mystics on these symptoms is no less striking than the feeling that they lack the words to translate their impression."<sup>80</sup>

The interpretation of von Hügel is opposed then to the antithesis drawn between mysticism and Christianity, but it also causes the specific characteristics of mystical experience to disappear. A very similar tendency is also found in contemporary theology.

**I**T WOULD BE NECESSARY, at this point, to canvass the opinions of theologians, if this work had not frequently been outlined.<sup>81</sup> Besides, after recalling very summarily the two dominant trends, I will limit myself to a glance at the most recent development. Theological opinions on mystical experience can be arbitrarily subsumed under two large categories.

The first establishes a difference only of degree and not of kind among faith, charity and mystical experience. Mystical experience, even at its height, admits of no miraculous or charismatic element. As a result every Christian is called, even if in a remote way, to the highest contemplation.

The second class of opinion willingly considers mystical experience as an extraordinary grace, which would be rather of charismatic character, without at all denying that there exists a contemplation for the normal human mode in the immediate prolongation of faith, nor that mystical experience properly so-called is in the line of sanctifying graze.

The progress realized in the 18th and 19th centuries by the mass of theological studies was to distinguish mysticism clearly from all the secondary and extraordinary phenomena in which authors such as Ribet and Görres still please to submerge it, and also to reintroduce mystical life into the perspective of Christian life and to set in relief the unity of the spiritual life. But these works are dominated, as Dom Stolz noted,<sup>82</sup> by the investigation of the supernatural structure of the subject: faith, charity, the gifts of the Holy

Ghost. The present flowering of Biblical, patristic, liturgical studies on the contrary directs attention toward objective realities: the Bible, the Church, the sacraments, worship. Mysticism will be located then, not only in the prolongation of the supernatural organism of the Christian, but equally in the participation in all the aspects of the Christian mystery. To the psychological and introspective mysticism of the 16th century we will readily oppose the objective mysticism of earlier ages. Thus Dom Stoltz endeavors to eliminate from the mystical experience the particular psychological mode which gives it precisely its experimental character. "Quietude, union, ecstasy, are expressions which have originally a theological significance, without direct relation with a special psychological experience."<sup>83</sup> Still, in order that the term *mysticism* have a meaning, it is necessary to designate an "experience of the divine."<sup>84</sup> But it is a question of an experience which transcends experience, which is situated outside the psychological. Even as the light of faith includes nothing other than the normal exercise of our faculties, so the intensity of this light which is mystical knowledge allows of no psychological transformation.<sup>85</sup> It is obvious that this theory rests on the equivocal significance of the term *experience*, and that one is giving there with one hand what he takes away with the other. It is, in fact, evident to all Catholic theologians that mystical experience is not a simple psychological phenomenon; it is always "trans-psychological," because it is in ontological continuity with supernatural realities. But this *ontological* continuity in no way prevents a *psychological* discontinuity. On the contrary, if this ontological continuity is real, mystical knowledge can add nothing to the knowledge of faith except a new psychological mode of seizing the same divine reality. Or rather the specific traits of mysticism must be entirely reduced to those of Christian life. In this case it is useless to speak of mystical knowledge, and all the dazzling texts which mention it are only a collection of sublime metaphors. This is pressing skepticism too far, and the primary characteristic of what St. John of the Cross calls the "mystical intelligence" is still the experimental manner of its apprehension.

This mystical intelligence furthermore does not in any way reject Christian "mediations": Scripture, the Sacraments, the Church, without which, on the contrary, it cannot be born, or develop. Moreover, the necessity of opposing a Scriptural and Eucharistic mysticism to an introspective mysticism does not present itself.<sup>86</sup> It has not yet been proved that there exists a gulf between the psychological mysticism of the 16th and 17th centuries and medieval contemplation, or that of antiquity.<sup>87</sup> Undoubtedly in every age the mystics have tried to translate the secret of the King into the language and mental forms which a transitory culture has bestowed on them. The historian can recapture a transcendent experience only by threading the maze of literary influences which sustain the contingent expressions in which it is reflected. The Christian mystical experience appears therefore in the course of history invested in diverse forms. The living realities, the privileged themes, the doctrinal elaboration each time confer on it a new visage distinct from those which one has already known. Besides, the great spiritual personalities have not received passively the intellectual outlines of their background and of their school. They have profoundly marked them with their own impress, in the image of the exalted experience which they have, so to speak, rediscovered.<sup>88</sup> The Christian Fathers

poured into the words of the Greek or Hellenistic vocabulary, which St. Augustine considered "precious vases," the new wine of Christ. St. John of the Cross later extended the metrics of Boscán and of Garcilaso to the dimension of the "peaceful and tranquil night." A double influence, personal and cultural—to say nothing of the Holy Spirit—has contributed to the diversity of Christian mysticism. But in new backgrounds and with a new actor, it is each time the drama of the union of the Creator and the creature which begins anew. The old human soul, so changing and so much the same, illuminated by the same Scriptures, communicating in the same Eucharistic mystery, always takes up again its agonizing adventure and will pursue it to the dawn of the last day. The unity of Catholic mysticism is not only posited by an act of faith but it is not altogether hidden from observation.<sup>89</sup> The most recent patristic studies, even while insisting on the particular characteristics of each personality and of each school, nevertheless perceive a continuity in the Christian mystical tradition. And the experimental character does not seem to be absent from ancient mysticism.<sup>90</sup>

From the foregoing superficial, but varied, inquiry, the most important problems related to mystical experience disengage themselves. How can the multiplicity of its forms be reconciled with its unity? In this field there is no study comparable to Etienne Gilson's on the unity of philosophical experience,<sup>91</sup> which, freeing itself from historicism, would throw light on the intelligible laws of the diversity and of the identity of Christian mysticism. As the history of philosophy can be written only by a philosopher, so the development of Christian mysticism can be perceived only by one who, if he is not a Christian, at least takes care to accept the evidence as it stands, with all its implications, without attempting *a priori* to interpret it as he likes. Phenomenology permits such an attitude.

To the problem of the unity of Christian mysticism we must add that of its continuity with the Christian experience of the New Testament, and finally the problem of the essence of the mystical experience.

The internal dialectic of the interpretations which we have surveyed (the psychological or philosophic mysticism of pantheist sentiment or of the idealist creation of self; the rejection of this mysticism by Christian faith; the acceptance of mysticism totally reduced to religious experience or to Christian experience) reveals to us the perspective outside of which mystical studies pass by their object.

As Père Maréchal has already firmly established, there is no mysticism apart from a synthesis between a doctrine and an experience;<sup>92</sup> both elements are indispensable. Christian mysticism in particular is unattainable and inconceivable apart from its ontological, but in part observable, connection with Christ, revelation, dogma, the Church, the sacraments. On the other hand, it is no more than a metaphor, without any save literary interest, if it does not admit of a psychological experience *sui generis*, which is not simply Christian faith, however implicitly it may be that, but it is faith lived in a particular psychological modality which is the experimental mystical knowledge of God. It is in respect to this synthetic structure that I will attempt to disengage some of its characteristics.

*Translated by ERWIN W. GEISSMAN*

**The concluding section of this article will appear in the Summer issue.**

- <sup>1</sup> London, 1899.
- <sup>2</sup> *The Varieties of Religious Experience. A Study in Human Nature* (1902), 39th impression. New York, 1941.
- <sup>3</sup> *Mysticism, A Study in the Nature and Development of Man's Spiritual Consciousness* (1911), 13th edition. London, 1945.
- <sup>4</sup> *The Mystical Element of Religion as studied in Saint Catherine of Genoa and her friends* (1908), 2d edition. London, 1927.
- <sup>5</sup> *Des Grâces d'oraison. Traité de théologie mystique* (1901). 11th edition, with Introduction to the 10th edition by J. V. Bainvel, Paris, 1931.
- <sup>6</sup> "A fact which is known to us, not by Revelation, but by experience." J. de Guibert, "Une définition théologique des grâces mystiques," *Recherches des sciences religieuses*, 1928, p. 271. See also the remarks of R. Garrigou-Lagrange on the union of the inductive and deductive methods: "La théologie ascétique et mystique ou la doctrine spirituelle," *La Vie Spirituelle*, 1919, pp. 16-18.
- <sup>7</sup> *Discours sur la religion*, translation and notes by I.-J. Rouge. Paris, 1944. Pp. 151-2.
- <sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 154.
- <sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 156. See p. 166, the description of this "ecstatic intuition," as it is often called. It is a passage like this which shows how unjustly the interpretation of Christian mysticism has been connected with the impoverished monistic theology of Schleiermacher. In this edition of the *Discours* the translator frequently establishes the relationship with the "revelations" of the great Christian mystics. I will limit myself to the remark that the ecstasy of Schleiermacher has nothing specifically religious about it, that its pantheist allure is the very negation of a Christian ecstasy, and that its indeterminateness prevents us from ranking it on the same plane as the union of which the mystics speak.
- <sup>10</sup> W. B. Selbie, *Schleiermacher, A Critical and Historical Study*. London, 1913, p. 37.
- <sup>11</sup> *Discours*, p. 194. It is well known that in the discourses Schleiermacher still allows two elements of religious knowledge: intuition and feeling. In the *Dogmatics* only the feeling of dependence remains.
- <sup>12</sup> "Not only would religious knowledge never know how to cast off its subjective character; but it is in reality nothing else than that very subjectivity of piety considered in its legitimate activity and development." *Esquisse d'une philosophie de la religion d'après la psychologie et l'histoire*, 9th edition, Paris, 1904, p. 381.
- <sup>13</sup> "The divine is within us. It is enough to disengage it from the ontological imagination." J. Piaget and J. de la Harpe, *Deux types d'attitudes religieuses; immanence et transcendance*, Geneva, 1928, pp. 30-31.
- <sup>14</sup> A. E. Garvie, *The Ritschlean Theology Critical and Constructive, an Exposition and an Estimate*, Edinburgh, 1899, pp. 133-136, 141-142.
- <sup>15</sup> William James, *op. cit.*, Lecture XVIII, *Philosophy*.
- <sup>16</sup> J. Wahl, *Les philosophies pluralistes d'Angleterre et d'Amérique*, Paris, 1920, p. 157.
- <sup>17</sup> William James, *op. cit.*, Lectures XVI-XVII, *Mysticism*.
- <sup>18</sup> Let us recall the distinction finely suggested by Charles Du Bos: "Perhaps we are touching here on the central opposition which has generated all the misunderstanding between the Christian and modern man: for the modern, the psychological is enough; it is an end in itself. For the Christian it is nothing more, nothing else, than the vestibule of the theological." *Le dialogue, avec André Gide*, Paris, 1929, p. 116, n.1.
- <sup>19</sup> "Reason applied to a sphere above rationalism," W. R. Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, p. 21.
- <sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5.
- <sup>21</sup> "Formless speculation." *Ibid.*, p. 22.
- <sup>22</sup> "They were ascetics first and Church reformers next; neither of them was a typical mystic." *Ibid.*, p. 218.
- <sup>23</sup> "The Gospel of St. John—the 'spiritual Gospel,' as Clement already calls it—is the charter of Christian mysticism. Indeed, Christian mysticism, as I understand it, might almost be called johannine Christianity; if it were not better to say that a johannine Christianity is the ideal which the Christian mystic sets before himself." *Ibid.*, pp. 44-45.
- <sup>24</sup> "Mysticism deals not with states of consciousness but with ultimate reality, or it is nothing." *Mysticism in Religion*, London, 1947, p. 55. Inge concedes nevertheless that the psychologist can study by abstraction states of consciousness without reference to their object. I would say precisely that it is a question then of very partial analyses, for even from the phenomenal point of view, the particularity of mystical experience is to disclose a transcendence determined in a state of consciousness. To attempt to consider only this state of consciousness is to neglect the global phenomenon which one elects to investigate elsewhere. Mystical testimony must be accepted as a whole. Inge properly says: "If God is banished from the inquiry, or treated as a product of merely subjective imagination, we need not trouble about the mystics any more. For they are convinced that their communion with God is an authentic experience." *Ibid.*, p. 27. See also "The Psychology of Mysticism," in *Philosophy*, XIII (1938), pp. 387-405.
- <sup>25</sup> Evelyn Underhill, *Mysticism*, pp. 14-15.
- <sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 81-94.
- <sup>27</sup> The term *immediacy* in these pages always has a psychological meaning.
- <sup>28</sup> See the texts cited by A. Fonck in the article on "Mysticism," in the *Dictionnaire Théologique Catholique*, column 2634.
- <sup>29</sup> H. Delacroix, *Etudes d'histoire et de psychologie du mysticisme. Les grands mystiques chrétiens*, Paris, 1908, p. 365-366.
- <sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 388.

<sup>31</sup> "Always, in dealing with Catholic mysticism, one meets this essential difficulty, that its fundamental ideas are precisely 'Catholic'; one always finds there a common and universal basis of ideas which are almost immutable." P. Grout, *Les mystiques des Pays-Bas et la littérature espagnole du XVIIe siècle*, Louvain, 1927, p. 6.

<sup>32</sup> H. Delacroix, *op. cit.*, pp. 74-75.

<sup>33</sup> E. Underhill, *Mysticism*, p. 109. See Chapter V where there is a forceful exposition of the bond between the dogmas of the Trinity and the Incarnation and the experience of the mystics.

<sup>34</sup> J. Baruzi, *Saint Jean de la Croix et le problème de l'expérience mystique* (1924), 2d edition, Paris, 1931, p. 93. See also pp. 219, 230, 674.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 390.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 447.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 449.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 674, n. 4.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 448.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 455.

<sup>41</sup> J. Maritain, *Les degrés du savoir*, Paris, 1932, p. 18, n. 2. R. Dalbiez, "Saint Jean de la Croix d'après J. Baruzi," *La Vie Spirituelle*, Oct.-Nov. 1928. Baruzi examines the criticisms which were addressed to him in the beautiful irenic pages of the preface to the second edition.

<sup>42</sup> J. Baruzi, "St. Jean de la Croix," *Histoire générale des religions* (Quillet), Paris, 1947, IV, pp. 185-197, esp. 188.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 192.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 197.

<sup>45</sup> This problem is dealt with in the thesis of Jean Vilnet, "Bible et mystique chez saint Jean de la Croix," *Les Etudes Carmélitaines*, Paris, 1949.

<sup>46</sup> In the text of St. John, *Qui autem diligit me, diligitur a Patre meo, et ego diligam eum et manifestabo ei meipsum* (14, 21), St. John of the Cross reads a properly mystical content, where he speaks of "elevated knowledge full of love" (*Montée*, Book II, Chapter XXIV). "These words comprehend the knowledge and the attempts of which I speak, and through which God manifests Himself to the soul which draws near to him and which truly loves Him." (*Ibid.* In the translation by Grégoire de Saint-Joseph, Monte Carlo, 1932, II, 21). Thus the Biblical words seem to be lived analogically at different levels of experience. Does the Gospel text imply the psychological mode proper to mystical experience? It does not appear to exclude it. It would therefore be very hazardous to say that St. John the Evangelist has not understood it in the most profound meaning that it can have. But then the question comes up: is the meaning which is the most, "lived," the most clear, that which includes experimental mystical knowledge? Has one not been wrong to make of mystical experience, in the strict sense, a criterion of perfection, since the New Testament is extremely reticent on this point, and this experience remains the privilege of a very small number of souls?

<sup>47</sup> J. Baruzi, *Création religieuse et pensée contemplative: I. La mystique paulinienne et les données autobiographiques des épîtres; II. Angelus Silesius*, Paris, 1951.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5-6.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 52.

<sup>50</sup> It clearly seems, as Dom J. Dupont demonstrates, that this revelation should be considered in an eschatological perspective, as a manifestation of the future glory. Nevertheless St. Paul recognizes a "spirit of wisdom and insight" (*Eph.*, 1, 17) conferring a "fuller knowledge" which is the supreme perfection. *Gnosis, la connaissance religieuse dans les épîtres de Saint Paul*, Louvain-Paris, 1949, pp. 187-199.

<sup>51</sup> Baruzi, *Création religieuse et pensée contemplative*, p. 47.

<sup>52</sup> The principal texts are discussed by Dom C. Butler, *Western Mysticism* (1922), 2d edition, London, 1951, pp. 53-62; J. Maréchal, *Etudes sur la psychologie des mystiques*, Brussels-Paris, 1937, II, 173-179, 204 ff; Dom A. Stoltz, who presents other patristic testimony, says "Tradition sees in the case of St. Paul and, since his rapture must be interpreted as a 'type,' in all mystical life, an ultimate participation in the first paradisiac life, in the way as the life of the just who still await, after death, the final consummation." *Théologie de la mystique*, 2d edition, Chevetogne, 1947, p. 27.

<sup>53</sup> J. Dupont, *op. cit.*, p. 189, n. 1, *in fine*.

<sup>54</sup> The term *in specie*, which St. Augustine translates "by essence," with reference to the vision of Moses (*Nam.*, 12, 8) does not have this precise meaning in the Hebrew text. See Dom Butler, *op. cit.*, p. 7. J. Huby says of St. Paul: "Despite these authorities (St. Augustine and St. Thomas), I still believe that the contemplation of the Apostle, as elevated as it was, yet remained of the order of faith and not of the beatific vision, that in accord with the whole of Pauline doctrine it was, like all knowledge of God here below, partial and mediate, *per fidem et non per speciem*, by way of faith and not of vision (2 Cor., 5, 7)." *Mystiques paulinienne et jobannique*, Bruges-Paris, 1946, p. 120. J. Lebreton sees in the rapture an intellectual illumination; see *Recherches des Sciences religieuses* (1940), pp. 85-89.

<sup>55</sup> Baruzi has foreseen this objection and limits himself to seeking "to what extent a greater clarity can be obtained by this confrontation of a term (mystical) which Paul did not know and of expressions which he himself used." *Création religieuse*, p. 12, n. 4.

<sup>56</sup> Albert Schweitzer, *Die Mystik des Apostels Paulus*, Tübingen, 1930. Besides the opposition between *Christusmystik* and *Gottesmystik*, all Pauline mysticism, according to Schweitzer, dependent on the vision of Damascus, is oriented in an eschatological perspective.

<sup>57</sup> F. Heiler, *Das Gebet. Eine Religionsgeschichtliche und religionspsychologische Untersuchung* (1918), 4th edition, Munich, 1921, p. 248, and numerous references on p. 523.

<sup>58</sup> N. Söderblom, *The Living God. Basal Forms of Personal Religion* (1933), Oxford, 1939, p. 348.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 368.

<sup>60</sup> F. Heiler, *La Prière*, Paris, 1931, pp. 262-263.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 264.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 293-294.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 329.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 329.

<sup>65</sup> "The 'negative way' of the mystic is a dead-end, as all 'ways' are dead-ends. The way is only *The Way*; and this is Christ." *Der Römerbrief*, 7th edition, Zurich, 1940, p. 299; "Nowhere

is there more indirectness than in the kingdom of romantic directness—the Indians!" *Ibid.*, p. 26. Besides, the knowledge of faith in Barth, if it has nothing in common with introspective experience, wanders so far from all the categories of normal thought that it bears a strange resemblance to a mystical perception passively received and transcendent to ordinary consciousness. Whence comes the embarrassment of interpreters in characterizing Barthian faith, without appealing to mystical knowledge, since it is explicitly rejected, while at the same time it is perhaps implicitly present. P. J. Hamer also justly speaks of "contact with the Word of God in faith" rather than of a knowledge. *Karl Barth*, Paris, 1940, pp. 48-58.

67 "Our experience is that which is not our experience." *Römerbrief*, p. 84.

68 "What have these depths self-discovered and self-surveyed in common with the depths of God? Nothing but the name!" *Die Kirchliche Dogmatik*, I, 2, 3rd edition, Zollikon-Zürich, 1945, p. 839.

69 E. Brunner, *Die Mystik und das Wort. Der Gegensatz zwischen moderner Religionsauffassung und dem christlichen Glauben, dargestellt an der Theologie Schleiermachers*. Tübingen, 1928, Chapter XV.

70 Oscar Cullman, *Christ et le Temps*, Neuchâtel-Paris, 1947, p. 38. See also p. 157 apropos of the very numerous Christocentric formulae of St. Paul. "If the first Christian did not have the rigorously linear conception of time which I have shown in the first three parts of this work, all of these statements could have been interpreted, wrongly, in a *mystical* sense. Such an interpretation is excluded by the temporal character of the history of salvation. Participation in a myth located outside of time necessarily assumes a *mystical* character, as we find in the case of the Hellenistic mystery religions. On the other hand, participation in a temporal event of the *past*, if this past really preserves all its value, can rest only on *faith* in the salvific value of these past events."

Let us note that in opposition to the orthodox tendency, the ideas of R. Bultmann, especially those which concern the demythologizing of the Christian *kerygma*, amount to an exaltation of experience independent of objective thought. Undoubtedly this experience is conceived now, after Heidegger, as a call exacting a decision turned towards the future; but the bond between this call and the "mythic" framework, where it makes itself understood, posits once more the problem of the bond between experience and doctrine, and that of different planes of religious knowledge, in a liberal perspective. Thus Christology must be delivered from objectivizing thought: "It seems to me that Christology should be radically freed from the control of an ontology of objectivizing thought, and be expounded in a new ontological idealism." R. Bultmann, "Zur Problem der Entmythologisierung," in *Kerygma und Mythos*, Hamburg, 1952, II, 206. See the critical remarks of P. J. Hamer, "Zur Entmythologisierung Bultmanns. Kritische Bemerkungen," in *Catholica, Jahrbuch für Kontrovers-Theologie*, 1952, n. 2.

71 F. von Hügel, *The Mystical Element of Religion*, I, Chapter II; II, Chapter XV, Sect. IV.

72 *Ibid.*, II, p. 282.

73 *Ibid.*, II, p. 283.

74 Maurice Nédoncelle against P. le Grandmaison gives a more favorable interpretation: "In reality Hügel does not maintain that the infused graces of contemplation may be vested in any Christian, or with better reason, in any human being." *La Pensée religieuse de Friedrich von Hügel (1852-1925)*, Paris, 1935, p. 174.

75 "The most elevated intuitions are conditioned by elementary mechanism, by mental structures which persist even when they are pursued by highly spiritual objects." L. Oeschlin, *L'intuition mystique de sainte Thérèse*, Paris, 1946, p. 3.

76 Rudolf Otto, although one cannot accept his views without reservations, underlines this difference felicitously: "It is not only the *relationship* with the Divine which differs..., but one is confronted with another *essential form* of Divine, according to which the 'Absolute,' or rather the object of the religious relationship, is conceived as immanent or as transcendent God. From then on it is impossible to determine the difference by using a formula which has the precise value of a definition only for the *relationship* of the pious man to the object of the relation, and does not emphasize, at the same time and before all else, the disparity of the object in order to make it the principal point of distinction." *Mystique d'Orient et mystique d'Occident*, Paris, 1931, p. 145.

77 A.-D. Sertillanges, *Henri Bergson et le catholicisme*, Paris, 1941, p. 96.

78 "A vivid sense of how immensely the Spirit, thus directly experienced by their spirits, transcends, and yet also is required by and is immanent in, their keen sense of the Finitude and Contingency present throughout the world of sense-perception and of clear intellectual formulation." Von Hügel, *op. cit.*, II, p. 282.

79 L. de Grandmaison, "L'élément mystique dans la religion," in *Recherches des Sciences Religieuses*, I (1940), 180-208, esp. p. 196.

80 *Ibid.*, pp. 197-198.

81 J. V. Bainvel, Introduction to the 10th edition of Poulain's *Grâces d'oraison*, Paris, 1923. C. Butler, *op. cit.*, "Afterthoughts." "Pour fixer la terminologie mystique," in *La Vie Spirituelle*, (1929-1931). J. Maréchal, "Sur les cimes de l'oraison," in *Nouvelle Revue Théologique*, LVI (1929), pp. 107-127, pp. 177-206. M. de la Taille, "Théories mystiques," in *Recherches des Sciences Religieuses*, XVIII, pp. 297-325. A. Fonck, article on "Mysticism" in *Dictionnaire Théologique Catholique*, Paris, 1930, columns 2660 ff. Article on "Contemplation" in *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité*, Paris, 1952.

82 Dom A. Stoltz, *Théologie de la mystique*, 2d edition, Chevetogne, 1947.

83 *Ibid.*, pp. 134, 144-145, 186.

84 *Ibid.*, p. 178.

85 *Ibid.*, pp. 192-196.

86 Père Bouyer shows that the word *mustikos* inherited from the Greeks takes on a new meaning in the Fathers where it is used in a Biblical and liturgical, but also in a spiritual sense. "Mystique, essai sur l'histoire d'un mot," *La Vie Spirituelle*, 1949, pp. 3-23, esp. p. 8.

Père de Lubac remarks that the adjective "mystique" derives from the noun "mystère" (*musterion*) which writers at the beginning of the Middle Ages sometimes translated as *mysterium*, sometimes as *sacramentum*. *Mysterium* operates in two areas: a ritual or cult area, the Eucharist; a Scriptural area, allegorical exegesis. But it does not follow that mysticism appertains exclusively to the celebration of the Eucharist or to the spiritual reading of Scripture. *Corpus mysticum. L'Eucharistie et l'Eglise au Moyen-Age*, 2d edition, Paris, 1949, pp. 55.

<sup>87</sup> The thesis of Dom Butler has frequently been stressed, notably by Dom Stoltz, on the difference between sober "Western mysticism," which is found in St. Augustine, St. Gregory, and St. Bernard, and the later mysticism in which the influence of Pseudo-Dionysius has become preponderant. If one takes count of the date of *Western Mysticism* (1922), one perceives that the author had it always at heart to distinguish the contemplation of his three models from all extraordinary phenomena; by which one only then began rigorously to distinguish essential mystical experience. The *Montée* of St. John of the Cross is diametrically opposed to this description of Western Mysticism: "It is a mysticism very far removed from any kind of quietism, although the images, the phantasms and the sensible perceptions are banished from the imagination and the memory, the discourse of reason reduced to silence and the faculties of the mind set at rest, while words are stilled and language fails. All this nevertheless does not produce a void, but disengages the place which permits the soul, thanks to a strongly-tempered activity and an intense concentration, to come to life and to bear itself energetically toward God." Butler, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

<sup>88</sup> Père de Lubac admirably expresses this idea: "There are no two great thinkers, no two great mystics, to pose the essential problems in equivalent terms. Each of them, even at the heart of the same doctrinal or spiritual tradition, communicates to us the feeling, if we know how to question him, of the perpetual invention which necessarily is the life of the spirit, and of the perpetual changing of its frontiers. No one of them passes on without his action remaining inscribed in the very regions in which we believe ourselves in the presence of eternal categories." *Op. cit.*, p. 263.

<sup>89</sup> I deliberately limit this unity to Catholic mysticism, because Orthodox or Protestant mysticism, and *a fortiori* that of other religions, poses special problems. Vladimir Lossky, in his *Essai sur la théologie mystique de l'Eglise d'Orient* (Paris, 1944), calls attention in passing to one or other of these problems concerning the East. "The Eastern tradition has never distinguished clearly between mysticism and theology, between the personal experience of the divine mysteries and dogma affirmed by the Church (p. 6)." Consequently "mystical individualism remained foreign to the spirituality of the Eastern Church (p. 18)," while it developed more in the West where mysticism and theology became two distinct domains. So much for the differences. But when the author, following the Aeropagite, offers "radical apophatism" as a property of the theological tradition of the East (p. 35) it is necessary to recognize that even a Westerner is not completely out of his element here. Undoubtedly in the West the apophatic tradition developed in two directions: a speculative plane in which it is subordinated to, or at least united to, cataphatic theology; a spiritual plane in which it is predominant. It remains that Pseudo-Dionysius, through John Scotus Eriena, Hugh of St. Victor, St. Thomas, German and Flemish mysticism, Spanish mysticism and beyond, are far from unknown in the West. Characteristics of this kind, such as the transcendence of God in relation to all human knowledge, and the revelation which it supposes, certainly reinforce the affirmations of a unity of Christian mysticism.

With reference to all religions, P. C. Pepler resolves the problem of the unity of mystical experience by utilizing theological criteria: the universality of grace and of the Redemption of Christ, the possibility of supernatural mystical graces outside of the Church ("The Unity of Mystical Experience" in the *Spirit of Unity*, Oxford, 1950, pp. 52-67). It is evidently on the theological plane that the problem of forms and of the unity of universal or Christian mystical experience can receive a definite solution, our point of view here is that of phenomenological observation, and consequently properly theological criteria remain outside our perspective.

<sup>90</sup> Th. Camelot, *Foi et Gnose. Introduction à l'étude de la connaissance mystique chez Clément d'Alexandrie*, Paris, 1945, pp. 134-135: If one limits mysticism to the precise sense of 'intuitive and experimental knowledge of God present,' one will be able to say, I think, that it is mysticism so understood, the *pati divina*, which is in question in the pages we have analyzed."—J. Daniélou, *Platonisme et Théologie mystique. Essai sur la doctrine spirituelle de saint Grégoire de Nysse*, Paris, 1944: For him there is no vision of God, but only an experience of the presence of God, that is, God is seized on as a person in an existential contact, outside of all intelligence and finally in a relationship of love. This comes from the very character of mysticism. Dionysius the Areopagite borrowed this teaching from Gregory, and, through Dionysius, John of the Cross inherited it."

<sup>91</sup> Etienne Gilson, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience*, New York, 1950.

<sup>92</sup> J. Maréchal, *Etudes sur la psychanalyse des mystiques*, Brussels-Paris, 1937, II, 415.

# HOLY SCRIPTURE: MEETING PLACE OF CHRISTIANS

JEAN DANIELOU

CHRISTIAN UNITY is one of the great problems of today, when the minds of men are occupied with many questions whose spiritual repercussions—and consequently the effects on the entire history of humanity—are far less important. We note with joy that for various reasons the points of contact between Christians of the various beliefs are more and more numerous. This is true negatively, to the extent that solidarity among Christians makes itself felt more and more vividly in the face of a de-Christianized world. But also positively, to the extent that, in fact, a real meeting of minds takes place.

I would like to discuss one of the places of unity *par excellence*, a field where a meeting of minds is most manifest. That is the Word of God, the Sacred Scriptures. Obviously Christians of different creeds have always had the Bible in common. I will also discuss the fact that reflection on the Word of God is now leading them towards a unity of mentality and doctrine. This unity does not consist merely in the material fact of possessing the Scriptures in common, but also in certain common principles to which this common possession has given birth.

**I**N THE FIRST PLACE we perceive two essential but different facts, one on the Catholic side and the other on the Protestant, which have enabled both creeds to progress independently by means of the Bible on the road to unity.

On the Catholic side I would like to point out that for the past fifty years the whole Bible, the Old Testament as well as the New, has assumed a place of greater and greater importance in the life and thought of the faithful. This is one of the great facts of our times, the consequences of which are incalculable. And it is a new fact. The Catholic Church has indeed never denied the Bible; for her it has always been the Word of God and the most essential treasure of her heritage. But it must be admitted that in the 18th and 19th centuries it was somewhat neglected. The reproach that Protestants have for us on this point is well founded. A few years ago there was certainly a difference between a Catholic's and a Protestant's acquaintance with the Bible.

How did this neglect come about? There are many reasons, some peculiar to Catholicism and others more general. Of the former the main one is pre-

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cisely the Catholic reaction to Protestantism. The exclusive attention Protestants gave to Scripture and their principle of individual interpretation caused the appearance in Catholic circles of a reaction, a tendency to place more emphasis on the interpretation of Scripture by the Tradition of the Church (that is, on the teaching of theologians and the ecclesiastical *magisterium*) than on the text itself, which seemed capable of being interpreted erroneously.

There are also other more general reasons. First of all the Bible, especially the Old Testament, seemed like a difficult book. It is very understandable that certain Christians hesitated putting the first chapters of Genesis into everyone's hands without certain preliminary explanations. These chapters are naturally troublesome since they do not possess the answers to the problems they raise. And, from certain points of view the Bible is, as it were, a scandalous book, because of certain episodes in it either concerning God Himself or human affairs which, literally understood, shock the moral sensibility of the modern man. This is still prevalent. I once met an American theologian who was surprised that the Church should continue to write commentaries on the Old Testament. The "jealous God," the God of fear, the avenging God, the pitiless God —what have we to do with Him? What does He now mean to us? Many have been tempted to put aside the Old Testament as a book that is neither edifying nor corresponding to the spiritual needs of souls brought up on the Gospel. Preachers know something about this; they are not always at ease when they have to explain a text of the Old Testament from the pulpit.

For various reasons there had been a certain estrangement in Catholicism with respect to the Scriptures, but in the last fifty years there has been an extraordinary change, a greater and greater interest on the part of both clergy and laity, in the Word of God. This is manifested primarily by the return to the New Testament which characterized the beginning of the 20th century. It was then that several wonderful books on Christ were published, from Père Lagrange's *The Gospel of Jesus Christ* (Newman) to the study of Christ by Père de Grandmaison.

This return to the New Testament has consisted not only in an extraordinary interest on a documentary level. The faithful have turned to the Gospel because they are looking for the Words of life and this has not been merely a conversion of the intellect, a curiosity, but also a conversion of the heart, a search for a more evangelical life. In every group, meditations on the Gospels have become the normal method of prayer and spiritual sustenance. The generations of today will have been brought up on the Gospel, bathed in it, and this is something admirably new.

In addition to the return to the New Testament, our time is also characterized by the return to the Old Testament. After rediscovering the Person of Christ, we are now avid to seek out all that prepared and prefigured him. This is evidenced by the present popularity not only of the Gospel but of the entire Old Testament. Today there are several great editions available to the public.<sup>1</sup>

Renewed interest in the Bible is also shown by the great enthusiasm given to lectures on the Old Testament. Only a few years ago one could not get

teams of Catholic Action or even the clergy together for lectures on the Gospel. There is now a desire for the Old Testament. Père Péret's Bible lectures, for example, have had a great success in lay and clerical circles, and this again shows a thirst for living Biblical thought. One could give many other examples. This fervor for the Old Testament is a new fact. It represents an important event in Catholicism. Formerly Protestants could reproach us for not knowing the Scriptures but this is no longer true. Obviously, this is a great step towards unity.

At the present time we must say that we find considerable progress in Catholicism not only in the popularity but in real knowledge of the Bible as well. I said a moment ago that there used to be difficulties in the Bible, some scientific, some devotional. On these two points we see a great change. On the one hand, fifty years ago no one dared to deny that the first chapters of Genesis, the book of Isaiah and the book of Psalms, were dangerous. We did not know how to reconcile the requirements of science with those of the Biblical Commission. One was not always at ease. I believe that today we can openly approach these difficult problems in such a way that both the requirements of science and those of Père Voste's letter to Cardinal Suhard can be integrally satisfied.<sup>2</sup> There used to be a domain that appeared forbidden and dangerous, where today one can advance without fear. This is more important perhaps than we can realize. In fact it is important not only for intellectuals; we must not forget how many people, half a century ago, lost their faith because they could not see how the Bible could be reconciled with science.

This was also a serious matter in popular circles. Abbé Michonneau once said that in his opinion one of the great obstacles to the people's faith was a vague feeling that certain accounts in the Old Testament could not be believed: it resulted in a general distrust of Scripture. Today we can really explain every problem concerning those particularly difficult chapters in a way that satisfies the critical point of view without minimizing any part of revealed doctrine. There is nothing more serious than to burden people's minds, in the name of faith, with those things which they will one day be able to perceive one has no right to impose on them. In such a situation, people will run the risk of doubting everything, including revelation itself. Now we are able to distinguish the Word of God and the great historical truths from certain expressions which are to be explained in terms of the literary form or the author's mentality, and this is essential if we are to spread the faith not only in intellectual circles but among people as well. The progress that has been made by Biblical science in the past fifty years is an admirable gain. How could we not honor the greatest pioneers—I am thinking of Father Lagrange and the Biblical School of Jerusalem, the Biblical Institute of Rome, and the wonderful book that appeared at Lyon which was such a credit to the Lyon Biblical School and its founder; the Psalter of Father Podechard.

Such words show the existence of a Catholic Biblical science that is not afraid of attacking the most delicate and important problems, so that one of the difficulties of approaching the Old Testament disappears. But that is not all. We said that one of the troublesome things in Scripture, particularly in the Old Testament, was the impression that it contained traces of an obsolete

religious mentality and for that very reason was hardly suitable for spiritual life today. This problem is transcended now by the greater and greater interest given to the Old Testament and to a theology that is properly Biblical, i.e., concerned with the essential religious teachings.<sup>3</sup> We are witnessing the rediscovery of the great fundamental realities of the Bible and we know that they constitute an incomparable richness for the nourishment of our theological and spiritual meditations. It is certain that the God of the Old Testament and the great categories of sanctity and majesty which Scripture reveals to us, through the depths by which they introduce us into the divine reality, surpasses everything that the philosophers have been able to tell us.

The entire Old Testament is an incomparable light for our minds and lives as Christians. We can hardly feel sorry for the early Christians who had nothing else to nourish their thought and piety, and who sought in the Old Testament the only spiritual nourishment of their souls.<sup>4</sup> They needed nothing else. We are also happy to note that the work of Catholic exegetes is being oriented in this direction. We can mention the works of M. Cerfau at Louvain<sup>5</sup> and his students;<sup>6</sup> the great work of Père Guillet on the great themes of the Old Testament; Father Gelin's book, *Les Idées Maitresses de L'Ancien Testament*; and the articles of A. Feuillet on Biblical eschatology.<sup>7</sup> All this shows an interest given to the essential ideas of the Old Testament and we welcome a step forward in the return to the Scriptures. The Bible in its entirety is resuming its life-giving and illuminating function of the living Word of God at the heart of Christian life. We must not forget that the Bible is not a dead book, a collection of documents, but the words which God speaks to every one of us today. It is the Divine Word, as Origen said, present under the appearances of the letter. The Sacrament of Holy Writ is being restored to its place with the other Sacraments, that of the Body of Christ, the Eucharist. The restoration of Scripture in its essential function at the heart of our spiritual lives and of our action as Catholics is a great event and a decisive step on the road to unity.

**O**N THE PROTESTANT SIDE we observe a different kind of progress, but one which equally constitutes a step towards unity. I will summarize in a brief formula the comparison of the two points of view by saying this: Catholics and Protestants are coming closer together to the degree that Catholic theology is becoming more Biblical and Protestant exegesis more theological. The second tendency is as true today as the first, for Protestants are again finding in Scripture the affirmation of the great dogmas of the Christian faith.

A moment ago I gave a rather severe picture of the Biblical situation in Catholicism a century ago. I could make a similar picture of the Protestant situation. There was no neglect of the Bible—it remained the essential book—but the Bible was interpreted by a so-called liberal Protestantism which must be said to have represented the consensus of Protestant thought at the end of the 19th century. It was interpreted in a purely human and rationalistic way, as the greatest of all human books but not as a witness of divine events. More precisely, the members of the *Ecole de l'Histoire des religions* saw in Christian-

ity a moment of the religious evolution of humanity—Christianity was the meeting of Jewish and pagan trends. All this was explained in a perfectly natural and rational manner, but Scripture, the Word of God, was thereby entirely emptied of its substance. It was no longer the book written by the Holy Ghost. But we are glad to say that in the Protestant world today there is less and less of this point of view. Here too there has been a change, and if we consider not only a few *élites* but also the more extensive communities we find the same interpretation of Scripture as ours, i.e., the revelation of the great divine realities which are the object of our faith.

One of the exegetes who has played the greatest role in this change and to whom we owe a great deal is Oscar Cullman, professor at Bâle and Paris, who once wrote that in his opinion no one understands anything in Scripture without faith, because Scripture is not a book that can be approached only with critical methods or with purely rationalistic formation. It is a book to which one has access only by an interior conversion.<sup>8</sup> What influences have been at work there? I am pleased to honor in particular Karl Barth, the great Calvinist theologian who has violently shaken rationalistic Protestant circles by reminding them of the supernatural and transcendent character of the Word of God.

Everywhere we encounter constructive work that is entirely convergent with ours. To cite only a few examples, I am thinking of the great centers which Bâle and Switzerland now represent, where alongside a Cullman we meet a Wilhelm Visher, whose *La Loi ou Les Cinq Livres de Moïse* has just been translated.<sup>9</sup> Some of his interpretations may be debatable but certainly not the clear statements of the great revealed truths. In England today we have a galaxy of great New Testament scholars: in particular Manson, Hoskyns and Dodd.<sup>10</sup> In Sweden, Anton Fridichsen has grouped around him a promising team that includes Riesenfeld, Edsman, Reicke, who are known by their interest in the Sacraments.<sup>11</sup> I am only giving a few examples but it is really a fact that concerns the entire Protestant world. It is an immense step forward. Here too there is something new, a significant event on the road to unity.

We would be unable to talk to a Protestant who does not believe that Jesus Christ is the son of God. We can indeed talk to one who does. What is interesting here is that the progress which was first evident on the level of essential dogmas, i.e., of the Holy Trinity and the divinity of Christ, has now extended into other domains. One of the characteristic traits of present-day Protestantism is the rediscovery of the Church in its various aspects. This is found in the domain of the Sacraments, heretofore misunderstood and neglected in favor of preaching alone. They have regained their place in the life of the community, at the same time that the theologians have restored their meaning.<sup>12</sup> Elsewhere the notion of a doctrinal authority is beginning to reappear and the disagreement between Catholicism and Protestantism ceases to be the opposition of authority and liberty and becomes that of two different concepts of authority. Even the biblical foundations for the Primacy of Peter are recognized by many.<sup>13</sup> Now the only question is to know to what extent this primacy continued to exist in the Church after the Apostolic age.

**T**O DAY IT IS not merely two parallel movements that we are witnessing, one separate from the other. What we must say, and this is the second question we have to discuss, is that today biblical science is a field where oecumenism already exists in fact, where Catholics and Protestants work together and depend greatly on each other. It is elementary honesty to recognize that modern biblical scholarship is the result of this collaboration. This fact was recently demonstrated again in the foundation at Upsala of a world *sodalitas* of specialists of the New Testament made up of both Protestant and Catholic scholars. This is a banal fact, you will say. Such work in common always existed on the scientific level; science has no fatherland and biblical science, as a science, does not escape the general law. It is true that Protestants have always benefitted from Catholic research; for example, the archeological excavations in Palestine and the progress in the knowledge of Semitic languages. Reciprocally, Catholics have always utilized the discoveries made by Protestants pertaining to the literary criticism of the Old Testament. How could we not point out in particular the revolution that took place in the field of exegesis by the theories of the *Formgeschichte*.<sup>14</sup> It would be absurd not to benefit from a discovery because it was made by someone who does not hold the same creed.

However what I wish to discuss is something else, less banal and more essential. I refer to the collaboration that exists not only on the level of the related biblical sciences such as archeology, philology and geography, but on the level of the very understanding of the World of God, which is the essential subject matter of exegesis. Here it is, in the understanding of Revelation, that we note in every way an interdependence of Catholic and Protestant scholars, so that we can say that exegesis in the highest meaning of the word is a workshop where both work side by side in the most friendly way.

And so it is a simple act of honesty to acknowledge everything that we owe to our Protestant brethren, everything that exegesis owes to their work. It is simply justice to acknowledge that today in our seminaries and scholasticates it is to a great extent by means of these Protestant works that we study the New Testament and develop a Biblical theology. What exegete or theologian does not constantly use Kittel's dictionary, an admirable lexicon of the New Testament containing articles of several pages on every important word and edited in a very dogmatic spirit? True, we sometimes find ideas we do not share, but, all things considered, it is a tool that is absolutely indispensable to every exegete and theologian of today. All this must be acknowledged, for the beginning of oecumenism is to recognize which of each other's works we do in fact use. To do so and not to say so would be an act of dishonesty which obviously would not favor reunion.

I could point out innumerable examples of this interdependence.<sup>15</sup> Nor is this surprising. It is certain that Protestants give a more exclusive effort to Scripture, whereas in Catholicism theology, moral and dogmatic, as well as other disciplines, also require time. This is a limitation for Protestant science but also its strength, and that explains why in this field they have surpassed us and why on many points we are so indebted to them.

But we must note that the reverse is true. I have often noticed in conversations with Protestant exegetes that they use many of our works, particularly the Lagrange collection of commentaries on the Old and New Testaments. It is therefore not at all a one-sided movement, but an exchange in which Protestantism is simply ahead of us.

**T**HIS IS THE POINT I finally want to make, that at present there are a number of positions on the Biblical question common to the ensemble of Christian creeds, a number of fundamental theses on which the majority of Christian exegetes, whatever creed they hold, are agreed. This constitutes a sort of basis for further work in common. That is what I called a moment ago an oecumenism of fact.

In an important document published by the World Council of Churches in October 1949,<sup>16</sup> which we can consider representative of present Protestant thought on the question, we find a list of theses whose similarity to the Catholic position is striking. This document consists of three parts. The first concerns the theological presuppositions necessary for the interpretation of the Bible. The second has to do with the interpretation of the text. The third has to do with a problem with which Protestants of today are concerned, namely the search for biblical teaching in the political and social order, the interpretation of the present world in the light of Scripture.

As far as the presuppositions necessary for the interpretation of the Bible are concerned we encounter several principal ideas. The first proposition declares: "We are agreed in recognizing the Bible as our common point of departure. That is where, in fact, the Word of God reaches us." This is a clear affirmation that the Bible is the Word of God, the supernatural revelation, and we can subscribe to it.

Of greater import is proposition C: "We are agreed in recognizing that the point of departure for the Christian exegete is in the community of the redeemed of which he is a member by faith." This is the formal condemnation of "free-thinking," of individual interpretation of Scripture, since it is by reference to the community, i.e., to belief in the Church, that the Christian exegete finds the norm of his interpretation. I do not need to point out—and here is a very essential point—that the fact that this can be published in an official document emanating from the ensemble of Protestant Churches, is something quite extraordinary. It shows that what we were saying a moment ago about the opinion of a few exegetes really represents Protestant thought—not all Protestants of course, but the common opinion.

That does not mean, however, that on this subject there is complete agreement between Catholics and Protestants, but it helps us to locate the agreement and disagreement. In fact, the question is no longer Scripture and Tradition, but apostolic Tradition and ecclesiastical Tradition. This means that Protestants now recognize, as we do, that what Christ did was not to write a book but to found a community to which he confided a message. Mani, the founder of Manicheism, because he left his writings so that one could be sure of his thought,<sup>17</sup> pretended he was superior to Jesus Christ who had written

nothing down. This reflection is suggestive and brings up a problem: "Why did Our Lord write nothing down?" And this leads us to surmise that "if He wrote nothing it is doubtless because He did not want to write anything, and therefore what He wanted was not to give us a book but essentially to found a living Church to which He would confide His words." This is a point which is now grasped by the majority of Protestants, particularly as the result of the research on the origins of the New Testament which has shown, incontestably, that the New Testament was first and for a long time an oral Gospel, the preaching of the community, and that it was only at the end of a certain time that it was written down. It is quite evident from the documents that the living tradition of the teaching of the Church had priority over the writing down of the Tradition. And it was actually the study of the New Testament which convinced Protestants that this thesis is absolutely founded on exegesis. Thus the difference, today, is no longer Scripture or Tradition, but a difference between one understanding of tradition and another. Protestants and Catholics are quite agreed in believing that the Church has authority, but the point is now to know how far this authority goes. Protestants admit that the authority of the apostolic community was absolute, but for them post-apostolic authority—the authority of the Church, a real authority which it would be imprudent not to follow normally—does not nevertheless represent an infallible authority. This is the point at which they stop. Let us note, however, the immense step that has been taken. We thus have much more in common and the remaining differences are limited and made more precise, and we can think that the fidelity to the Word of God can overcome other obstacles so that the differences may be thinned out even more.

With our Orthodox brethren there is no difficulty on this point. They find that Catholics and Protestants consider Scripture, as it were, from the outside, seeking to discuss it, to justify it, whereas they still feel interior to it, in the manner of the early Fathers of the Church. For them it is quite simply Scripture that is continued in the Church; they are borne by tradition which is the meditation on Scripture in the memory of the Church. The result is that the problems we bring up do not exist and the question is resolved without even being brought up. In this our brethren of separated Orthodoxy are the living presence among us of the exegesis of the Fathers of the Church—the interpretation of Scripture which consists in seeing in the life of the Church the realization of the figures of the Old Testament. One cannot imagine an integral exegesis that would not include this exegesis.

Let us return to our document. Paragraph D reads as follows: "We are agreed in recognizing that Jesus Christ is the center and purpose of the whole Bible. This permits us to consider the Old and New Testaments in a perspective where Jesus Christ is at the same time the accomplishment and purpose of the law." Here we meet a new principle which I think is significant, a great rediscovery of the exegesis of today, Protestant as well as Catholic: the interpretation of each Testament by means of the other.<sup>18</sup> On the one hand the Old Testament must be interpreted in the light of Christ, of which He is the preparation and the prefiguration; this is the typological exegesis of the early Church and it reappears today enriched by the discoveries of Biblical

criticism. The reverse is also true. This is one of the great advances of present New Testament exegesis which is thereby renewed in an astounding way: we will understand the New Testament if we recall the fullness of biblical realities which Jesus Christ represents and by means of which He defined Himself.

It is certain that words like Redemption, Messiah or Holy Spirit are charged with an incomparable theological richness when we apply them to the New Testament with all the meaning with which they are filled throughout the Old. This is of great importance from the point of view of both scientific and pastoral theology.

The document then discusses the importance of the critical study of the text of the Bible: the establishment of the correct text, the literary form, the historical situation, the meaning of the words, the understanding of the text in the light of the context. On these points, which represent the discoveries of Biblical criticism, the agreement is so evident that there is hardly need to point it out.

We come to the last point concerning the Bible as a light to help us understand the world in which we live. Here the document indicates especially two essential propositions. First, "We are agreed in recognizing that it is necessary to begin with a direct study of the Biblical text in relation to a given problem." Thus, "while taking into account the adaptation of the message to present conditions, we must be ready to let ourselves be guided by the Bible in order to know the will of God."

What is affirmed here seems very significant to me. The Bible is not only a witness of past history but the light which alone can give us the understanding of the present, for the ways of God remain the same. It always remains the true interpretation of history for true history is that which God makes, and it is within this history that all human events finally must take on their meaning. Indeed, any concordism must be avoided and we must not imprudently give a providential meaning to such or such an event. But we must say that there is a biblical interpretation of history which gives the profound key to these events. Herbert Butterfield, a Protestant author and professor of modern history at Cambridge University, pointed this out at the height of his career in a book that appeared in 1949, *Christianity and History* (Scribner's). He first explains that every solution, every interpretation of history that he has met has deceived him. None had given him the key to things. There has been Marxist history which interprets the development of history according to the development of economic conditions. There has been Spengler's theory that interprets the history of civilization as a series of biological cycles without any relation to each other. What is the error in all these interpretations? According to Butterfield everyone tries to justify his own theories by the interpretation he gives to history. And he says, the only access to the understanding of history is to abandon every spirit of self-justification. One can enter into the mystery of history only at this price. This is true also of "ecclesiastical history." There is an apologetic manner of writing history among Christians, but no apologetic history will ever be true history.

Butterfield particularly emphasizes the fact that one of the most persistent illusions of the human interpretation of history (one however which medita-

tion on the Prophet Isaiah ought to correct) is the persistent illusion that temporal success is a sign of God's blessings. He says that if we were to apply this view to contemporary events, we should be obliged to say that the U.S.S.R. is especially blessed, because without a doubt it has received all the advantages of the last wars and is the most favored from the point of view of temporal success. This is precisely what certain Christians are saying when they identify "the direction of history," in the Marxist sense of the word, with the plan of God. Biblical theology, on the contrary, teaches us that temporal success is not a sign of God's blessing in the life either of the individual or of nations. Open Isaiah: you will see that the nations which had temporal success, Babylon or Assur, are, in reality, instruments that God makes use of in order to chastise the people He loves. And on the other hand the people God loved, the elect, are the ones on trial whom God chastises through His love.

Getting back to our document, it next declares, "We are agreed in recognizing that Biblical teaching on social or political questions must be considered in the light of the tension that exists between life in the world and the life of a member of the Kingdom of God." Although we do not have the time to devote to a study of the relationship of ethics and eschatology, we agree in recognizing that Biblical teaching of the two ages plays an important role in the interpretation of a particular social or political problem. In a Christian biblical perspective of the world we can never consider such a problem as an end in itself. The eschatological perspective, on which Protestant thinkers have so much insisted, seems to me in fact fundamental. The world has an end: this end is already realized in Jesus Christ, for there is nothing beyond Jesus Christ; the end is carried on in the Church until its accomplishment. This eschatological perspective is essential for a truly integral interpretation of all social or political problems. Otherwise Christianity is degraded into a kind of Christian humanism, which is nothing more than a kind of humanism that has no part in the integral vision of the world in the perspectives of God.

**A**LL THESE POINTS on which our agreement with Protestants is obvious show that it was right to say at the beginning that something new is in the air. A meeting of minds is already partially a reality. Of course there are distances still to be covered and immense obstacles remain. We must not have illusions on what remains to be done, but we must believe that union is possible and that it is not to be rejected in eschatological times. To speak otherwise would be to doubt the creative power of the Holy Ghost.

*Translated by RUSSELL S. YOUNG*

<sup>1</sup> Père Daniélou here mentions four French editions of the complete Bible which are available, the Crampon, the new translations prepared under the direction of the Dominicans (Editions du Cerf) and Benedictines (Editions du Maredous), and a popular edition of the Pirot translation.

<sup>2</sup> See, for example, the work of Père Chaine: *Le livre de la Genèse*, Collection Lectio Divina, (Cerf, 1948).

<sup>3</sup> See the excellent remarks of J. Coppens: *Les Harmonies des deux Testaments* (Casterman, 1949), pp. 104-118.

<sup>4</sup> As it was for St. John of the Cross. See Jean Vilnè: *Bible et Mystique chez Saint Jean de la Croix*, 1950.

<sup>5</sup> *La théologie de l'Eglise suivant Saint Paul* (Cerf, 1945).

<sup>6</sup> For example, Dom P. Dupont, *Gnosis: La connaissance religieuse dans les Epîtres de Saint Paul* (Louvain, 1949).

<sup>7</sup> "La venue du règne de Dieu et le Fils de l'homme," *Rech. Sc. Rel.*, 1948, p. 544; "Le triomphe eschatologique de Jésus," *Nouv. Rev. Theol.*, 1949, pp. 701-723; 806-820; "La synthèse eschatologique de Saint Mathieu," *Rev. Bibl.*, 1949, pp. 340-364; 1950, p. 62-92.

<sup>8</sup> *Rev. Hist. Phil. Relig.*, 1925, p. 574.

<sup>9</sup> Delachaux et Niestlé, 1949. *Les premiers Prophètes*, 1951.

<sup>10</sup> Hoskyns' *The Enigma of the New Testament* (Faber) has been translated into French.

<sup>11</sup> See in particular Harold Riesenfeld: *Jesus transfiguré*, Upsala, 1939.

<sup>12</sup> See Gregory Dix: *The Shape of the Liturgy*, 1946; Oscar Cullman, *Le culte dans l'Eglise primitive*, 1946.

<sup>13</sup> Anton Fridrichsen: "Eglise et Sacrement dans le N.T." *Rev. Hist. Phil. Rel.*, 1937, p. 337.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Père Benoit. "Réflexions sur la 'Formgeschichtliche Methode,'" *Rev. Biblique*, 1946, pp. 481-513.

<sup>15</sup> To cite only one example, Père Braun, O.P., in a recent remarkable article ("Le Baptême dans le IVème Evangile," *Revue Thomiste*, 1948, p. 347) uses the research of Cullman, whom he honors (pp. 312-317).

<sup>16</sup> *Principes directeurs pour l'interprétation de la Bible*, Conseil oecuménique des Eglises, Geneva, 1949.

<sup>17</sup> Henri-Charles Puech: *Le Manichéisme*, 1950, p. 66.

<sup>18</sup> On this question, see J. Coppens: *Les Harmonies des deux Testaments*, 1949, which gives a complete bibliography; Jean Daniélou: *Sacramentum futuri. Essai sur les origines de l'exégèse hypothétique*, 1950.

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# SCRIPTURE AND TRADITION

JOHN R. HALL

OSCAR CULLMANN

## The Influence of the Unicity of the Apostolate

**T**HE PROBLEM of the relationship between Scripture and Tradition is first of all a problem of the theological relationship between apostolic time and the time of the Church. All other considerations depend on the solution that is given to this question. The alternative of coordination or subordination of Tradition to Scripture can be led back to the question of knowing how we must understand the fact that the time of the Church is the continuation and development of the time of the Apostles. Let us note at the outset that this fact is susceptible of different interpretations. That is why agreement even on the fact that the Church continues the work of Christ on earth does not necessarily imply agreement on the relationship between Scripture and Tradition. Thus, through the thesis developed in *Christ and Time*, as well as our studies on the sacraments in the New Testament, we have moved closer to the "catholic" point of view. We affirm, in fact, that the history of salvation continues on earth. We believe we find this idea in the whole New Testament, and we even consider it as the key to the understanding of St. John's Gospel. We maintain, in addition, that the sacraments, Baptism and the Eucharist, occupy in the Church a place like that of the miracles accomplished by Jesus Christ at the time of the Incarnation. Nevertheless, we are going to show in the pages that follow that we submit Tradition to Scripture. On the other hand, certain Catholic explanations of the unique role which the time of the apostles plays for revelation seem to come remarkably close to the "Protestant" point of view. Nevertheless, their authors combine and resolutely juxtapose Scripture and Tradition. That is to say, it is a matter of defining exactly the temporal relation that we have mentioned.

The time in which the history of salvation unrolls includes the past, the present, and the future. But it has a center which serves as point of orientation, as norm, for the whole extent of this history and this center is constituted by what we call the time of direct revelation or the time of the Incarnation. It includes those years from the birth of Christ to the death of the last apostle, that is to say, to the death of the last ocular witness who has seen the risen Jesus and who has received, either from Jesus incarnate or from the risen Christ, the direct and unique order to bear testimony of what he has seen and heard. This testimony might be oral or written.

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All the particular fractions of total time derive their meaning from those few years which are the years of revelation. If we wish to assign to them a date in conformity with secular chronology, we can do it only approximately because we do not know the precise date of Christ's birth or that of the death of the last apostle. We may say, nevertheless, that they are the years which proceed from about the year 1 to the year 70 or 80 of our era, without insisting that these are the precise limits, and this particularly because the written testimony of certain apostles has been fixed only after their death.

If we consider the Christian faith from the vantage point of time, we would say that the "scandal" of the Christian faith is to believe that these few years, which for secular history have neither more nor less significance than other periods of history, are the center and norm of the totality of time, a scandal whose symbol may be considered our usual manner of counting years starting with the year 1, which is supposed to be that of the birth of Christ. It is only in starting from the events of these central years that the faith sees history unfolding itself, in two senses, both backward and forward, the history of salvation in the interior of secular history. It is only in the light of these years that it speaks of the history of a chosen people which leads to the Incarnation of Christ. It is only in the light of these years that it awaits an accomplishment of all things which is bound up with a return of Christ, and it is especially in the light of these years that it believes, in the present time, in a Church-body of Christ by which the Lord exercises his actual reign over the universe.

## T

HE PROBLEM of Scripture and Tradition concerns the place that we assign to the time of the Church in relation to the time of the Incarnation. This time of the Church is part of the history of salvation. We underline it expressly as against a strict Protestant position which recognizes in the time of the Church no value *sui generis* in the history of salvation, and which does not recognize any other possibility of being Christian than that of living in the past time of the Incarnation of Jesus Christ and the apostles. This is to misunderstand that Christ reigns today and that the Church is the center of this universal kingdom.

But this affirmation does not suffice. At each epoch of the history of salvation, the time of the Church ought to be defined, determined, in starting from the center. Just as the past appeared to us as the time of the preparation (the "old" alliance), the future as that of the final accomplishment, so the time of the Church is the *intermediary* time. Intermediary: for the decisive event has already taken place, but the final accomplishment is still to come. The miracles of the years 1-70 continue to produce themselves, and nevertheless neither the absolute of central time nor the absolute of the final accomplishment are realized: condition of an essentially intermediary time. The Church participates in this intermediary character. She is certainly the body of Christ, body of the Resurrection, but since this body is composed of us, sinful men who remain sinners, she is not simply the body of the resurrection. The Church remains at the same time an earthly body which is not only able

to be crucified, but which also participates in the imperfections of every earthly body.

That is to say that time of the Church prolongs the central time, but that it is not itself central time: it prolongs the time of Christ incarnate, but it is not the time of Christ incarnate and of his apostles and eye-witnesses. The Church is built on the foundation of the apostles, she will continue to be built on this foundation as long as she will exist, but she can no longer produce apostles in the present time.

In fact the apostolate is, by definition, a unique function which could not be prolonged. The apostle, according to *Acts* 1, 22, is the unique—because direct—witness, of the Resurrection. In addition, he has received a direct order from the incarnate and risen Christ. In the manner of the Jewish *schaliach*, he is "like the one who has sent him." He cannot transmit to others his completely unique mission. After having acquitted himself of it, he returns it to the one who confided it in him: Christ. That is why in the New Testament the Apostles alone fill exactly the functions which are those of Christ himself. The missionary order that Jesus gave them in *Matthew* 10, 7 ff. corresponds exactly to the mission that Jesus assigns to his own person as Messiah in his answer to John the Baptist, *Matthew* 11, 6: to cure the sick, to drive out demons, to raise the dead, to preach the gospel. That is why the New Testament will assign the same images to the apostles that are applied to Jesus: "stone," and the corresponding images of "foundation," "columns." These images are never used to designate the bishop.<sup>1</sup>

The function of bishop which is transmitted is essentially different from that of the apostle which cannot be transmitted. The apostles institute bishops, but they cannot delegate their function which is not renewable. The bishops succeed the apostles, but on a completely different level. They succeed them, not as apostles but as bishops, which is also an important function for the Church, but is sharply different. The apostles have not instituted other apostles, but bishops. That is to say that the apostolate does not belong to the time of the Church, but to that of the Incarnation of Christ.

The apostolate consists in the testimony borne to Christ. Certainly the Church also gives testimony to Christ. But she is no longer able to give him that direct testimony which characterizes the testimony of the apostles. Her testimony is *derived*, since it no longer reposes on the direct revelation which was the privilege of the apostle alone, the eye-witness.

The Epistle to the Galatians makes the most clear and explicit distinction between the preaching of the apostle and the preaching of those who depend on the apostles (*Gal.* i, 1, 12ff). The apostle alone has received the gospel δι' ἀποκαλύψεως (*Gal.* 1, 12), by direct revelation, without human intermediary. The apostle Paul is in agreement on this point with his adversaries: he alone is an apostle who has been called by Christ *without the intermediary* of another, or in other words, outside the chain of tradition. The "Jewish party" reproach Paul precisely for having received the gospel by the intermediary of other men and refuse him, for that very reason, the title of apostle. Paul energetically denies the fact, but he recognizes implicitly that he would not be an apostle if he had not received the gospel in a *direct* manner from Christ.

**T**O AFFIRM IN THIS WAY the unique character of the revelation given to the apostles is not to deny the value of all post-apostolic tradition, but it is clearly to lower it to the level of a human *donnée*, although the Holy Spirit may manifest itself through it. We have shown elsewhere that there is an apostolic tradition, and that it is identified with the Kyrios itself.<sup>2</sup> The apostles compare their testimonies; for the richness of revelation requires a number of apostolic testimonies, as it requires a number of written gospels, and they transmit their apostolic and unique testimonies. There is a tradition, a "paradosis" which does not fall under the condemnation that Jesus pronounces in regard to "paradosis" in general. There is only one normative tradition: that of the apostles, considered in its diversity as a unity.

No writing of the New Testament underlines as much as St. John's Gospel the fact of the prolongation of the work of Christ incarnate in the Church of the believers. It is the very purpose of this writing to put this continuation in evidence. But this very gospel sharply distinguishes between the continuation by the apostles which is part of the central time and the continuation of the post-apostolic Church. The sacerdotal prayer (Chap. 17) establishes this line of descent: Christ—the apostles—post-apostolic Church. The members of the last are designed as those who *believe because of the word of the apostles* (*John 17, 12*).

We have already said that the unicity of the apostolate is underlined even with vigor by Catholic theology, but it seems to us that at the decisive point it does not draw from this the consequences that are implied. For if we think through this important idea of the unicity of the apostolate to its final end, we will necessarily come to make an essential difference, also from the point of view of revelation, between the *foundation of the Church*, which took place in the time of the apostles, and the *post-apostolic Church*, which is no longer that of the apostles, but that of the bishops. We would then accept a difference between apostolic tradition and ecclesiastical tradition, the first being the foundation of the second, which excludes the coordination of the two.

If the apostolic tradition ought to be considered as the norm of revelation for all time, the question arises: how to make actual for us this testimony that God has willed to give to the apostles for the salvation of the world, in an age which we called the middle, the center of time? The Catholic Church responds: by apostolic succession, by the infallible magisterium of the Church, by the vehicle of further, post-apostolic tradition. The objective revelation of God will reach us then (1) by way of the apostles, (2) by way of the ecclesiastic tradition which will make explicit the testimony of the apostles. But is the *unicity* of the apostolate guaranteed in this manner? We have seen that it rests on the immediate character of revelation granted to the apostles, on the fact that it did not reach them through any intermediary: δι' ἀποκαλύψεως (*Gal. 1, 12*). The apostle cannot then have a successor who can play the role of revealer for future generations in this place, but he must *himself* continue to fill his function in the Church of today: *in the Church, not through the Church, but by his word*, διά τοῦ λόγου (*John 17, 12*), in other words by his *writings*.

Certainly the oral and written word of the apostles is not identical with objective revelation, with the divine word itself, since human language—spoken or written—participates in our feebleness and consequently would not know how to be an adequate vehicle of the word pronounced by God almighty. But it is only by those means which are accessible to us that God can address himself to us, and he has chosen the apostles in order that by their testimony the good news may be transmitted to us. In order that other human elements are not introduced into this testimony, the apostolate has precisely the character of unicity which is able to be safeguarded for us only by the *writings* of the apostles. These maintain on one hand the unicity of their mission, and in addition assure the direct action of the apostles on us, men of the 20th century.

Since it has thus pleased God to *reserve* the transmission of the gospel of Christ to this single category of Jesus' contemporaries, in order to *reduce to the minimum* its deformation by the human element, should not the Church for its part do everything to respect this special position? We are going to see that the Church of the second century has effectively understood this necessity by creating the canon of the New Testament and by taking care not to admit into it any writings whose *apostolic* origins it was not precisely able to guarantee.

The fixing of the revelation granted by God to the apostles, *eye-witnesses*, took place in the very age we called the middle of Time, the center of the history of salvation. No word pronounced or written later by other men belonging to the Church of Christ could be placed beside the apostolic writings which all pretend to be the immediate expression of the testimony of those things they have seen, even if they were not all written under the direction of the apostles themselves.

For us the written testimony of the apostles is the element of life which always brings us back to the immediacy of Christ. If we take into consideration the grandeur of this miracle—the *unique* ministry of the apostles who lived at the time of the Incarnation, realized in our midst, in the 20th century, not by ourselves or our contemporaries, but by those apostles themselves, men of the first century—we can no longer speak of the dead letter of the Bible. However, this presupposes that we share the faith of the first Christians that the apostles are not writers in the same way as other authors of antiquity, but men set apart by God in order that they execute by their testimony—first oral, and later written—his plan of salvation.

The scriptural principle is not then, as we might have been able to believe, a simple application of the scientific principle brought into its own by the Renaissance: the necessity of returning to the sources in order to study and understand an historical phenomenon. On the contrary, it is based on the faith in this essential fact of the history of salvation: the setting aside of the apostles, at the moment of the Incarnation, as unique instruments of God's revelation in Jesus Christ. But it is true that by the natural consequences which it implies for theological method, the scriptural principle meets up with the scientific motto: go back to the sources. There is the meeting-place between historical science and Protestant theology.

If we believe with the first Christians that the divine institution of the apostolate has had, in the economy of salvation, this meaning of transmitting the revelation of God in Christ in an *immediate* manner, then by eliminating all other intermediaries, inevitable source of deformations, we ought to respect God's plan by preserving the same function for the apostolate in our Church today. The real presence of the apostles in the Church of all times has been given to us in the New Testament. But we meet it precisely to the degree that we seek direct contact with these witnesses, by eliminating intermediaries in our turn.

Does this mean that the Church in which we have been placed by Baptism is not for us the place where the Holy Spirit is at work? This conclusion would run counter to the faith which is attested to by all the writings of the New Testament. On the contrary, according to it, the Holy Spirit, which formerly had been reserved to a few men of God, has become accessible since Pentecost to the whole community of believers. We must take seriously this conviction of primitive Christianity. It implies that the work of Christ proceeds in his Church; the history of salvation continues. There is no blank between Christ's ascension and his return. The gospel of St. John has been written in order to show that when leaving the world Christ has not abandoned the world. The Holy Spirit is at work in it. There will still be miracles of faith, as in the time of the Incarnation, as in the age of Jesus and the apostles. And the great miracle of the redemptive death and resurrection of Jesus is conferred on the Church in the sacraments of Baptism and Holy Eucharist.

We may even go further. The inspiration by the Holy Spirit continues also in the sense that the "paraclete" is the spirit of *truth*. There will still be revelation. And nevertheless the sacerdotal prayer makes a sharp distinction between the apostles and those who believe "because of their words." Perhaps it is for this reason that St. John's gospel reports a special effusion of the Holy Spirit which took place before the one described in the Acts of the Apostles, as early as Easter day, from which the apostles alone benefited (Chap. 20, 22). The revelation of the Word of God *continues* in the Church, but it will no longer be a *norm*, a *criterion*, as is the revelation given to the apostles. The Church will examine all further revelation, but while using as a criterion this precise norm which is the apostolic testimony. The Church will not then be a superior court whose business it is to decree what must be added to this norm. *God speaks to the Church today by the testimony of the apostles.* As long as there will be a Church, this testimony of the apostles will be a *sufficient norm*.

**T**HE ROLE OF THE APOSTOLIC TESTIMONY is double: it stirs up inspiration and also serves as its control, since in all inspiration other spirits risk substituting themselves in the place of the Holy Spirit. The Church will then have the right and the duty of proclaiming that which, examined in the light of the apostolic norm, appears to her as revelation. In this way an ecclesiastical tradition is developed. It will have its own great value for the Church, and Protestantism is wrong to underestimate it in principle. Besides it recognizes this in act by assigning a great place, for example, to the writings

of the theologians of the 16th century and even to the decisions of the first councils. But whatever may be the respect the Church owes to tradition and the importance which it has in the elaboration and the comprehension of Christian doctrine, it is never able to take the same value as the apostolic norm; it is never able to become the norm. A norm is a norm precisely because it cannot be enlarged. We must not confuse *revelation* and the *criterion of revelation*.

In practice, the institution of the apostolate, unique in the divine history of salvation, seems to us to be slighted by the infallible magisterium of the Catholic Church. For by this norm of the magisterium the unicity of the apostolate finds itself annulled. It is true that the Catholic Church pretends to *interpret*, simply to explain the apostolic testimony by its decisions which constitute tradition. But when the ecclesiastical interpretation takes the same normative value for all times as the apostolic norm itself, does not the claim that this is only interpretation become a fiction? Certainly we should always consult the interpretations which have been given of the norm in order to understand them, but we ought always to be ready to revise them and even to abandon them by placing ourselves back again in the face of the norm itself, that is, precisely to eliminate the screen of previous interpretations.

In addition, does not the Catholic Church tend to abandon—if not in theory, at least in fact—the fiction of tradition—interpretation of the Scripture, when in the justification of the dogma proclaimed in 1950 it does not wait to give it a scriptural basis, but depends on the *consensus* of the Church, as if the collective inspiration in the Church no longer had any need of being controlled by the apostolic testimony, as if it were sufficient to control it by the infallible magisterium of the Pope?

Nevertheless, Catholic theology will always oppose to the affirmation of the superiority of Scripture over Tradition the argument that Scripture *needs to be interpreted*. We gladly recognize this necessity. For, as we have already said, the apostles used that imperfect instrument which is human language, and besides, their languages and forms of thought are not our own. We are also of the opinion that the Church ought to take her magisterium more seriously, which is not the case in the Protestant Church, by pronouncing in the name of the Church in the matter of exegesis. She ought to take a position *vis-à-vis* such an interpretation proposed by the exegetes, and ought to pray for the assistance of the Holy Spirit when she exercises this magisterium. She ought to transpose the message of the Bible into the language of today. When she does this, she ought to know that she is fulfilling her duty for her time, and that she is not accomplishing a work like that of eye-witnesses, which will commit all the future centuries of time of the Church, so that future generations will be tied by the decisions in the same way that they are tied by Scripture. The previous decisions of the Church will serve the exegetes as guide, but not as norms, as criteria.

Even when there is inspiration from the Holy Spirit, in every interpretation of Scripture there is a human element. We repeat that there is also this human element in the apostolic writings themselves which are already a transposition of the Divine Word into human language. But behind them there are the apostles, there are eye-witnesses. The human element is reduced to an

inevitable minimum which is inherent in the very notion of divine revelation to man. If on the other hand we place as norm between scripture and ourselves those official interpretations that have been given in all past ages by the Church, errors that are insignificant when considered separately are amplified by virtue of a process which no tradition handed down by men who are not eye-witness can escape. Here the question of chronology necessarily is involved. That is why the time of the Church cannot be normative like the time of the *foundation* of the Church.

Otherwise our interpretations would risk falling under the condemnation which Jesus pronounced on *tradition* (*Mark 7, 9*): You abolish the commandment of God in order to keep your tradition. The interpretation that the rabbinic tradition had given of the commandment to honor father and mother also considered itself faithful to the divine word and a clarification of a written commandment which would not be clear in itself, and nevertheless Jesus recommended here, as in the antitheses of the Sermon on the Mount, the necessity of returning to the Word itself in order to grasp its divine intention, without passing through the intermediary of a traditional interpretation.

But is this not to overlook the fact that everything is changed by the coming of Christ, by the reality of the existence of a Church of Christ? Is it not a blasphemy to assimilate in this manner the tradition of the rabbis to the tradition of the Church? With this objection we return to our point of departure: the distinction that there is to be made between the time of the Incarnation and the time of the Church; to make this distinction is to say precisely that in the Christian perspective there are different kinds of tradition. There is an apostolic tradition which is a norm because it rests on eye-witnesses chosen by God, and there is a post-apostolic tradition which is a precious aid for the comprehension of the divine word on condition that we do not consider it as a norm. Even while accepting the *exegetical directives* of the Church and of her doctors, we ought to remain ready to place ourselves face to face before the testimony of the apostles, as the apostles found themselves before the divine revelation itself (*Gal. 2, 12*), without the intermediary of any interpretation.

Certainly the same Holy Spirit who inspired the apostles is at work in the Church, and the Church is the place where Christ manifests his presence. "Do not extinguish the Spirit," St. Paul said to the Thessalonians, but he also knows that other spirits are at work even in the Church. That is why he adds: "But test everything, and hold on to what is best." It is not a denial of inspiration to say that it needs to be controlled. But we should add: it is not a denial of the magisterium of the Church to say that it needs to be controlled: controlled by the word of the apostles.

#### **The Importance of the Fixing of the Canon by the Church of the Second Century**

**I**N ORDER TO DETERMINE the relationship between Scripture and Tradition, we started out, in the preceding section, from the very foundation of the Christian Church, that is from the period which we call the central period of the history of salvation, from the time of Jesus and his apostles. We then

interrogated the New Testament itself on the problem that concerns us, and we found that the idea of the apostolate, or more precisely the unicity of the apostolate, imposes on us the response that we believed we ought to give. While centering all our argumentation on this idea of the apostolate, we have up to now considered only the New Testament as Scripture, that is, the direct testimony of the apostles on the fundamental facts of the work of Christ incarnate and of their own acts.

At present we are going to take up the question by starting from the history of the ancient Church, and we are going to try to discover if our previous results would find themselves confirmed in this way. If just previously we sought the answer to our problems in Scripture, we are going to look for it now, so to speak, in tradition. Here we insist on the fact that *the new-born Church herself made the distinction between the apostolic and post-apostolic tradition*, by clearly submitting the second to the first.

Catholic theology, in order to combat the thesis of the superiority of Scripture, emphasizes the priority of Tradition by comparison with Scripture. This is a fact which no-one would think of denying, on condition, however, that this be a matter of the priority of *apostolic Tradition*. But if it can be shown that the Church herself recognized an essential difference between tradition previous to the establishment of the Canon, and tradition after that point, the fact of the priority of oral apostolic tradition in relation to its fixed form would prove nothing for Tradition. We will speak first of the origin of the first Christian writings, then of that of the Canon.

In effect the oral tradition of the apostles precedes the first apostolic writings. This tradition prior to the first writings was certainly quantitatively richer than written tradition. But we must ask what is the significance of the fact that the apostles or their spokesmen whom they used as secretaries, at a particular moment took up their pens in order to give this tradition a written form. This is a fact of the highest significance for the history of salvation. Its meaning can only be that of having delimited the oral tradition of the apostles, in such a way as to make the apostolic testimony under this form a definitive *norm* for the Church, at the moment when she was to spread out into the entire world and be established until that time when the Kingdom of God would appear. Once we admit that the oral tradition of the apostles was confided as a deposit to the Church in order that she draw from it, in the course of centuries, elements which are not found in the apostolic writings, the fact of the birth of writings whose authors the Church calls "sacred writers" would be completely minimized. The writings of the apostles would then be lowered to the point of becoming instruments, which though they might certainly be useful, would no longer be indispensable. In fact the theory of "secret," unwritten traditions of the apostles had been elaborated by the gnostics, and the Church herself pointed out its danger.

If, on the other hand, the fixing of the testimony of the apostles by giving it a written form is one of the *essential acts of the Incarnation*, we have the right and the duty of assimilating the apostolic tradition and the writings of the New Testament and of distinguishing both from the post-apostolic, post-canonical tradition. We shall see that the rule of faith which has been trans-

mitted under the oral form has nevertheless been accepted as a norm alongside of Scripture, only because it has been considered as having been fixed by the apostles. What is important is not so much the fact that the apostolic tradition is oral or written, but that it was *fixed by the apostles*.

But did the ancient Church herself truly distinguish between the apostolic and the post-apostolic tradition? Here is the moment to speak of the establishment of the Canon by the Church of the second century. This is a matter again of a fact of primordial importance for the history of salvation. We are absolutely in agreement with Catholic theology when it insists on the fact that the Church herself has made the Canon. We even find in this the supreme argument for our demonstration. The fixing of the Christian Canon of Scripture signifies precisely that the *Church herself*, at a given moment, has traced a clear line of demarcation between the time of the apostles and the time of the Church, between the time of the foundation and the time of construction, between the apostolic community and the Church of Bishops, or in other words between the apostolic tradition and the ecclesiastical tradition. If this was not the signification of the establishment of the Canon, that event has no meaning.

We must, in fact, represent to ourselves the situation which brought the Church to conceive the *idea* of a Canon. Towards the year 150, there still existed an oral tradition; this we know from Papias who wrote an exegesis of the words of Jesus. He himself tells us that it is based on the "viva vox" and he attributes more importance to it than to the writings. We not only have this declaration of principle from him, but he has left us some examples of this oral tradition as it is present through him, and these examples certainly show us what we ought to think of an oral tradition by 150! It has a completely legendary character. We can be convinced of this by examining the story that Papias reports to us of Joseph Barsabas, the candidate not chosen (in *Acts* 1, 23ff) to fill the post of twelfth disciple, which was left vacant after Judas' betrayal. But above all, we must mention the obscene and completely legendary character of the death of Judas himself.

By 150 we are still relatively near the time of the apostles, but nevertheless we are already too far away from it for the living tradition to offer in itself the least guarantee of authenticity. The oral traditions that are echoed by Papias were born in the Church and transmitted in the Church, for outside her, no one would have any special interest in describing the punishment of a traitor in such strong colors. Papias is then the victim of his illusions when he thinks the "viva vox" is more precious than the written books. The oral tradition has a normative value at the time of the apostles who were eye-witnesses, but this was no longer true in 150, after it had passed from one mouth to another.

The traditions reported by Papias are not alone. We have from this same period the first apocryphal gospels which gathered together other oral traditions. It is enough to read these gospels in which Jesus is spoken of as a child who makes live sparrows, carries water in his apron, miraculously kills his comrades who molest him, or to read those numerous apocryphal Acts in order to understand that tradition, in the Church, no longer offered any guarantee of truth, even when it claimed to speak out of a chain of transmission. For

they justified all these traditions by the establishment of chains which went back to the apostles. Papias himself claims this when he says that he has been informed by people who had contact with the apostles. Only the magisterium of the Church is enough to save the purity of the gospel.

**B**Y ESTABLISHING the principle of a Canon, the Church recognized by this act that *from this moment on*, tradition was no longer a criterion of truth. She put a line under the apostolic tradition. She declared implicitly that from that moment on all further tradition ought to be submitted to the *control* of the apostolic tradition. In other words she declared: here is the tradition which has *built* the Church, which is imposed on it.<sup>3</sup> She certainly did not wish to put an end to the continuation of the evolution of tradition. But by *an act of humility*, so to speak, she submitted all further tradition elaborated by herself to the superior criterion of the apostolic tradition codified in the Sacred Scriptures. To establish a canon was equivalent to recognizing that from then on ecclesiastical tradition needed to be controlled; it would be controlled—with the assistance of the Holy Spirit—by the apostolic tradition fixed in writing. The Church thus recognized that too long a time had passed from the days of the apostles to be able to guard the purity of tradition, *without a superior written form*; it was no longer possible to prevent small legendary distortions from slipping in, and then being transmitted and even amplified. This decision also implied that the tradition which alone would be considered apostolic would have to be *delimited*. For all the gnostics were making use of secret, unwritten traditions, supposedly apostolic. The establishment of a canon, therefore, meant that the Church renounced the consideration from that point on of using any other traditions, that were not fixed by the apostles in written form, as a norm. There certainly may have been other authentic apostolic traditions, but the Church decided to consider as apostolic *norm* only what was written in these books since she was convinced that if she admitted as norms those oral traditions that were not written down by the apostles, she would lose the criterion of judgment as to the foundation and pretension to apostolicity of numerous traditions that might develop. To say that the writings assembled in a Canon ought to be regarded as the *norm* means that they ought to be accepted as *sufficient*. The magisterium of the Church, by this supreme act of establishing the Canon, had not abdicated, but made its future activity depend on a superior norm.

By establishing a Canon, the Church of the 2nd century had not only taken a stand in regard to difficulties that had sprung up at that time, especially because of gnosticism. *She took a position which committed the whole future of the Church.* She did not establish a norm for others, but for herself, and she submitted the Church of all ages to come to this norm. In this she has not deprived the Church of her magisterium, but has given it its precise character: it will truly be the magisterium of the Church only in the degree to which it will take its point of departure in the act of submission to the ecclesiastical norm of the Canon. It draws its efficacy from this submission. The Holy Spirit will be at work in this very submission. *Within this framework, revelation will continue to be granted to the Church.*

Is it legitimate to attribute to this act of establishing the Canon such a primordial importance in the history of salvation? Would not this be to grant an exceptional dignity to the Church of the second century? We must recognize that this was in fact a decisive moment for the time of the Church. On one hand, about the year 150 it was still near enough to the time of the apostles to be able to make, with the assistance of the Holy Spirit, the choice among oral and written traditions; on the other hand, the bewildering multiplication of gnostic and legendary traditions had made the Church ripe for that *act of humility* which involved submission of *all* further inspiration to a norm. The establishment of the Canon could not have been undertaken at any other time in the Church. It is at this precise moment that God granted the Church the grace to recognize the difference between the time of the Incarnation and the time of the Church. Only the clear distinction between these two periods can permit the Church to retain a sharp consciousness of having her place in the history of salvation, her own time. She has it precisely to the degree that she recognizes that the time of Jesus and the apostles is the middle of all time and gives significance to all times, as well as to the time of the Church.

But the Canon fixed by the Church of the second century does not only include the books of the apostles, but also the Old Testament. First of all it must be said that the Old Testament was admitted only because it was understood that the time of the Incarnation is the middle of time, the middle of a history of salvation which begins before the Incarnation and is prolonged after it. The Old Testament was received into the Canon as a testimony of that part of the history of salvation which prepared the Incarnation. It is in this way that Jesus and his apostles understood the history of Israel. The Church then has been faithful to the *apostles* themselves when they brought the Old Testament into the *apostolic norm* of the Canon.

An objection here suggests itself. From the moment that the history of the divine people of the old alliance takes on a normative character in this way, why would it not be the same for God's people of the new alliance, that is, the Church? Was not the time of the preparation of the Incarnation privileged by comparison with the time of the unfolding of the Incarnation which is the time of the Church?

The objection is perfectly legitimate.<sup>4</sup> But here again it is necessary to consider the fixing of the Canon as an element of the history of salvation itself. To fix this *norm* certainly did not mean, as many Protestants think, that the history of salvation would be halted from then on until the moment of Christ's return, so that there would no longer be anything to do but mark time in place. We must even say boldly that the people of the New Alliance are, on the contrary, entitled to preference in comparison with the people of the Old Alliance, since they already live in the new age, although its final accomplishment is yet to come.

And nevertheless this time of the Church, in spite of all the divine graces of which it is the beneficiary, especially in the sacraments, in spite of all its privileges, would not know how to be a *norm*, for it is not *closed*, as at the time of the apostles and the time of the fixing of the Canon the preparation of the Incarnation of Christ in the history of the people of Israel was closed. In creating a norm, the Church did not wish to be her own norm, since her

experience told her that *without a superior written norm, her magisterium would not know how to keep pure the apostolic tradition.* Even while remaining conscious of her high mission of representing the Body of Christ on earth in present time—the greatest mission that exists, she understood that she would be able to accomplish this mission only by submitting herself to the norm of the apostolic Canon. If the fixing of a Canon had been made by the Church with the tacit presupposition that the magisterium of the Church, the ulterior traditions, ought to be juxtaposed to the Canon with an *equal normative authority*, we would no longer see the reason for which she created the Canon. If, after as before its constitution, the magisterium of the Church continued to be a *supreme norm of equal value*, the Church would always be able to judge again by herself on the last count as to the conformity of teaching to her doctors and the apostolic tradition. The fixing of the Canon would have been superfluous in this case. It has meaning only if the Church from that time on exercises her magisterium by submitting it to that superior norm and by always returning again to that norm. We can hazard this paradoxical affirmation that the magisterium of the Church at least approaches real infallibility to the degree in which, by submission to the canon, it abandons all pretension to infallibility: that the tradition created by the Church takes on a real value for the intelligence of divine revelation to the degree in which it does not pretend to become an indispensable screen that is placed between the Bible and the reader.

Nevertheless there is the rule of faith. But is it not important that the idea of giving it a normative authority has been conceived *at the same time* as that of giving a normative authority to the Canon, that is, about the middle of the second century? Mistaken on the direction of certain declarations of the Fathers of the second century, we have too much of a habit of opposing the rule of faith and the Canon, as if the first constituted the *continuing tradition* of the Church, apart from the writings of the apostles. In reality the definitive fixing of the rule of *apostolic faith responds to exactly the same need of codifying the apostolic tradition* as the canonization of apostolic *writings*. There is not the Credo of the apostles on one side, and their writings on the other. But the two form a bloc from then on as the apostolic tradition *vis-à-vis* a post-apostolic tradition. The rule of *apostolic* faith, that is the tradition of which the second century Fathers spoke. What is important is not that it was first transmitted orally, but the conviction that its text has been *fixed*—just as much as the canonical books of the New Testament—by the apostles. It is not a matter of the conviction of the Church of the second century, of a secret or implicit tradition, but of a text already *fixed* at the time of the apostles, as were their writings.

This Credo was like the apostolic resume of the books of the New Testament, in order to give in this way a rule of apostolic interpretation for all these quite different books. The multiplicity of apostolic writings made necessary for the different needs of the Church a short resume of the truths that were common to them.<sup>5</sup> In order to be able to be a norm of interpretation, it was necessary that the Credo itself be apostolic. There would certainly still be fluctuations, on the subject of the precise and definitive text, but in the great lines the different affirmations were already contained in the symbols of

the mid-second century, and especially the principle of the norm of a rule of apostolic faith was admitted at that moment. The attribution of each phrase to one of the twelve apostles is a legend. But it has this truth in it that there is, at the base of the oldest symbols developed, briefer formulas whose text was fixed during the *apostolic* period, and whose traces we have found in the New Testament.

The role of *future* Credos of the Church, as they will be elaborated by the councils, is quite different. They are certainly also necessary, in the sense that they are intended to take a position in regard to problems of their time, heresies of the day. They are necessary, and in each age the Church ought to elaborate a Credo. Nevertheless these later confessions can never take the value of the symbol of faith attributed to the apostles; they will never be able to become norms for all times. Certainly here again we must repeat what we said of the post-apostolic traditions of the Church. They have a very great importance in as much as they are able to guide our understanding of the apostolic revelation, but they are not, like the symbols of the apostles, a last page to be added to the New Testament.

We arrive at the conclusion that the difference that we have established between apostolic and post-apostolic tradition is not arbitrary, but that it is *the difference that the Church, at the decisive moment, in the second century, has herself made by posing the principle of an apostolic Canon and an apostolic compendium of faith.*

We would then be able to find an intrinsic confirmation of all the preceding discussion in the patristic evolution. For a long time it has been established that except for the letters of Ignatius, the writings of the Fathers that are called apostolic—who in fact do not exactly belong to the apostolic age, but to the beginning of the second century—: the first epistle of Clement, the supposed homily of Clement, the Epistle of Barnabas, the Shepherd of Hermas, the Epistle of Polycarp, in spite of the theological interest that they contain, differ considerably from the thought of the New Testament and fall back to a great degree into a moralism which ignores the notion of grace and the redemptive death of Christ, so central for apostolic theology. It has also been observed that the Fathers of the Church who have written *after* 150, Ireneaus, Tertullian, although chronologically further away from the New Testament than the authors of the first half of the century, have understood far better the essence of the gospel. This fact appears paradoxical, but it is perfectly explained by that important ecclesiastical act of the codification of the apostolic tradition in a Canon, from then on the superior norm of all tradition. The Fathers of the first half of the century have written at a time when the writings of the New Testament already existed, but they had not yet been invested with canonical authority, they had not yet been set apart. There was not yet a norm at their disposal, but at the same time they were too far removed from the time of the apostles to be able to draw directly on eye-witnesses as a source. The meetings of Polycarp and Papias with apostolic representatives were no longer able to guarantee a pure transmission of authentic traditions; the fragments of their literary work that have been preserved prove it.

After 150 on the other hand, contact with the apostolic period was re-established thanks to the constitution of the Canon, that process of elimination of all impure sources of deformation. Here we see the confirmation of the fact that the Church saved its apostolic base once and for all by submitting all further tradition to the Canon. Thanks to this Canon, she permitted her members to hear the authentic voice of the apostles, always new and in all ages to come, a privilege which no oral tradition that passed by Polycarp and Papias would have been able to assure her.

**W**E SAID THAT SCRIPTURE needs to be interpreted. The Church ought to feel herself responsible for this interpretation. She ought to take a position when it is imposed on her, in regard to certain explanations of the Bible proposed by her teachers or by independent scholars of her time. But as we have seen, in that case her responsibility consists in pronouncing herself in humble submission to the apostolic norm of the Canon. This implies two things: it means, first, that she does not force future generations to take the decision that she believes herself obliged to take as the norm of their interpretation of the same text, but that she remains conscious of the superiority of Scripture, immediate testimony of divine revelation, over the interpretation that she herself believes she ought to make of it and which can only be a derivative testimony in which the human element has a great part. It also means that she herself takes her decision by facing the biblical text itself directly, confident in the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit, and having recourse to tradition only as a secondary source, a guide which can enlighten us on condition that we do not place it above the word of the apostles and that we are ready, should the occasion arise, to separate ourselves from it.

Do we not always experience a liberation when, after having read a number of commentaries, no matter how good they may be, we read the biblical Word itself, forcing us to forget what we have read in the commentaries, with the healthy naivete of the catechumen who wants to hear the apostles speak of what they have seen and heard? Certainly the Bible, needs to be interpreted For its authors have been men of their time, and for that reason it contains inevitable imperfections, inherent in every human word which tries to translate the divine word. But is it not a lack of faith to pretend that, because of the human character of revelation transmitted by the apostles, we are no longer capable of hearing their testimony without going through a long chain of intermediaries—in which, besides, the human element plays a much greater role since the latter are not eye-witnesses like the apostles? Certainly we ought to take up the reading of the Biblical word with this philological knowledge that we have acquired and we ought to give certain directives to the ordinary man who does not possess them. But for the exegete as for the ordinary man, in order to become capable of hearing, in the midst of the 20th century, the very voice of the apostles, he ought to have the certitude (and communicate it to others) that the eye-witnesses, although expressing themselves in the language of their time, still know how to speak to us in a *direct* manner, precisely when we are ready to place ourselves before their word with that faith in the Holy Spirit which can dispense with intermediaries.

**I**S THE ABYSS which separates Catholic doctrine from Protestant doctrine on this point impassable? Perhaps it is in theory. In practice the two attitudes are remarkably close. We have said that Protestants have always recognized a tradition as guide: the decisions of the first oecumenical councils and the writings of the Reformers. But for some time now the interest of Protestant theology, more than previously, has been turning also towards patristic study. The Protestant world has begun to understand what an immense treasure there is in the work of the Fathers of the Church, and that singular conception of the history of the Church and of Christian thought, which would assume that between the second and the 16th century there had been a total eclipse of the gospel with the exception of a few sects, is gradually being discarded.

On the other hand, we are today confronted with a Catholic interest in the reading of the Bible which perhaps was unknown in any previous period. The works of Father Lagrange, to name just one man, the Encyclical *Divino afflante spiritu*, the extraordinary growth of the *Institute biblique* at Rome and the Dominican *Ecole biblique* in Jerusalem, do not these things prove that the most precious Catholic contributions to the understanding of the Bible are due, in spite of the theory of Tradition, to a *direct, immediate* contact with the biblical text, even in its original language? And the "Catholic variations" in the appreciation of a particular exegetical problem—we may think of the famous "comma Johannis" (*1 John*, 5, 7)—these revisions of previous authors, do they not prove that on many occasions the Catholic Church has known how to place Scripture above her tradition?

We do not seek, in mentioning these rapprochments, which can be experienced on the practical level, to minimize the great doctrinal divergence which remains in spite of everything. But we think that they ought to incite us to discuss the old problem of Scripture and Tradition without any polemical intention, with absolute serenity and frankness, which will be only to the profit of the dialogue of Christian confessions.

*Translated by JOSEPH E. SUNNEEN*

<sup>1</sup> For all details and bibliographical indications, see O. Cullman, *Saint-Pierre. Disciple—Apôtre—Martyr*, 1952.

<sup>2</sup> "Paradosis et Kyrios. Le problème de la tradition dans le paulinisme," in *Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie religieuse*, 1950, p. 12 ff.

<sup>3</sup> This point is strongly underlined by H. Diem, *Das Problem des Schrift-Kanons* (Th. Studien), 1951.

<sup>4</sup> It has been formulated in an oral discussion with Père J. Daniélou.

<sup>5</sup> O. Cullman, *The Earliest Christian Confessions*, Allenson.

# ARE THERE MORAL HERESIES?

JACQUES LECLERCQ

**I**T IS THE ELEVEN o'clock Mass in a fashionable parish. The preacher comments on a phrase of the gospel: "It is hard for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven." The parishioners, who are stylishly dressed, and wear the best of overcoats and costly furs, listen in obvious ill humor. When they leave the church, Mr. and Mrs. Wilson exchange their impressions. "These young priests are unbearable!" When they get back to their house, Mr. Wilson writes a letter to the Cardinal: "The clergy are preaching politics in the pulpit . . . Will not his Eminence call them to order? Let the clergy preach Christian doctrine! The people have a real need of it . . ."

Christian doctrine?

Mr. Wilson recites the *Credo* faithfully. He believes in all the dogmas of holy religion. He believes in the Holy Trinity, the doctrine of grace, the real presence, and the Holy Catholic Church . . . He is a faithful husband, a good father; he doesn't steal and he doesn't kill . . . As for his fortune, he either inherited it or earned it honestly . . . He pays his employees in accordance with the accepted wage levels. What does religion have to do with the distribution of goods?

Doctrinal teaching is expressed in dogmas: are there any moral dogmas? "And I say to you: Love your enemies; pray for them that persecute you." But nobody does this except for a few heroes, and these saints are universally regarded as exceptions who are more admirable than imitable.

Is this a failing? We do not all seem to be convinced that it is. Is it an *obligation* to love our enemies? Are we failing in our duty when we do not love our enemies, in the same sense and perhaps more seriously than when we miss Mass on Sunday?

Do Our Lord's words represent a simple pious exhortation or do they lay out a *rule*? Does a disciple have the *obligation* of conforming to it?

Can we apply the notion of heresy to cases like these?

**L**ET US DISTINGUISH between moral *doctrine* and moral *practice*.

We are all weak and we all violate certain precepts, but there is no question of heresy on that account: heresy is intellectual.

But it may also happen that a Christian refuses to accept one of Christ's teachings . . . We ought to love our enemies; "Oh, sure, but if I ever get my hands on that guy . . ." All men are brothers; yes, but we are a superior race and we are not called upon to treat those of an inferior race as equals . . . In this case, it is the rule of fraternity that is not accepted. It is not simply being

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violated through weakness; it is being *refused* by the mind. But if heresy is the refusal to accept a Christian doctrine, is this not heresy?

Two striking examples have been given in our time by the social doctrine of the Church and its international teaching. If the popes have judged that they must intervene, it is not because there was a new doctrine to teach, but because Christians—at least, a large percentage of them and including the most notable—had their minds so corrupted that they no longer understood the implications of Christian doctrine. But we know that the teaching of the popes has not been accepted. Those who have conformed to it—I am not speaking of their conduct, but their minds—have been and still are but a small number. The majority have remained indifferent to this teaching, and have continued to assume their own attitudes without taking it into account. They do not protest against the popes, but they make use of this teaching in their own way, or isolate a few texts in order to interpret them in a way that is opposed to their actual meaning. And when an ordinary priest echoes the pontifical instruction, they accuse him of not preaching Christian doctrine.

We remember Pius XI's discouraged words in his Christmas allocution of 1931, when he said that he would not speak of peace because "such an abuse has been made of even these messages that it would seem that proof has been given of the impossibility of taking up this chapter without giving rise to the most contradictory and absurd interpretations . . . Men do not understand or they are not disposed to understand."

We are dealing here with the problem of the adhesion of the mind, not weakness of will.

CERTAIN MORAL DEVIATIONS have sometimes been condemned—for example, in the middle ages, the sexual deviations of certain sects, and later on, some deviations in the matter of homicide or the quietist deviations of the 17th century—but the great heresies which have had the front of the stage in the history of the Church are dogmatic heresies or speculative heresies, on the subject of the Trinity at the end of antiquity, later on, those on grace and the real presence in the Eucharist, and those on the sacraments. These heresies have not been without practical consequences, but they have not directly aimed at action. There is a form of intermediary heresy in that which concerns the Church, in which heresy leads to schism.

But it must be said that the heresies which have brought on great movements in the Church are controversies between theologians. The case of the Reformation is quite clear; Luther is a theologian and the Reformation begins in a Faculty of Theology. This raises certain problems.

If people were won over so easily to the Reformation, was it not in part because they were rather indifferent to the problems that were disputed by theologians? The ordinary people are especially sensitive to the practical repercussions of Christian life, and Protestants often appeared more preoccupied than Catholics with the purity of Christianity. The Church defined doctrine, and anathematized error, but the practical abuses were flagrant, and at the beginning of the crisis, there was little disposition shown to be concerned with

them . . . The Counter-Reformation came later but the evil was done and in many countries it was too late.

Today psychology and the sociology of religion provide means of approach which we did not think of previously. What real place does the doctrine of grace hold in the life of Christians? Here is a Catholic community and here is a Protestant community: they profess different doctrines on grace. But what place do these doctrines hold in the life of the faithful? Do they know them in their theological precision? For the majority of Catholics, cannot the doctrine of grace, such as they understand it, be reduced to simply believing in help from God, the precise character of which is vague?

But then is there a real difference between the content of the conscience of a Catholic and a Protestant? I am speaking here about those who are not theologians, that is to say the rank and file, the majority of fervent Christians. They are attached to their Church by ties of every kind among which the tradition of their environment plays a great part . . . But the problem then is quite different from that which the theologians have posed.

Besides, they themselves have taken this into account. When the moralists ask themselves what are the minimum conditions of explicit faith, that is, the minimum of what must be believed in a conscious manner in order that the sacraments may be validly administered to the dying, they let themselves be satisfied with very little. The ordinary Christian limits himself to an act of confidence in the teaching of the Church . . .

**I**F THE MAJORITY OF CHRISTIANS admit that there are three persons in God and not two or four, if they admit that Christ is really present under the Sacred Species, this is not because they have come to be convinced of this by their studies and reflection, it is because the Church teaches it to them and these doctrines leave them indifferent. It may be that in other times minds were enthusiastic about these problems, but in our day this is not so. These doctrines leave them indifferent because they do not see in what way they change anything in their life. But when a doctrine touches life, their spirit of discussion awakens.

But in our day what concerns every-day life, or what Christians understand to be related to it, is moral theology, especially those teachings which are related to the Christian concept of fraternity. And it is not only moral weakness which opposes the application of these doctrines, but attitudes of mind.

A man is a heretic when he does not admit that all men are brothers; he is a heretic when he does not admit that he ought to love his enemies; he is a heretic when he thinks that he ought to love wealth and try to acquire as much of it as possible, even if he takes pains not to sin and in this way to avoid hell.

We have always thought that the Catholic was defined by a doctrinal adhesion to those truths that are called dogmatic, and we have generally treated the question of orthodoxy as if, from the moment that the dogmatic teaching of the Church was accepted, moral deviations were simply the result of moral

weakness. The question that we are taking up here is that of knowing if moral deviations do not often proceed from intellectual deviations which also have a doctrinal character, since there is a moral doctrine.

As I just said, at the time of the Reformation one of the principal causes of its success was that in many cases Protestants were of higher moral value than Catholics; they were given the name of "the evangelicals," and often they deserved this title more than the Catholics. When Julius II formed a league against Venice with the aid of France, he began to place at the service of the League all his temporal and *spiritual* powers, and as a result placed an interdict on Venice; then, after he shifted his alliances, he waged war against France and shifted his spiritual arms, placing an interdict on France; in all this he does not seem to have had any doubts as to the legitimacy of his action... When the gentry of the 17th century believed it their duty to confront each other in a duel, they did not appear to have had any intellectual hesitation, either. And in our time it is much the same in regard to social justice, or the matter of contraception...

Invincible ignorance, we will be told; they are in good faith, they are under the influence of their environment... But is this not equally true for many Arians in the 4th century, or the reformers of the 16th?

At a distance, we have the impression that dogmatic controversies were simple; but when we study their history from a closer vantage-point, we begin to notice the subtleties of Arianism, Pelagianism or semi-Pelagianism, Baianism and Jansenism, and we begin to be aware that the matter of invincible ignorance has as much relevance here as in moral questions. And we get the impression that one is much more easily excluded from the Church in the case of these dogmatic problems...

Here I will be told perhaps that the Church shows herself to be quite strict in the matter of contraception. On that particular point in fact the Church is insistent in our time, but that is only one point among many others, for morality covers the whole of life.

On these conditions, I will now be told, you are going to expel three-quarters of Christendom from the Church... That's just about what was done during the time of Arianism: there was a moment when the Catholic church kept very few of her members with her. The Church has shown more than once that in the presence of heresy she was ready to lose a great deal, humanly speaking, in order to safeguard the deposit of faith.

But while attention has been given to controversies that are called dogmatic, minds wander on the level of the moral rule which is also a doctrine.

Let us go back to the social teachings of the Church. The Pope speaks; no one contradicts him. But when a simple priest teaches the same doctrine, his words are considered inopportune. We're completely in agreement, they say, the Pope is right, but in the concrete situation around here, this teaching is badly understood and we must avoid exposing people to truths from which they will draw dangerous consequences... Or they say that the people have perverted minds, and will see in the pontifical teachings what can serve as a pretext to justify their unhealthy appetites and dangerous claims...

Since the ordinary priest, curate or pastor, is easily vulnerable, they attack his prudence or the "poor timing" of his action, insisting on an exact understanding of the pontifical teaching. But what they call an exact understanding is an interpretation which reduces the words of the pope to theoretical proposals which would never be applied . . .

In order to enter into the thought of the pope, we must first enter into the spirit of the Gospel, which the Sovereign Pontiffs echo. When the popes take a stand on the subject of some practical realization, this position is customarily full of nuances, to the point of sometimes being enigmatic for someone who does not know the Gospel or does not take it into account. But this is the attitude of a great number of Catholics; they have, on a certain number of points, very stubborn views which cannot in any way be brought into harmony with the Gospel and are impelled by opposing preoccupations; and if they find a text of the pope which can serve their purpose, if taken in isolation, they immediately exploit it—given the opportunity, they would do the same with the Gospel itself. This explains those discouraged words of Pius XI that we quoted a few pages back.

**I**GIVE YOU a new commandment: love one another as I have loved you." Here is something that is clear: we are dealing with a commandment, not an exhortation or a counsel. The manner in which Christ loved us is well known: we ought to love each other as he loved us, in that manner, no other. Do we dare to say that we are not here in the presence of a dogma?

But what the Church suffers from most in the world today is that the mass of humanity does not *see* that it is loved by the Church as Christ loved us. After all, the Church means Christians, and in order that humanity *see* that it is loved in this way, Christians must love men in just this manner.

It is true that the Church—taking the word in the sense of the ecclesiastical organization—teaches that this is what ought to be; it is also true that we can notice in the Church many manifestations of charity which correspond to Christ's word and that the highest authorities of the Church often intervene to defend it against calumnious imputations. Religious authorities and the Catholic press take great care to point up manifestations of Christian charity, and certainly we cannot blame them for it . . .

But it is none the less true that the Wilsons whom we mentioned at the beginning of this article remain numerous and important, that we see them being presented everywhere as model Catholics. They are influential in the Church, because a great number of Church enterprises depend on them, and they peacefully impose their views as the rule of moral orthodoxy.

I say deliberately, rule of *orthodoxy*, for it is a matter of doctrine, not simply of practice.

The Catholic as he is generally conceived, is characterized by his religious practices: he goes to Mass, he goes without meat on Friday; he is not characterized by charity. But this is practice; let us put the question from the doctrinal point of view: the Catholic then is one who *believes* that he must go to Mass and that he must do without meat on Friday, who recognizes that

he is at fault if he does not do this; he is not one who *believes* that he must love his neighbor *as Christ loved us* and who acknowledges himself to be at fault if he does not love him *in that manner*.

Are there moral heresies then? Yes, and they are serious, for they prevent the world from perceiving the benefit of doctrinal orthodoxy. Doctrinal orthodoxy is centered on Christ; it has as its end the maintenance of an exact view of the meaning of Redemption: from the doctrine of the Trinity to that of grace, the Church, the sacraments which are instruments of grace, all doctrine has as its aim to arrive at determining what Christ is, how one may be united to him and what are the conditions required to be his disciple,—and in an efficacious manner. If the Christians' convictions about life are inspired by sources other than the preaching of Christ, the attachment to fundamental truths becomes like a life-giving water which passes through pipes that have been stopped up at the place where this water ought to flow in order to bring about its purifying effects.

The truths that are habitually called dogmatic are indeed fundamental, but what is the purpose of a foundation if nothing is built on it? "Whoever hears the words that I say and puts them into practice will be like one who built his house upon the rock." The rock is the foundation, given by the fundamental doctrines, but humanity cannot make its home on a rock; it must be given a home to live in that is built on a rock. It is moral doctrine which draws the plans of this house, and it is moral practice which builds it; but in order to build the house, we must first know what we want to construct. To limit orthodoxy to fundamental doctrine is to say to humanity while it is camping out during a storm, "Come here and camp on this rock and you will not risk being carried away by the sands." Men will be no less drowned during a typhoon.

Christianity forms a whole; it is necessary to accept it in its entirety. In the preaching of Our Lord everything converges towards that "as I have loved you." We cannot cut the plant from its root, but the root is not the plant, and if the kingdom of God is the tree which springs forth from the mustard seed, still it is necessary that it spring forth . . .

*Translated by JOSEPH E. CUNNEEN*

# NOTES on other Publications

## POLITICAL AND CULTURAL BACKGROUNDS

1

The Committee on International Relations at the University of Notre Dame has published two timely and excellent political studies: *Bolshevism, an Introduction to Soviet Communism*, by Waldemar Gurian, and *Christian Democracy in France and Italy*, by Mario Einaudi and Francois Goguel. (University of Notre Dame Press, 1952). Both volumes are compact analytical inquiries into contemporary historical movements and both these movements—ideological and political-social—in the full context of modern man and society. Gurian's work is essentially an analysis of Marxism-Leninism as a secular religion, but one which established, and was conditioned by, a totalitarian regime in Russia, and subsequently became a world power. Gurian views this pseudo-faith as a "perfectionist utopianism," challenging our own tired and skeptical beliefs and promising to cure our spiritual and social ills. Therein is its attraction and, possibly, its positive meaning: "For it may force us to reflect upon the foundations of our existence and social order. The same movement which denies the conscience of men and replaces belief in social reform by a doctrine of necessary development can become a means of sharpening our social conscience and effectuating social and political reforms."

The second book, on Christian Democracy, describes what may be regarded as a reaction to the Communist challenge—a reflex, however, which must be understood not only in terms of Communism but also in terms of the political and social secularism which preceded it. Goguel's treatment of the MRP in France, and Einaudi's account of the Christian Democrats in Italy seem extremely balanced accounts of this important political movement, dealing realistically with both their shortcomings and the obstacles they have had to overcome.

2

*Goals of Economic Life*, A. D. Ward, editor (Harper). This new book of essays by outstanding Protestant spokesmen in theology and in all fields of the social sciences should be read by all those interested in the relevance of the economic aims of our society to the moral and spiritual life. One might be disturbed and even impatient with Prof. Bouding's rather inadequate analysis of some of the assumptions of liberal capitalism, but his sincere desire for reform within the capitalist structure is beyond question. The general level of the volume is as high as the names of such distinguished contributors as Reinhold Niebuhr, R. M. MacIver, John Clark, Ralph Emerson, and Theodore Greene might suggest. John C. Bennett's reminder that the economic order is not fully autonomous, but "stands under the judgment of God" is perhaps most explicit: in America an idolatry idealizing an institution is "better disguised than in Communism, because it is often expressed through the use of Christian symbols, but it creates great religious and moral conflict in American life."

## 3

*Also noted.* Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn's *Liberty or Equality* (Caxton, 1952), presents the thesis that Catholicism is the friend of liberty and the enemy of democracy; democracy is egalitarian by nature and leads to tyranny. Despite the maze of quotations and references, the author, starting with brutally over-simplified concepts, is attempting to make an apparently inevitable historical line between Hus and Hitler. The whole makes for bad history and muddy political philosophy.

Reinhold Niebuhr contributed a telling criticism of the vacillating and often negative position of European socialism since 1945 in the *YALE REVIEW*, Winter 1953... E. E. Evans-Pritchard's "Religion in primitive society" (*BLACKFRIARS*, May) is a balanced statement on the contribution social anthropology can make to the other subjects concerned with problems of religion... The March *REVIEW OF SOCIAL ECONOMY* contains an article on the Schuman plan by Cyril Zebot, on "The Point Four Program and our Responsibilities to Underdeveloped Areas," by W. Gibbons, and on co-determination in West Germany, by Edmund A. Kurth...

## 4

*Literary Criticism.* The modern literary critic is haunted by the specter of An Incomplete Reading. He stands at some point in a path that leads from the medieval fourfold reading through the system-making German critics of the early nineteenth century (such as August Boeckh, whose eightfold reading of a text is most strangely and sadly ignored today) to the no longer New Critics who have added the processes of Reading by Myth, Reading by Ritual, Reading by Imagery, Reading by Ambiguity... He has paused near such a landmark as Kenneth Burke, who has devoted a career to developing a vocabulary in which to start talking about books.

The critic then with a sense of his responsibilities must limit himself to a practicable number of these approaches to the heart of letters, or he may, in total act of renunciation, turn back to the method of a Matthew Arnold and choose a dogmatic but brilliant *aperçu* to illuminate his target. Francis Fergusson, in *Dante's Drama of the Mind*, subtitled *A Modern Reading of the Purgatorio* (Princeton), makes a handsome effort to combine these methods. He tabulates nine possible ways of progressing through the *Purgatorio* and announces that he has limited himself to three; these three are connected, or inspired, by a thesis. His commentary on details and aspects of Dante's journey owes something to Kenneth Burke for critical terminology, to Erich Auerbach for the concept of *Figura*, and to Charles Singleton for Danteana; it is an unusually warm and ingratiating discussion of certain aesthetic and spiritual facets of the poem.

Not so much can be said of the thesis which was to provide the *anima* of the book. This thesis is of course the one announced some years ago in the *Idea of a Theater*, where Fergusson told us that the *Commedia* is 'the only... work intended to exhaust the possibilities in Aristotle's definition [of tragedy]: to imitate all the modes of human action in ordered and rhythmic relationship.' (It is rather an unscholarly enthusiasm which tells us Dante's

intentions about a definition he never saw, especially after this same paragraph had earlier informed us that Aristotle was 'thinking of *Oedipus Rex*' when he said that tragedy is the imitation of an action; Fergusson employs both these assertions as though they were true.)

This is not the place to develop a quarrel with Fergusson's idea of the theater; through his loaded choice of the *Oedipus Rex*, *Bérénice*, *Tristan and Isolde*, and *Hamlet* as the cornerstones of his theory he was able to describe drama as an essentially timeless, spaceless rhythmic process of self-realization, with certain implications for the group surrounding the central individual. This is an idea which almost totally ignores the specific form and function of drama and takes us back full circle to the medieval understanding of *comedia* and *tragoedia* as transformations of condition, expressed in any medium. (The medieval notion was derived from a society which had no functioning drama; it may be important that Fergusson seems to think that modern dramatists are only shreds and patches of what they should be.)

It turns out to be gratuitous to treat segments of the purgatorial process as 'playlets' with 'tragic rhythm,' with 'stage-directions' and consisting of 'a prologue and four small acts or movements.' This kind of talk makes of drama not a form-and-function, but a metaphor—in Fergusson's word, an analogy—which in this instance is an *ignis fatuus* casting a ghostly light on a collateral path but little light on the functional line of Dante's journey.

## PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

### 1

*Science and Religion* (Cambridge). Charles E. Raven is here concerned not so much with the relation between science and religion but rather with the Christian attitude towards nature. He is inquiring into the "history of natural religion and its proper effects upon Christian theology."

His great erudition is particularly evident in his chapters on the Biblical Attitude Towards Nature, Nature in the Early Church, and St. Albert in the Middle Ages. Though we do not dispute the author's concentration on biologists rather than physicists, it does seem that he has given Gesner a greater historical importance than he is due. His final chapter is an excellent, though cursory, statement of the present relations between science and religion and one of the most forthright indictments yet made by a Christian of the Christian lack of response to the searchings of scientists for a deeper meaning to their discoveries.

### 2

*The Rabbinic Mind* (Bloch). This work of Dr. Max Kadushin is a formidable presentation of the categories and intellectual structure of Rabbinic thought. The book represents a continuation and expansion of the thesis of Kadushin's earlier *Organic Thinking*, in which he tried to establish the psychological and spiritual principles of coherence in Rabbinic thought. Those

who prefer to imagine that the Judaism of the 2nd century was a comparatively arid experience will find here challenging material. For it is Kadushin's purpose to indicate the inner dialectic of Pharisaic Judaism, the dialectic which reflects within the "chosen community" a vision of the divine spirit which is obscured the moment it is examined on any but its own terms. *The Rabbinic Mind* is a valuable presentation of the intellectual glossary of the classic Jewish experience.

## 3

*God and the Unconscious* (Regnery). Father Victor White, treating Christianity as though it is meaningful in itself and relevant to the problems of the day, has written a discriminating study of depth-psychology for the lay reader. Much of the material was widely appreciated when it appeared in various reviews, but the book is a unity, and not a collection of occasional pieces; it also contains Fr. Gerhard Frei's appendix on Jung's conception of the Self in its religious aspects. Father White emphasizes the value of the challenge implicit in Jung's psychology: "Whether we belong to any denomination or none, he (i.e. Jung) challenges us to become more conscious, more responsible, more adult in our religion—or irreligion—if we would not destroy ourselves and our fellows. Western man fools himself if he thinks he has outgrown religion and has no need of God... But he *has* outgrown an infantile religiosity which is no more than an escape mechanism, an outer and theoretic compensation for an inner godlessness in practice."

Father White seems not yet to have been able to read Freud with the same intelligent sympathy with which he has approached Jung. The other general criticism of the book would seem to be that because it is so occupied with the heights and depths of the psyche, more pedestrian levels—on which we mostly live—are all but ignored.

## 4

A rather thorough and suggestive study of "Kierkegaard and Rabbinic Judaism" is presented by Marvin Fox (JUDAISM, April). Kierkegaard's thought has been vigorously challenged for the past decade in Jewish circles, primarily by reason of his thoroughly heterodox version of the Sacrifice of Isaac. Whereas Kierkegaard assumes that utter impossibility of the gap between man and God, Rabbinic thought insists upon the dialectic of utter nearness and utter distance. The Sacrifice of Isaac is viewed by the Rabbis as impossible without the prior challenge of God's justice. Abraham is seen as the progenitor of Job rather than the submissive martyr.

## 5

CROSS CURRENTS is happy to call the attention of its readers to a new periodical, THEOLOGY DIGEST, edited by the Jesuits of St. Mary's College, Kansas, which aims to keep non-professional readers informed of current problems and developments in Catholic theology. The level of the articles chosen in the first issue (Winter 1953) augurs well for the future: Roger Aubert's "Liturgy and the Teaching Church," Yves Congar's "What is a layman?", Joseph Coppens' "The Different Senses of Sacred Scripture," Msgr. H. Francis Davis'

"The Priesthood of the Faithful," etc. The editors will appreciate suggestions as to how they can make their publication more useful.

*Also noted.* Romano Guardini's moving essay, "The Jewish Problem, reflections on responsibility," was translated in the DUBLIN REVIEW (1st Q., 1953) . . . The November LIFE OF THE SPIRIT contained a balanced statement on myth by Ian Hislop . . . Dr. J. W. C. Wand's *What St. Paul Said* (Oxford) is a good exposition by one grounded in the background of the Acts and the Epistles, the history of the time, the actual text (the author has already translated The New Testament), and the knowledge of the literary problems involved . . . The Winter THOUGHT contained an able statement by Charles Donoghue on the non-ideological basis of the American form of government, which ought to be of help in the present confusion of vocabulary in Church-State discussions.

# SUGGESTIONS

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